



Daily Report

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Ligachev Opens Supreme Soviet Session on INF
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[Speech by Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, at a session of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities in the Kremlin Hall of the Council of Nationalities—live]

[Text] Good morning, comrades. Esteemed comrade deputies, our esteemed guests. For the first time in their many years of activity the USSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions and deputies are examining an international treaty on real nuclear disarmament. There is perhaps every reason to say there has never been anything like it in world practice.

A matter of special political significance has been submitted for debate by the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has charged its commissions with examining and giving their conclusions on the treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles signed by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, party Central Committee general secretary, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Washington on 8 December 1987.

Embarking on the fulfillment of my responsible duties, I think I shall express a common view if I say we feel pride in our great motherland and in the peace-loving foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. As well as this, all of us sense the great responsibility placed on us—in this case, responsibility for our country's defense capacity and for international security.

The elaboration and signing of this document were the results, first and foremost, of the Soviet leadership's persistent and enterprising efforts. Note, however, should also be taken of the following. There would be no treaty without reciprocal steps by the U.S. Administration, nor without the support of realistically-thinking politicians in the West and other countries, and of the world progressive public. The signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is, in essence, a practical step toward a rebuilding of international relations based not on confrontation but on active peaceful coexistence and active international cooperation.

If, comrades, one asks the question: What can serve as a guiding line for us deputies in the evaluation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty? The following answer can be given to this question, I think, in the most succinct form: equal and identical security for both the Soviet Union and the United States. When evaluating the Soviet-U.S. treaty we have to take into account, first of all, how it has been

received by the Soviet people, who have always been characterized by a peaceful disposition and by a striving for good relations with all states and all peoples.

I think yesterday's statement by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on Afghanistan is splendid proof of that. I wish to inform you, comrades, that, especially since the treaty, the Soviet-U.S. treaty, was concluded in Washington, a large number of letters in which Soviet citizens approve of and support the historic goals and meaning of the Soviet-U.S. treaty have been received by the Party Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, many departments, and also by newspaper editorial offices, television and radio. At the same time—and we would like to stress this—the Soviet people are asking many questions. They want, as the saying goes, to understand thoroughly what the treaty gives to us and the whole world and how it is going to affect the defense capability of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people are also interested in whether the treaty will be approved by the U.S. Senate. Are there guarantees that the United States will observe it fairly and consistently?

One cannot fail to admit, comrades, that these questions are not fortuitous. We see, in particular, that in the discussion of the treaty in the U.S. Senate there are, along with a striving to seriously understand its essence, quite a few attempts to blacken the treaty, as it were, and to thwart its ratification. In the West, even among high state officials, there are quite a few who are trying to prove, however strange this may seem, that it is precisely in nuclear arms that the world's salvation lies, as nuclear arms, in their view, are just about the best means of struggle against war. It is supposedly thanks to them that there has been no further world carnage for more than 40 years.

Basing themselves on such postulates, if one may call them that, some are trying to use the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles as a pretext for further building up the arsenals of nuclear weapons in the United States and NATO, in general, for the purpose of compensation and modernization, as they put it.

All this, of course, cannot but put us on our guard: Is this not perhaps an outflanking maneuver aimed at wrecking the treaty? The U.S. Administration is attempting to evade the ABM Treaty and create space strike weapons. The Soviet Union's position on the so-called SDI is common knowledge: This position remains as before. A 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons is possible only if the ABM Treaty is strictly observed. For our part, we proceed from the view that after it is ratified by both sides, the Soviet-U.S. treaty should not only be most strictly observed, but should also initiate a process of disarmament at all points of the compass, as the saying goes, in all directions. In particular, it can and must open the way to a 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union,

toward stopping nuclear tests, toward a reduction of tactical nuclear and conventional weapons and armed forces, and toward a ban on chemical weapons.

Alongside this, we are counting on the conclusion and implementation of the treaty being accompanied by expansion and deepening of international economic, scientific and cultural ties, and altogether, it seems to us, by an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations.

One can have no doubt that all the peoples of the world will benefit from this.

But one must not hope that now the cause of disarmament will proceed as a matter of course. There are powerful forces in the United States and Western Europe which are solidly behind militarization of the economy and public life. What is needed here are the efforts of both sides, both the Soviet and the U.S. sides, and the efforts of parliamentarians of all countries, of all forces for peace throughout the world.

It is our task, comrades, to analyze the contents of the treaty and weigh the consequences of its implementation. I should therefore like to inform you of the following: In addition to the opinions of the heads of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USSR ministry of defense, and experts from many other departments, we shall also be interested in the assessments of specialists and scientists regarding the consequences of implementing the treaty and what it would entail in the foreign political, military, financial, economic ecological and other spheres. To this end, taking part in our joint session of the foreign affairs commissions is a large group of deputies who are members of other commissions of both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Naturally, and I would like to emphasize this, we must treat the views of representatives of the Soviet public with full responsibility and, I would say, with full attention. Proceeding from all of this, the commissions will eventually formulate their conclusions, which we shall then present to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Finally, there is the following. Besides Supreme Soviet deputies, there are representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the USSR Ministry of Defense, of the USSR Committee for State Security, and of other interested departments and public organizations, as well as press, television, and radio workers present here. Representatives of fraternal countries—the GDR and the CSSR—are also taking part in the session of the commissions at our invitation.

I would like to announce to you the following. Notification of the session was given to the embassies of a number of foreign countries in the Soviet Union, in particular, to the United States, Britain, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the FRG. That is, those states which are directly affected by the elimination of Soviet and U.S. missiles. The intention was that, if they so wished, they could send their representatives to today's hearings.

As far as I am aware, there are such representatives here in the hall. A similar opportunity to send representatives to our session was also granted to the embassies of all other countries which made such requests to the USSR Supreme Soviet. There is also a substantial group of foreign journalists in the hall.

The following procedure is proposed for this first session of ours: First, we would like to hear reports by the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense of the USSR. After that the debate will begin, and depending on how things progress we shall decide how to continue our work. If this procedure suits the Supreme Soviet deputies then we could begin listening to the reports by our ministers. Are there any other ideas, comrades? No. Then allow me to give the floor to comrade Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs and Politburo member, for his report:

Shevardnadze Address

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[Speech by Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, at session of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities, in the Kremlin Hall of the Council of Nationalities—live]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies! Esteemed guests! The government has presented for your judgment the treaty between the USSR and the United States on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles that was signed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and U.S. President Reagan on 8 December 1987 in Washington. For the first time in the history of the nuclear decades, which announced their arrival with the tragic incineration of Hiroshima, two great powers have agreed on a real reduction in certain modern types of weaponry. Over 2,500 missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are to be eliminated. The Soviet Union is to destroy 1,752 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles while the United States will no longer have any land-based nuclear missiles with a range of between 500 to 5,500 km.

The formulation of the treaty required several years of strenuous labor in which diplomats, military men, technical experts, scientists, political figures, ministers from both sides as well as the highest leaders of our countries took part. The three Soviet-U.S. summit meetings that have taken place since the CPSU Central Committee April 1985 Plenum in Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington were landmarks, which to a decisive degree secured the reaching of agreement. The program for nuclear disarmament put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 was of fundamental significance to the elaboration of the Soviet approach to talks. It was taking into account the realities of this program

and the practical possibilities arising from them that the conceptual and at the same time concrete content of the campaign for a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 was developed in this program. Soviet diplomacy received precise pointers for energetic actions to achieve the aim that had been set out.

When what seemed to be insuperable difficulties arose, creative thinking continued to seek the most purposeful options, the options for solutions. The statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of 28 February 1987, his speech in Prague on 10 April, and his interview for the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA of 21 July of the same year, are vivid examples of a sensible weighing, of flexibility, of the ability to take all factors into account when looking for solutions that are in line with the interests of the Soviet Union and its allies, and also those of other countries, including our partners at negotiations.

The history of the agreement on the treaty is a persuasive illustration of Lenin's idea that nobody will serve peace for us on a plate.

As far as the elaboration of our positions is concerned, these were worked on, under the direct guidance of the Politburo of our party, thoroughly and from all aspects, by various Soviet ministries and departments, and by the relevant departments of the party Central Committee. All of this large-scale and multifaceted work was carried out collectively, with a sense of responsibility and with profound understanding of how important the matter was for the security of the state and for the guaranteeing of international development, which promises a nuclear-free and violence-free future for the whole world.

One should note in particular the important role that was played by our allies, who not only supported the concept of the treaty, but also helped to implement it with their advice and specific proposals. In this sense, the treaty that has been signed is the product of the joint creative work of the whole socialist community, and primarily of the Warsaw Pact member states. Other countries and public movements helped make the accord; speaking in the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, on the whole, the treaty that has been signed is the result of the joint efforts of all peoples; it is our common triumph. The difficulties that were encountered on the way to the treaty were connected both with objective causes—the unprecedented nature of the subject of the treaty—and with subjective ones—the attempt by the United States to gain a unilateral advantage. I shall cite a few examples in connection with this. We had to devote considerable time and effort to overcome the U.S. desire to reserve for itself a right not to destroy the Pershing-2's, but to reequip them into missiles with a shorter range by removing their second stage.

We also succeeded in preventing the U.S. plans to avoid destroying their land-based missiles by converting them into sea-based missiles or even by leaving them in

Europe without nuclear warheads. The U.S. demand for the establishment of a intermediate-range missile reduction procedure under which at first only Soviet missiles would be reduced while U.S. missiles would remain untouched for a fairly lengthy time was also lifted. Our position, implemented in the treaty, that the appearance in the future of new types of missiles being destroyed should not be permitted, ought also to be considered a serious achievement.

The Soviet side has had to do a great deal of work for it to be possible for its conception of the global double-zero to form the core of the agreement reached with the United States. Many people in Washington did not want to get down to zero on the issue of operational-tactical missiles.

The resolution to the very complex problem of the elimination of 72 U.S. nuclear warheads on West German Pershing-1A missiles made a tangible contribution, finally, to moving matters forward to an accord. These warheads, as a result of intensive diplomatic work in September 1987 have been covered by all the relevant destruction procedures envisaged by the treaty. Related to this, the role of the FRG Government should be noted: Its constructive solution on the Pershing-A's assisted the finding of an accord.

Understandably, as Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev] has already noted, there would have been no treaty had the U.S. Administration, our partner in the talks, not displayed at the most important stage preceding the signing a feeling of realism and willingness to find mutually acceptable solutions. Accordingly, the treaty that is under examination is a compromise that has been adjusted in the political, military, and technical respect and a balance of interests and security. Under the circumstances that have come into being, this is the maximum that could realistically be achieved.

Nevertheless, an analysis of public opinion and of the attitudes of Soviet people, to the consideration of which the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments must continue to give increased attention during the working out and implementation of foreign policy shows that the treaty has not been received in a straightforward way [dogovor vostrinyat u nas v strane neodnoznachno] in our country. Permit me first of all to say that the discussion around the treaty that has unfolded in society ought to be welcomed. The absence of indifference on decisions that are being taken and the display of real power on the part of the people are a sign of the changes that are taking place in the country that testify to the affirmation of the process of democratization and the atmosphere of glasnost in our society.

A people's acceptance test [narodnaya priyemka] of the concluded treaty is in effect taking place. Taking into account the question arising among our people and understanding the concern displayed in this connection,

I should like to throw further light on certain significant aspects of this international legal document, and also of the critical comments being heard in the West about the treaty.

First, the liquidation of two classes of contemporary nuclear weapons is undoubtedly a step of tremendous significance. However, it would be a serious error to suppose that by this the answer has already been found to the main question of the nuclear age: Is mankind's survival now guaranteed? The historic weight of this 4-percent reduction in the total of nuclear weapons is not that it gives such a guarantee, it does not, but that these are the first 4 percent by which the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and United States will be reduced. But one must not play down the significance of this step. If you imagine, hypothetically, that these 2,500 missiles that are the subject of this reduction were to be launched against their targets, then there would be a categorical answer to the main question of the nuclear age: the silence of perished civilization on earth.

Second, the treaty, as is known, provides for the liquidation of an unequal quantity of Soviet and U.S. Missiles. The Soviet Union—the figures have already been given—is to destroy more missiles than the United States. Concern is being expressed. Is there not an inequality between the sides inherent in this fact? No, this is not so, since elementary arithmetic is not always able to reliably reflect the military balance, particularly shifts in it. We are indeed going to destroy a greater number of missiles. Why? In the specific historical conditions, an asymmetry of nuclear arsenals has come about in a certain class. The Soviet Union, at the moment of signing the treaty, had more of the missiles in question than the United States. The Americans, in particular, have not fully implemented the NATO program for the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of Pershing-2's and land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe. The true correlation will be measured in the final outcome of the reductions. The outcome envisaged is as follows: Not a single missile of the classes in question possessed by the United States, not a single one by the Soviet Union. The results of successive reductions will be set the same for both sides at the zero level.

Third, the question is being asked: Do not the NATO countries gain more from this than the Warsaw Pact countries, inasmuch as the Soviet Union has agreed to the treaty, while leaving aside for the time being the question of the nuclear potentials of Britain and France? It would be wrong to think so. First of all, we are taking into account that Britain and France have stated their readiness to join the process of nuclear disarmament at a later stage, after the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States have been reduced considerably. At the current levels of armaments, it has turned out to be possible both for us and the Americans to opt for quite deep reduction: without fear for our safety or that of our allies. No side gains military superiority from that. Second, the preservation of a deadlock situation at

the talks over the English and French missile systems would have meant the absence of any accord at all. This would have allowed the United States to build up in Europe the number of its nuclear missiles capable of reaching important targets in Soviet territory and in that of our allies in minutes. Understandably, such a course of events could not suit us. One had, first of all, to solve the task of eliminating one of the most dangerous kinds of weapons, possessing a high level of accuracy and an extremely short flight time. Incidentally, our SS-20 missiles and operational and tactical missiles, which, naturally, were aimed at the corresponding targets in Western Europe, have the same qualities. So there is a true balance of interests here.

Fourth, the question is asked: Was it really necessary for the Soviet Union to eliminate its intermediate-range missiles in Asia, when the United States did not have them there? One of the most important tasks both in politics and military strategy is to foresee and prevent a disadvantageous course of events. The absence of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Asian territory today does not mean that they would not be there by tomorrow. Now, thanks to the concluded treaty, they will not be there. Also, we are proceeding from the fact that our preparedness to eliminate two classes of nuclear missiles in Asia will promote a decrease of U.S. nuclear presence in that region.

Fifth, hardly had the signatures on the treaty pages dried before the most militarist circles of NATO and the United States started talking about the need to compensate for U.S. missiles lost in Western Europe. Essentially the question is of starting a new nuclear arms race on the continent, moving additional nuclear forces into Europe or closer to it, and speeding up arms modernization. Such a course of events would be at variance with the emerging tendency toward reducing nuclear arms and decreasing the nuclear threat.

In the final analysis, the question is: What is more advantageous for the construction of the common European home? Scarcity of weapons in Europe, on the basis of sufficiency for defense, or saturation with weapons? Everyone who is genuinely concerned about the security of the European peoples feels no hesitation in answering this question. It is increasing the scarcity of weapons, and not only nuclear ones, which promises Europe calm and prosperity, and a better recognition among Europeans of how their further destiny is a common one. The Soviet Union, contrary to speculations being put about in the West, is not striving to create additional splits in Europe, to undermine traditional European ties. We take as our premise that the results of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the United States and the signing of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are an important step for the solution of European problems, and equally important for the reduction of the military confrontation between East and West. All of this creates favorable conditions for positive integrational processes, both in Europe and worldwide.

Sixth, certain Western figures assert that the process of nuclear disarmament should have been begun not with nuclear weapons, but with conventional ones. The design is a simple one: to delay nuclear disarmament, or even to stop it. The Soviet Union favors solution of the problem of conventional weapons, and is prepared to have specific discussions at the negotiating table about the asymmetry in armed forces and weapons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization that has arisen, specifying who has more reserves of this or that, and who has less, and is prepared to undertake (?casting of real light on) the advantages in individual kinds of weaponry that exist on both sides. It is altogether intolerable to create pauses in the matter of disarmament, that is a very important premise. We are in favor of moving forward without halting in all areas of disarmament problems, without prior linkage and conditions. Such is the logical form for further development of the process of reduction and elimination of weapons. It is more acceptable for all than the formal logic of the opponents of disarmament.

Allow me to touch on the issue of monitoring [kontrol] separately. In undertaking practical measures to reduce nuclear arms, the Soviet Union cannot allow the other side to attempt to violate the accord or not to wholly fulfill the obligations assumed. In affairs concerning the nerve-centers of state security, there must be no ambiguity in matters related to treaty adherence. For that reason, we made special efforts to supply the treaty with a thoroughly elaborated monitoring [kontrol] system of the utmost reliability, unprecedented in the practice of international relations. Together with the use of national technical means, this regime includes measures, based on cooperation, for on-site inspection, and moreover, at sensitive sites, very sensitive ones—at missile operations bases, ancillary missile facilities, and enterprises for the production of the relevant missile weapons. We proposed to the U.S. side an all-embracing monitoring [kontrol] regime enshrining the very highest standards of openness, glasnost, and depth of mutual verification [proverka]. The Americans did not agree with everything, but in the end solutions of a balanced nature were found. Thus, the treaty embraces facilities on the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as on the territory of allies—the GDR and the CSSR—and five allies of the United States—the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is of primary importance not only on the military-political plane. Its implementation will also be a specific contribution to the developing processes of restructuring in our country, a restructuring that has embraced all spheres of the Soviet people's life. Yegor Kuzmich has already said that the signing of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles creates a very favorable backdrop for resolving the most acute regional conflicts, too, specifically the very convincing and heartfelt statement on Afghanistan that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, our party's Central Committee general secretary, made yesterday shows this.

The treaty shows, first of all, that the increased hopes of breaking the vicious circle of the arms race are real. It creates a more favorable external atmosphere for the Soviet people's creative labor. The treaty will make it possible to release certain human resources, as well as technical and financial means for new production activity. The means that would have been used for maintenance, modernization, and production and replacement of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, but will be saved now, will exceed by far the expenses that will be required to carry out the elimination of missiles.

It is also desirable to bear these considerations in mind during discussion of the question of ratifying the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The treaty presented for the examination of the USSR Supreme Soviet is a good start along the road to subsequent reductions in nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the allied states on both sides of the political line dividing East and West and the whole international community, have accumulated truly invaluable practical experience, making it possible to move on further without decreasing the tempo. One of the highest priority tasks right now is to achieve Soviet-U.S. accord on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. During the December meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States, the foundation was laid that enables work to be completed in the next 4 or 5 months on the corresponding treaty. This aim can be realized by the time of the U.S. President's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. A reduction by one half in the most powerful—in terms of their destructive forces—nuclear strategic arsenals will mean that mankind will travel halfway down the path toward complete elimination of nuclear arms.

Nonetheless, it is still difficult to make any fairly certain forecast of how our talks with the Americans on this issue will proceed. There is something about the behavior of the U.S. side in Geneva that puts us seriously on our guard.

The U.S. delegation, despite the directives endorsed by the U.S. President and the general secretary of the party Central Committee in Washington, thus far clearly does not wish to abandon the debris of the old positions. It is hoped that the forthcoming arrival in Moscow of U.S. Secretary of State Mr Shultz will make it possible to bring the necessary clarity to the further intentions and possibilities of the U.S. Administration as far as the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the observance of the ABM Treaty are concerned.

In the condition of reducing Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, there is undoubtedly going to be an increase in the role of other components of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This relates primarily to the complex of questions on the armed forces and

conventional weapons, dual-purpose weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. We confirm our proposal to the West to come to the table for talks, put our cards on the table, and to try to reach agreement while taking into consideration in so doing the need to observe the interests of security of the sides and of preserving and strengthening strategic stability.

We propose, in particular, that a mutually acceptable mandate should be adopted as soon as possible at the Vienna meeting, on the basis of which it would be possible to begin the previously mentioned negotiations.

The state of affairs regarding banning chemical weapons has recently been giving rise to growing anxiety. I should also like to say a few words in this connection. The United States, as well as France, have set in motion a braking mechanism on the way to adopting an international agreement. Where is the United States leading matters? Washington's policy on this issue is heading perceptibly toward a sharp turn away from an accord. The United States started production of binary chemical weapons at the moment when perceptible progress has been made at the talks aiming toward an urgent conclusion of an all-embracing convention, and when the absolute majority of states participating in the Geneva disarmament conference are voting in favor of concluding such a convention.

The references made by opponents of an agreement to the Soviet Union's superiority in chemical weapons are paradoxical, to say the least. If anyone really does believe in this, then why not opt for concluding a convention, which would eliminate all real and illusory so-called superiorities and lags and would lead to complete equality of states on the basis of a chemical zero.

I repeat: We are in favor of eliminating chemical weapons, and the sooner the better.

In conclusion, I should like to stress the following: The treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is not simply the product of the correct and timely catching of the right moment for the coinciding of the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States, and other states. It is not just the result of the persistence and dynamism of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. The treaty is a tangible manifestation of the deep-seated processes currently taking place of mankind's recognition that its fate is not guaranteed. This is the first act of insight by those in the West who took the nuclear flare over Hiroshima as the guiding star which was to lead them to positions of the political and economic rulers of the world. By the efforts of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and all progressive mankind, this was not destined to happen. The treaty under discussion today is in the final reckoning a reflection as in crystal of the new thinking, the most important tenet of which is taking maximum account of the mutual interests of states and peoples.

Permit me to express the hope that the consideration of the treaty by the Soviet parliament, in conditions of glasnost, and by way of democratic debate, will lead to a responsible state decision for its ratification, giving it the force of law. Then, as Mikhail Sergeyevich said, this treaty will become a historic date in the annals of the desire of people from time immemorial for a world without wars. Thank you. I thank you for your attention.

[Ligachev] Are there any questions for Eduard Amvrosiyevich? Please go ahead.

[Unidentified speaker] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, in the capitals of the NATO countries, judging from reports in the media, there is an active debate about the question of the buildup of nuclear weapons not covered by the intermediate- and shorter-range missile treaty. Thus the possibility is arising for the creation of additional nuclear potential by way of compensation for the dismantled cruise missiles, those which are to be dismantled, the cruise missiles and the Pershings. Does the treaty give us any guarantee against such outflanking maneuvers?

[Unidentified voice in background] [Words indistinct] on behalf of public organizations.

[Shevardnadze] I shall try to answer that very briefly, because in my introduction, and to some extent Yegor Kuzmich also spoke about it, I tried in my report, so to say, to set out our position. But I understand your concern. There is indeed a lot being said just now about compensation, about creating modernization, and so on, and this undoubtedly does give us serious cause for concern, and it also gives our allies cause for concern. I said in my speech that it is now very important to maintain dynamism, not to permit significant pauses in problems of disarmament. If serious intervals were allowed, quite unexpected developments of events would be possible. Therefore, the treaty itself does not give such a guarantee, but it creates good conditions to achieve progress and achieve the reduction of weapons in other fields, too.

[Ligachev] Are there perhaps any more questions, comrades, please? If there are none (and then there are some, give them) in written form, please. Can we accept such a procedure, comrades?

[Unidentified speaker] Yes.

Yazov Favors Ratification

*LD091009 Moscow TASS in English 0957 GMT
9 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov said today that literally every point in the INF Treaty with the United States had been carefully and all-roundly weighted by the Soviet negotiators.

He was speaking in the Kremlin today at a joint meeting of the Soviet parliament's foreign relations commissions.

The commissions—one of the Soviet of the Union and the other of the Soviet of Nationalities—have been entrusted with analyzing the treaty, which provides for scrapping Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, prior to ratification.

Yazov said that once ratified, the treaty would help reduce the risk of outbreak of war, bring down tension and thus increase security.

He added that the Soviet Union intended to press for further real disarmament accords, but kept showing unrelenting concern at the same time for its own security.

If the treaty went into force, the Soviet Union's defense capability, Yazov assured the MP's, would be at a level making it possible to protect the peaceful work of the Soviet people securely.

The defense minister went on to say that preliminary work to fulfil the tasks set to his ministry in connection with the treaty had been proceeding vigorously and would be completed on schedule.

The armed forces had been issued all the essential orders and all the activities connected with preparations for fulfilling the treaty's provisions were being duly supervised, Yazov said.

He said the Defense Ministry's view was that the treaty's entry into force would meet the requirements of the military-political situation and the interests of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty members.

"I believe that this treaty may be ratified," the Soviet defense minister declared.

Commissions Discuss INF

LD090953 Moscow TASS in English 0931 GMT
9 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent Boris Prokhorov:

The foreign relations commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—the two equal chambers of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the USSR—began discussing the INF treaty at a joint session today.

The treaty, which provides for eliminating Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, is thus continuing on the standard path to ratification, as determined by the Soviet law.

Signed in Washington on December 8 by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, it has been submitted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet as the only body constitutionally empowered to decide whether to ratify or not to ratify a treaty signed on behalf of this country.

As is always the case with the more important international agreements submitted for ratification, the Supreme Soviet Presidium has instructed the foreign relations commissions of both parliamentary chambers to consider the INF Treaty.

The panels opened their preliminary hearings today. After listening to reports by the Soviet foreign and defense ministers, the commission members decided to form a special ten-person review group to continue examining all the aspects of the treaty, which will later report its conclusions to the two foreign relations commissions.

The latter will then take a decision on the treaty.

Ratification proper is to be done by convening a meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. In case of the more important agreements, such a session is addressed, as a rule, by the head of government and the treaty is subjected to all-round scrutiny by the members of the Presidium.

If the decision they reach is positive, a decree ratifying the treaty is signed by the president of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the same meeting.

Pact Disarmament Commission Communique
LD060013 Moscow TASS in English 2334 GMT
5 Feb 88

["Communique on Meeting of Commission on Disarmament" —TASS headline]

[Text] Warsaw February 5 TASS—The first session was held in Warsaw on February 2-5 of the special commission of the Warsaw Treaty member countries on disarmament issues at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The delegations included senior representatives of foreign affairs and defence ministers.

The commission was set up in keeping with the decision of the Berlin (May 1987) meeting of the Political Consultative Committee for an exchange of views and information on questions pertaining to a limitation of arms and to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, including a discussion of the initiatives of the allies states and the drawing up of joint proposals in that field.

The heads of the delegations were received by Marian Orzechowski, member of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee, Polish foreign minister.

The deputy foreign ministers exchanged views on the situation in the field of disarmament in the light of the treaty concluded between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and on the main directions of the further actions aimed at ensuring progress on various aspects of disarmament, increasing the level of security in Europe and on the global scale, lending a continuous and irreversible character to the disarmament problem, building a world without nuclear weapons.

The meeting examined the situation at the consultations of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries in Vienna to prepare a mandate for the future talks on a cut in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Agreement has been reached to continue at the commission work on jointly drafting the general concept for the future talks.

Other issues pertaining to the limitation of weapons and to disarmament, including the proposals tabled by the delegation were also discussed.

The meeting of the commission proceeded in a business-like atmosphere, in the spirit of mutual understanding and constructive cooperation.

Bloc Sociologists Confer on Research Project
PM051649 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 88
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Socialist Way of Life"]

[Text] A meeting of sociologists from a number of socialist countries on the problem of comprehensive joint research project on "The Socialist Way of Life" ended at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences 28 January.

They thoroughly discussed the theoretical model of the way of life and a comparative research methodology which will make it possible to analyze the extent to which theoretical concepts reflect actual social processes in the socialist countries, to establish their general and specific development trends, and to draw up scientific recommendations to improve the socialist way of life in light of each fraternal country's specific features. Discovery of the common traits and specific features of the way of life in the different socialist countries will make it possible to develop a comprehensive program for its long-term study.

The meeting noted that positive experience in conducting such research in individual countries already existed. The scientists agreed on the need to adopt a uniform research methodology while also stressing the importance of developing national methodologies. Research documents have been drawn up which make it possible to carry out a comparative analysis of the actual social reality of socialist countries and to clarify the nature and manifestation of the basic law-governed nature of social progress in the historical context of world socialism.

The participants in the meeting outlined both short-term and long-term cooperation plans and recommended the creation of an integrated working body composed of representatives from all socialist states with the aim of coordinating activity and holding in one of the countries an international scientific-theoretical conference on problems of the socialist way of life.

Shikalov Addresses Vienna CSCE Meeting
LD051910 Moscow TASS in English 1838 GMT
5 Feb 88

[Text] Vienna February 5 TASS—TASS correspondent Igor Revyakin reports:

The Soviet delegation is prepared for the quest of mutually acceptable arrangements on the entire complex of burning Mediterranean problems and urges the Western colleagues for this. This was said today at a plenary sitting of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, by member of the Soviet delegation Viktor Shikalov.

The Vienna meeting can and must make a weighty contribution to the normalisation of the situation in the Mediterranean, he said. The participating countries in CSCE can play an important role in this. We urge the delegations of NATO countries to have a more responsible attitude to the consideration of the Mediterranean problems and to correct their essentially negative stand which they have so far been holding in the editorial group on matters related to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. We regard as unacceptable the line of those delegations at deliberate narrowing of the Vienna arrangements on the Mediterranean as compared with what was envisaged by the Final Act.

Viktor Shikalov said that the work of this editorial group on extremely important problems of security is not progressing, even though there is a solid basis for formulating appropriate provisions of the final document of the Vienna meeting. The editorial group is clearly not keeping abreast of the rates of the development of the world situation, the overall positive tendency for the confidence-building, security and disarmament which started manifesting itself in Europe.

Over many years the Mediterranean has been an arena of armed clashes, continued conflicts, one of the sources of the destabilisation of the international situation. The USSR has time back advanced the proposal for turning that region into a zone of stable peace, goodneighbourliness and cooperation, for spreading confidence and security building measures to it. We proposed to withdraw nuclear-capable naval ships of the USSR and the USA from the Mediterranean on a reciprocal basis, to agree on the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries and on the adoption by nuclear powers of the obligation not to use such weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory. The Soviet Union expressed the readiness to go even further. It proposed that the navies of the USSR and the USA be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. All our proposals remain valid.

The conclusion of the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles has made the problem of consolidation of security and stability in the flanks of Europe, also in the Mediterranean even more topical. Its topicality, specifically, is shown by the fact that in the framework of measures which, purportedly are called upon to compensate for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles from Europe, certain persons would like to equip U.S. naval ships with long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. Meanwhile NATO has an obvious advantage in the region as it is and we cannot overlook this. The situation in the area has a bearing on many countries, including the Soviet Union. The USSR has understanding for the initiatives of non-aligned Mediterranean countries aimed at turning the region into a peace zone. We hold that a useful role in a comprehensive solution of the problems could be played by a conference on the Mediterranean similar to the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the way Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia propose.

The fact that the Soviet delegation has now concentrated its attention mainly on the problems of security in the Mediterranean does not mean that we underestimate the need for the development of cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other areas. All this is, certainly, important and will require considerable joint efforts. We are prepared to promote the drafting of the necessary arrangements to this effect, Viktor Shikalov said.

More on CSCE Human Rights Symposium in Venice
PM081245 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 88
Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Symposium Opens"]

[Text] Venice, 4 Feb—An international symposium on the subject "Human Rights and Freedom of Religion in Europe, and the Promotion of Peace in the Spirit of Helsinki" organized on the initiative of the Venetian authorities has opened on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore in the Venetian lagoon.

Delegations from the CSCE states and prominent social, political, and religious figures are taking part in its work. The Soviet delegation is led by V.F. Yakovlev, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation and Deputy Chairman of the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights.

The participants in the symposium were greeted by Professor Carlo Bernini, chairman of the Venice provincial council (executive organ of power).

The Soviet delegation gave a press conference for representatives of the leading Italian mass media and foreign journalists. The members of the delegation gave a detailed account of the democratization process and

glasnost in the Soviet Union, noted the great amount of warm interest shown in these processes abroad, and answered questions which were particularly concerned with the state of religion in the USSR.

Kashlev Addresses Seminar

*LD062010 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1540 GMT 6 Feb 88*

[Excerpts] Venice 6 Feb (TASS)—An international seminar on "Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Europe, for Peace in the Helsinki Spirit," held on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore in the Venetian lagoon on the initiative of Veneto Province authorities, ended today. [passage omitted]

During today's plenary session, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, spoke. He stressed that the issue of human rights and freedom must be viewed in its entirety, taking social, economic, civil, and political rights together. The Soviet representative said there are still forces in the world that seek to examine the issue of human rights in just one set of countries, simultaneously forgetting the scandalous violations of these rights in their own homes—the mass unemployment, the persecution of fighters for peace and of progressive clergymen, and discrimination against religious and national minorities.

The speaker indicated that the discussion of humanitarian issues must be a frank [otkrovennyy] one. He noted that a good continuation of the Venice symposium could be an international conference in Moscow on issues of humanitarian cooperation. We must advance more boldly and decisively toward attaining the noble goal of ensuring human rights in all countries in the name of security, survival, and the prosperity of mankind under democracy and in the spirit of good and fruitful cooperation.

Lomeyko Addresses UN Session on Human Rights

*LD090430 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Geneva February 8 TASS—The participants in the 44th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights underway here started discussing the question of the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples who are under colonial and foreign rule or foreign occupation.

Addressing the session, head of the USSR delegation Vladimir Lomeyko emphasised that even though peoples' right to self-determination is recognized by virtually all states, far from all peoples can exercise it. The most striking example of this is the south of the African Continent. The state policies of apartheid conducted by the Pretoria authorities deny self-determination to millions of native population of the Republic of South

Africa and Namibia who are virtually reduced to the position of slaves in their own countries. Stubborn refusal of the South African authorities to comply with the known decisions of the Security Council on Namibia is an outright challenge to the whole world. The USSR supports the struggle that the Namibian people is waging for independence and self-determination under the guidance of its sole authentic representative—South-West Africa People's Organization. It is only on the basis of complete and undelayed elimination of the apartheid system and withdrawal of any support from the Pretoria regime that complex problems of the south of Africa can be resolved.

Concern is also caused by the continued attempts of some states to call in question the legality of the choice of independent road of development made by separate peoples and attempts to impose their own system of values and priorities on those peoples. The USSR declared more than once that it is for the peoples themselves to decide their destiny without prompts and pressure from the outside, the head of the Soviet delegation said. We note definite positive changes in the situation in Central America and the striving of the states of that region to resolve the existing problems by political means. The USSR also supports the efforts of the countries of South-East Asia for the settlement of the situation in the region. The course of national reconciliation proclaimed by the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea opens the road for the establishment of peace and stability in the region. Important processes of the normalisation of the situation take place also in Afghanistan.

Mankind's future will largely be determined by how we learn to respect each other's interests, views, originality and independence. We see in this the task of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights which should promote complete exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, the head of the USSR delegation said in conclusion.

Economic Official on Results of Joint Enterprises

*LD081238 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—"Eighteen joint-venture enterprises with the participation of the firms of the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, the United States, Japan, Italy, France, Switzerland, and India have been founded in the Soviet Union since the law allowing their establishment was adopted here a year ago. About ten more joint-venture enterprises will be established in the coming months, and talks on 40 projects are under way", Ivan Ivanov, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, said in an interview for the press.

"The first year of the existence of firms with mixed capital has shown: Apprehensions that the reservation of more than a half of capital by the Soviet side would lead

to its 'managerial dictatorship' proved unfounded", Ivanov pointed out. "At present foreign members of the boards of directors function at all joint enterprises and are, for example, in charge of engineering policy, quality control, and export."

"New provisions were introduced half a year ago to legislation to ensure greater flexibility of the functioning of joint enterprises in Soviet territory", Ivan Ivanov went on to say. "In particular, a tax privileges starting point was specified: Two years since the moment of the first announced profit."

"The training of Soviet managerial personnel for joint enterprises has been started at the All-Union Academy of Foreign Trade. Besides, business schools, in which there will be foreign students and teachers along with Soviet ones, are being set up," Ivan Ivanov said.

U.N. To Note Calls for South Atlantic Peace Zone
PM081553 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 88
First Edition p 5

[B. Tuzmukhamedov "Viewpoint": "The Dilemma of the South Atlantic"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The concept of a "peace zone" has firmly entered the international political lexicon. This entails a ban on siting nuclear weapons, cessation of the arms race, elimination of any military presence by states located outside the zone in question, dismantling of foreign bases, and ensuring of guarantees of security. A constituent part of the process of forming peace zones is the creation of preconditions, above all military-political preconditions, for the development of multilateral economic and political cooperation between the states situated within them.

This is, by and large, the content of the initiative that has been put forward and which has already received broad international support on the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. [passage omitted]

The South Atlantic region, although it has not yet become an arena for large-scale military preparations, is attracting growing attention from the United States and its allies. NATO circles are putting forward the idea of extending the bloc's southern flank here and the United States has formed a Southern Armed Forces Joint Command with headquarters in the Panama Canal zone. PROCEEDINGS magazine, which reflects the interests of U.S. militarist circles, has written: "If the U.S. position in Central America deteriorates, and the Panama Canal appears to be in jeopardy (in other words, if transformations unfavorable to U.S. ruling circles occur there—B.T.), the southern tip of South America will assume even greater strategic military importance for the North Atlantic community."

The desire of the region's states to secure themselves against an external threat, to prevent the region from being transformed into an arena of military confrontation, and to develop regional socioeconomic cooperation is growing stronger in response to this policy. This can be done by creating a peace zone. The Brazilian Government is implementing these ideas actively and consistently at international level. Having enlisted the support of Argentina, Uruguay, and a number of other countries on both sides of the Atlantic, Brazil submitted a draft resolution at the 41st UN General Assembly session, which was received positively by the world organization—124 delegations voted for it with 8 abstentions and only 1 (the United States) voted against. The results of the voting at the following 42d session were comparable: 122 for, 8 abstentions, and once again the U.S. delegate found himself on his own. These data speak for themselves.

Thus, the question of a peace zone and cooperation in the South Atlantic have firmly taken a place on the world community's agenda. The UN General Assembly intends to return to it at the next session.

'International Review': INF Treaty, Near East
PM091044 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4

[Arkadiy Maslennikov "International Review": "The World This Week"]

[Text] The famous ancient philosopher said that you cannot step twice into the same river. What he said about a continuously flowing stream of water is also true of the life of human society, where every day brings something new, pushing the past into Lethe, the river of oblivion. All the same, the deep channels along which world politics develops remain constant for a certain period, which enables us to speak of the quite specific face of our contemporary world.

Political Games Over Ratification [subhead]

In the past week, and, moreover, for many weeks before, one of the key avenues of world politics was the struggle over disarmament problems, at the center of which, today, is the question of ratification of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

In the U.S. Congress this week, the sessions of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees continued, addressed by specialists on arms control problems as well as politicians with experience in this area. These debates once again showed that the treaty's ratification today enjoys the support of the vast majority of American politicians, including those whose careers were shaped in the military sphere. Thus in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, testimony was given by five former U.S. defense secretaries—C. Weinberger, H.

Brown, J. Schlesinger, R. McNamara, and E. Richardson, representing all the administrations of recent years, from Kennedy to Reagan. And they all came out in favor of ratifying the treaty.

"I wholeheartedly and unreservedly support the treaty," R. McNamara stated. "I believe it is fully in accordance with U.S. national security interests." According to Richardson, as a result of the elaboration of the treaty "an opportunity opens up for further progress in the arms control sphere."

A justification of the present American Administration's position was put forward in committee by Defense Secretary F. Carlucci, who described the document submitted for ratification as "a major achievement in the arms control sphere." "The INF Treaty," he stated, "reflects the Reagan administration's opinion that arms control agreements should lead to arms reductions and not merely the limitation of their growth."

On Friday the committee members were addressed by representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's parliamentary organ, who had come to Washington specially. "The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles should be ratified," Frinking, chairman of the assembly, stated. "We should make every possible effort to ensure that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles is the first step in the lengthy process of changing the structure of the military balance in Europe and that it lays the foundations for more stable, secure, open, and just East-West relations."

All this does not, of course, mean that the opponents of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, and there are plenty of them across the ocean, have entirely laid down their arms and renounced the further struggle. Realizing that a frontal attack on a document that bears President Reagan's signature will hardly be successful, the opponents of Soviet-U.S. accords have been forced to change their tactics. The crux of the new tactics is to try to delay ratification of the treaty by casting all kinds of doubts on its feasibility and suitability for the United States, and also putting forward amendments that could emasculate the agreement. Senator J. Helms, who is leading this campaign, and his supporters are basically engaged in developing methods that would enable them to torpedo the progress of disarmament, if not now, then in later stages.

It is clear that in order to justify their positions, the treaty's opponents are making fairly effective use of the remarks and actions of representatives of the Reagan administration itself. When you look at the apologetic tone in which some members of the American Government justify the need to ratify the treaty, you cannot help remembering the comparatively recent statements by high-ranking Washington officials about the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," as well as the statements

being repeated to this day (even in official circles) that the USSR supposedly "always deceives," and therefore "cannot be trusted." More grist to this mill is provided by the claims periodically appearing in the American press, citing sometimes the CIA and sometimes the U.S. Department of Defense, that the USSR supposedly now has more intermediate-range missiles than was officially reported, or that the American Government has "no reliable means" of monitoring whether these missiles, which are subject to destruction, could be concealed in the guise of others whose production and combat deployment is not banned by the present treaty.

I repeat, when you read such reports you cannot help thinking that an awareness of the need for the mutual reduction of nuclear arsenals is having great difficulty in making its way into the consciousness of American politicians: Some have already mastered this truth but are acting with one eye on the past; others are stuck halfway; others again regard the very idea of such a reduction as some kind of insane delusion or worse—"Moscow's perfidious intrigues." One thing is beyond doubt: All three categories bear on their consciousness the imprint of decades of anti-Soviet, militarist propaganda, financed and directed by influential political, economic, and military circles across the ocean.

Finally, it is noteworthy that both the supporters and the opponents of the treaty in the United States are fond of citing the opinions of NATO bloc allies. A seemingly bizarre aspect of this is that both camps, to support their positions, appeal to the need to "maintain unity and cohesion" among the bloc members. But although the arguments of the supporters of ratification here appear logical and convincing (the governments of all the NATO countries, without exception, have now come out in support of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles), the opponents of this step are also by no means building their arguments on sand. The position of these circles was perhaps best expressed by E. Galbraith, former U.S. ambassador to France. Speaking at the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said that there are influential forces in Western Europe which are opposed to the Soviet-American treaty because of fears that this step could lead to discord among the NATO members. To justify his thesis, he cited, in particular, French military leaders, who, he said, "utterly reject the Soviet-American agreement first and foremost because it could ultimately lead to the neutralization of the FRG." "The treaty on intermediate-range missiles," E. Galbraith stated, "pushes us down a slope, and we will continue to slide down it until Germany is entirely free from nuclear weapons, neutralized, and demilitarized."

Thus a keen and complex political struggle is developing over the question of ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty by the U.S. Congress, a struggle which draws into its orbit not only various political currents within America, but also its West European allies.

The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, who have to study in detail the treaty, which has already been submitted for their approval, will undoubtedly study the ins and outs of this struggle most attentively. Being committed to ensuring that the treaty is approved and completely fulfilled in all its sections, they, like all Soviet people, cannot remain indifferent, if as a result of particular amendments in the U.S. Congress, the document is weakened and thus cannot reliably guarantee our country's security in the way that ensues from the jointly elaborated text.

Flame of the People's Wrath [subhead]

The flame of the uprising in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories has not yet died down and has now been raging for 2 months. Tel Aviv's rulers respond to the explosion of the people's wrath in the same old, tried and tested way—the stepping up of bloody repressions. In the last 8 weeks, according to PLO figures, 92 Palestinians have died as a result of the bloody terror, about 1,000 have been wounded, and tens of thousands have been left homeless or imprisoned.

"Israel's rulers are pursuing a policy of crushing the Palestinians' bones in the hope of breaking their spirit," an anchorman for the American television company CNN stated recently, commenting on a reportage from a hospital where young Palestinians had been taken for treatment, all with the same "injuries"—fractured extremities and broken heads.

Nonetheless neither bullets, nor sticks, nor prison tortures, nor the expulsion of the movement's activists can break the fighting spirit of the freedom fighters. Not a day goes by without demonstrations and other acts of protest against the violence and terror unleashed by the occupiers, taking place in the cities and villages and the Palestinian-inhabited refugee slum camps.

Nayif Hawatimah, general secretary of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP], who visited PRAVDA the other day, explained that these demonstrations are taking place in an organized way. He said that they are planned and directed by the Joint National Command operating on behalf of the PLO.

The Western press, N. Hawatimah said, persistently spreads stories to the effect that the present uprising flared up spontaneously, and that religious fanatics now play a leading role in it. The aim of such assertions is clear—to belittle the significance of the struggle taking shape by presenting it as a flareup of desperation which could end as suddenly as it began. By depicting the uprising as an instrument in the hands of orthodox Muslim extremists, the authors of such stories would also like to turn international public opinion in other countries against the Palestinians' struggle and thereby weaken support for it. Finally, the spontaneity thesis pursues the goal of confirming the fabrication put about by Israel and its Western patrons to the effect that the

PLO does not have influence among the masses of the Palestinian people and therefore cannot be seen as their sole legitimate representative.

In fact the present people's uprising in the Israeli-occupied lands was from the first and is now under the leadership of the PLO and of specialized organizations operating within its framework, the general secretary of the DFLP went on. All strata of the Palestinian people are taking part—students and young people, workers and peasants, office workers and merchants, Muslims and Christians. As for the main, motive force of the present movement, it is the working people, organized into trade unions.

The uprising in the occupied territories is seriously influencing the entire situation in the Near East. It has already dispelled the myth that the conflict in this region amounts merely to contradictions between the Arab states and Israel, which supposedly could and should be resolved through separate deals between Tel Aviv and its Arab neighbors. Events on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip have once again demonstrated that the basis of the conflict is the expansionist policy of the Israeli ruling circles, the first and main victim of which was the Palestinian people, who are deprived of a homeland. The present dramatic events in the occupied territories have irrefutably proved the total bankruptcy of this policy and the tremendous dangers it entails both for the peoples of the region itself and for the cause of peace throughout the world.

It is no accident that during the recent Security Council vote not only Israel itself but also its old patron, the United States, found themselves in total isolation. The resolution condemning Tel Aviv's policy was voted for even by Washington's most loyal allies in the NATO bloc, who at one time either supported their senior partner or at worst sought to observe a benevolent neutrality toward it. Things have gone so far, THE TIMES reports, that "Britain and its West European partners are planning to issue a joint statement demonstrating that the United States and the West European countries differ considerably in their approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict."

In the attempt to emerge from its international isolation and at the same time help its client, Tel Aviv, Washington hastily put forward a new "initiative," the essence of which amounts to granting the Palestinians limited "self-government" within Israeli borders. This initiative, rightly described as an attempt to whip up the struggle in the occupied territories and avoid a true solution to the question, was at once rejected both by the Palestinians themselves and by the governments of the majority of Arab countries. King Husayn of Jordan, on whose support Washington and Tel Aviv were counting, also pointed to the "urgent need... to speed up the quest for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through convening an international peace conference on the Near East under UN auspices."

Yes, the times are indeed changing. In the Near East, the hands on the clock of history are moving steadily toward the only correct course—the resolution of the region's urgent problems within the framework of an international conference, with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties directly involved in the conflict, including the PLO.

'International Situation—Questions and Answers'
LD060953 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1030 GMT 5 Feb 88

["International Situation—Questions and Answers"] program presented by Sergey Pravdin, international affairs commentator, with Sergey Andreyevich Losev, TASS director general; journalists Boris Andrianov, Igor Surguchev, Andrey Ptashnikov, and Vladimir Pasko; commentator Vyacheslav; and Aleksandr Murashkin, Aden correspondent]

[Excerpts] [Pravdin] Hello, esteemed listeners! Sergey Andreyevich Losev, TASS director general, participates in today's program which is, as usual, based on your letters. We asked him to answer some of your questions connected with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and with the future of USSR-U.S. relations.

Our regular listeners Andrian Nikolayevich and Galina Viktorovna Dodova of Moscow write: We are following the discussion in our country's highest legislative body of the treaty signed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in December last year, and we do not doubt at all that it will be ratified. How is this document being examined in the U.S. Congress? What did its first days show? ask the radio listeners. Comrades Makarov, from the town of Krivozerka, Penza Oblast, and Borotov, from the town Ura-Tyube in the Tajik SSR, and many others ask you to speak about this, too. Sergey Andreyevich, if you please.

[Losev] [passage omitted] There is no doubt that the American people support this treaty. Public opinion polls invariably confirm that two-thirds of Americans are for its ratification. U.S. political observers think that the treaty will be ratified in April or May this year. In other words, it will be ratified on the eve of the new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow.

[Pravdin] Where is the boundary between the opponents and the supporters of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles?

[Losev] The struggle over the treaty, the working out of which took 6 difficult years of talks, is in essence a struggle between the opponents and the supporters of peaceful coexistence. The crazed Americans belonging to the ultra-right do not at all want any agreement with the Soviet Union. Their absurd position was rather precisely described by President Reagan himself after the ultra-right subjected him to malicious and personal attacks for

signing the treaty. I think, stressed Reagan, that some of the people who are most against and who even refuse to grasp the very idea—never mind reaching mutual understanding—these people, in essence, from the bottom of their heart proceed from the fact that war is inevitable and that war between the two superpowers must break out. But despite the persistent efforts of the ultraright to preserve the wall of suspicion and mistrust between our two powers and peoples, the mood towards businesslike and mutually advantageous cooperation is strengthening in the depths of U.S. public opinion, although it is still early to speak about a radical turn in the Soviet-U.S. relations.

[Pravdin] The Shmurze family of Kaluga, Lyubov Nikolayevna Uvarova of Moscow, and also Comrade Beskudelin of Novocherkassk, Bortnikov of Taganrog, Laveykina of Khabarovsk, and Sorokina of the Krapivnaya village in Tula Oblast ask: What are the prospects for the Geneva talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons?

[Losev] At the Geneva talks the Soviet delegation strictly follows the agreements set out in the joint Soviet-U.S. summit statement on the outcome of the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. As the joint statement emphasizes with respect to the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons, the leaders of the two countries instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would oblige the sides to observe the ABM Treaty in the shape in which it was signed in 1972 and not to depart from the ABM Treaty in the course of the agreed time. In other words, a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons is possible only under the conditions of the observance of the ABM Treaty, in the shape in which it was approved in 1972. As is known, this treaty strictly bans the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of an antiballistic missile system in space. This is the core of the Soviet Union's position. Such linkage was acknowledged by both sides in the seventies. The ABM Treaty points out directly that only mutual restraint in the sphere of antiballistic weapons will make it possible to make headway toward reducing strategic offensive weapons. It is not possible to reduce the arms race in one direction and at the same time unleash it in another, even more dangerous direction—space—as is proposed by the U.S. Star Wars program, which is directed at achieving military supremacy and creating first-strike potential.

As Dukakis, governor of the state of Massachusetts and the frontrunner in the candidacy for the U.S. presidency for the Democratic Party, noted, only one obstacle now hampers the conclusion of the treaty on a 50% reduction of strategic weapons of the USSR and United States. This obstacle is the stubbornness with which President Reagan insists on continuing to implement the Star Wars program and on violating the ABM Treaty.

The accord, confirmed in the course of the Washington summit meeting, that the USSR and United States will not be striving for the achievement of military supremacy, has to be honestly observed. The new agreement is

only possible on this basis. George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, will arrive in Moscow on 21 February. According to a statement by a State Department representative, among the themes he will discuss is the progress of the Geneva talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons.

[Pravdin] Vera Dmitriyevna and Tatyana Dmitriyevna Rudneva, of Moscow, and also Yuliya Aleksandrovna Ivanovskaya, of the Moscow Oblast village of Kholshcheviki, as well as other comrades, ask whether progress is in view at the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions in armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

[Losev] Let me remind you that these negotiations have been under way without success since October 1973, even though the socialist countries have done, throughout the entire period, everything possible to get the negotiations out of the impasse. Nevertheless, the problems of reduction can be resolved, given the existence of political will on both sides. What is needed for this is, first and foremost, the renunciation of the quest for one-sided advantages for NATO, which is covered up by fabrications and by the imagined and allegedly manifold superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons.

One must seek a way out not by further increases in arms and armed forces, not by upgrading arms, but by mutual reductions and the elimination of the imbalances. The point of departure should be not some mythical balance of forces in Europe, but the real one that has taken shape over the course of decades. It is self-evident that there can be no one-sided reductions that encroach upon our security. [passage omitted]

[Pravdin] The Korniyenko family of Kharkov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Tyurtyurin of Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Kozlov of Perm, and Nikolay Shishlin from the Tula Oblast village of Kharki, ask whether anything new has emerged regarding stopping nuclear tests by the USSR and the United States.

[Losev] As you are aware, just recently, familiarization visits were made by Soviet and U.S. specialists to the U.S. nuclear testing ground in Nevada and the USSR testing ground near Semipalatinsk. The exchange of visits took place in an atmosphere of constructive cooperation and promoted better understanding of the practical problems connected with preparing for a joint experiment on monitoring [kontrol] the yield of nuclear explosions. The planned experiment will promote ratification by the U.S. Senate of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of 1974 on limiting underground tests of nuclear weapons, and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. From the Soviet point of view, the main purpose of the reciprocal visits to testing grounds and of the forthcoming experiment is to bring about a

complete ban on nuclear tests, which could become an effective brake on the development [sozdaniye] of new, and the modernization of existing, means of mass destruction.

This is far from being the only issue where real progress is possible. There are chances for completing the work on an international convention on banning and destroying chemical weapons, on eliminating shorter-range missile weapons in Europe. It is important not to stop at what has been achieved, but to advance persistently and to seek outcomes and solutions to the most difficult problems, in the name of creating a nuclear-free world and strengthening international security.

[Pravdin] Listener Sergey Mikhailovich Gorbikov from the Novosibirsk Oblast town of Cherepanovo asks us to discuss the causes of the so-called tanker war in the Persian Gulf, its victims, and the prospects for a settlement. [passage omitted] I would like to stress in particular that the tanker war is fierce, senseless, and hopeless—just like, incidentally, the Iran-Iraq conflict itself. The warring sides, deprived of opportunities to win any sort of real advantages on the battlefield, are using all possible means, without counting the cost, to inflict strikes against shipping. They are thereby opening the way to further escalation of the conflict and increased interference in it by the imperialist forces, which are pursuing their own aggressive aims. It should be noted that in order to form in the Persian Gulf its own naval and air force combat fist, the United States took advantage precisely of the aggravation of tension in the Persian Gulf and the expansion of the tanker war. Washington uses as an explanation for all this the fact that the largest oil reserves in the nonsocialist world are to be found in the Persian Gulf countries; and the United States, so it says, is safeguarding the freedom of navigation. The reserves of black gold in this region are indeed huge, and U.S. warships are escorting Kuwaiti tankers sailing under the U.S. flag.

But there is something else, it is true: The U.S. naval and air force armada in the Gulf exceeds all possible needs and has already itself become a source of regional tension. Our country met the request of the Kuwaiti Government to lease it three tankers, and three Soviet minesweepers and a destroyer arrived in the Gulf to escort these. The United States, on the other hand, keeps in the Gulf battleships, and aircraft carriers, missile cruisers, nuclear submarines, and even landing craft.

But let us now talk about possible ways of halting the tanker war, which are, incidentally, not in sight yet. Of course, the best way of all would be an end to the Iran-Iraq armed conflict itself, which would, of course, put an end to the tanker war, too. But despite the efforts of the United Nations, the Arab League states, and a number of other countries there has as yet been no success in settling this conflict. One step toward ending the tanker war would, no doubt, be the replacement of naval ships belonging to nonlittoral countries in the

Persian Gulf zone by a group of naval forces established under United Nations aegis—as was proposed by the Soviet Union. But even this initiative has been blocked by the United States. Now virtually every day brings news of more and more victims of the tanker war. [passage omitted: Boris Andrianov answers a question on Cambodia]

[Pravdin] The Nayokokuskul family and Comrade Ivanov from the Moscow Oblast town of Zagorsk, ask about the role of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon, and their powers. Comrade Ivanov asks in his letter, in particular, about the number of these troops, who their commander in chief is, and what it costs the United Nations to maintain them. My colleague Igor Surguchev answers this question.

[Surguchev] The UN Interim Forces in Lebanon were formed almost 10 years ago by decision of the Security Council. The other day, the council extended their mandate for another 6 months. [passage omitted] As is known, the mandate of the Blue Berets, who were sent to southern Lebanon following Israel's direct aggression against that country, sees their role as an important factor in preventing or restraining the conflict between the warring sides, that is, between Israel and the Lebanese national progressive forces, as well as the Palestinians. In principle, the task of the UN troops, according to the mandate, is to assist the Lebanese Government to restore its sovereignty and control over the entire territory of the country, and to ensure peace and security in the region. For the moment, they are not succeeding in carrying out this task through the fault of Israel, which, in contravention of the UN resolutions, has still not withdrawn its troops from the narrow border strip of Lebanese territory. [passage omitted] The presence of the Blue Berets does indeed exert a certain positive influence on the situation. Thanks to that presence, the scale of violence and confrontations in southern Lebanon is limited to a certain degree. [passage omitted] The main thing, though, is that the presence of the UN troops symbolizes the determination of the world community to bring about the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty over the whole of the south of the country. [passage omitted]

Their position in southern Lebanon is not an easy one. The troops of the world organization are not a belligerent forces; they are a sort of buffer between the aggressor and his victim. The UN troops and officers are therefore armed only with light firearms and do not have the right to open fire first.

Why are there no Soviet servicemen among them, our listener also asks? This question involuntarily gives rise to a counterquestion from me: Why should they be there? Is there any need for them? I assume there there never has been any such need, nor is there any now since the complement of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon is

complete. [passage omitted: Ptashnikov on U.S. unemployment; Pasko on currency questions; Lavrentyev on Chilean strikes; Murashkin on Soviet-Yemeni archaeological expedition]

'Top Priority' Program on East-West Talks

LD061516 Moscow in English to North America 0001
GMT 6 Feb 88

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner, presenting "Top Priority". With me on the panel, Drs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov.

One of the things that seems to have emerged after the summit in Washington is an agreement by both sides, a tacit agreement, that top government officials should meet on a regular basis. We see now, if we look back, that the meetings between Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz were instrumental in achieving the INF Treaty. As a matter of fact, sometimes it seemed they worked as firemen, coming in when the discussions were deadlocked. Now, as you know, and this was announced in Washington, Mr Shultz and Mr Shevardnadze are going to meet on a regular basis. Taking it one step further, we now know that there is going to be a meeting between the top defense figures, Mr Carlucci on the one hand and Marshal Yazov on the other.

[Bogdanov] General of the Army! Sorry, he's not yet marshal, Vladimir. I'm sorry.

[Pozner] Well, he won't be angry at me for my having said that!

[Bogdanov] I wouldn't like to mislead our American listeners!

[Pozner] You're absolutely right, right. In the past, incidentally, the idea of the top defense people meeting had existed, but Mr Weinberger more or less torpedoed it effectively. Now there's going to be a meeting, in Bern, I believe, between these two people.

In other words, we're seeing this, and there's also now the idea of having annual summits. Annual summits, not only summits to sign some very, very important documents and to achieve some very important agreements but summits simply to discuss major issues, summits that would permit the leaders of both countries to be in regular touch with each other, not simply through the red line, the hot line, and through letters and what have you, but personally. My question to you is: How do these developments strike you, to begin with? And we'll move on from there to other things.

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, let me say something unconventional, maybe something which you would not like and some other people will not like too, but I feel like saying that. I believe that we are witnessing an emergence of the new scheme of talks, qualitatively new scheme, qualitatively new, if you like, system of talks between states. Not only superpowers but between states. What do I mean to say? I mean to say that the old, traditional structure of talks is no more efficient. Do you know why? Because it's again bureaucratic enterprise. When you leave the most important problems of arms control, of political relations, to the so-called expert level, technocratic level, you are doomed to failure. That's the experience of many, many years—failure in the sense that you have not had (?will) at both ends, no; people are trying to achieve some results, but since they are trained in such a way, and their way of thinking is very different from the political way of thinking, they are trying to play around the table very long, bureaucratic games with very complicated bureaucratic cards, and at one stage or the other the political level gets impatient, gets upset, because they see there is no move ahead. And we have witnessed that at Reykjavik. We have witnessed that in many other places. So my feeling is that we have reached a stage when the political level, or decision-making level, by instinct if you like, not by some decree or some decision but by some political instinct, they took a decision to take the most important questions into their own hands because their experience tells them when they deal with that they reach a success. When they leave all that to the bureaucratic level or expert-like level, it drags on for years, for years and even for decades.

Now, you have mentioned that a number of meetings will take place on the regular basis, and that proves my view. It's not a theory I'm trying to expose; it's just, (?I mean), by that theory, maybe I will express it one day more coherently but, Sergey, do you agree with my, there is something in my...

[Pozner interrupts] Yes, please, Dr Plekhanov.

[Plekhanov] This is a new structure of talks, and hopefully this will help move forward the cause of disarmament. In the past, we in the Soviet Union have been rather skeptical toward the idea that if there are serious differences over substance—and no matter how you perfect the process, you're not going to get off the dead center [as heard]—however, it's turning out that the process is important in itself because when we are talking about the process of political meetings, summit meetings, whether it be at the level of the President and the general secretary or at the level of the foreign minister, you are faced with a situation where big political stakes are involved. And simply talking and then falling apart without achieving any significant results does not look good. It questions the efficiency of top political leadership. So when you get those people involved, and when you get them to tangle with the...to tackle the most thorny issues of the talks, of arms

reduction, then it's better of course, even if the substantive differences still remain, I mean as a means of attacking those differences, trying to resolve them, of course that is more efficient. And besides, there is a lot of good things that can be said in favor of a continuing dialogue which builds up a momentum of its own, which eliminates the worst stereotypes, because when the sides are not talking to each other, even in personal, interpersonal relations, that leads to a build-up of negative feeling, enemy images, all kinds of: Well, if I'm not talking with them, maybe I should not talk with them; maybe it's impossible to talk with them because they are so bad and we are so good.

[Pozner] Let me interrupt you here for 1 minute. First of all, what you said, Dr Bogdanov—I don't see why anyone would dislike it. I think most people would like it.

[Bogdanov] I will explain to you why. Because you have a number of so-called experts, professionals, technocrats, you know at both sides and when they hear what I said they will kill me, maybe, because...

[Pozner interrupts] Well, we'll protect you.

[Bogdanov] Please do protect me!

[Pozner] I did want to finish my thought. And my thought is as follows: Let me ask a very unstandard kind of question. To what degree do you think personal contacts between top-ranking government officials and leadership are important in the process of negotiations and agreement?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, my view is very precise on that, and my experience tells me that the chemistry between two leaders is very important. Without chemistry, even with very good political lines, ideas—they are doomed to failure. So I insist, chemistry is very important.

[Plekhanov] The chemical factor in the negotiations.

[Bogdanov] Yes, the chemical factor in the negotiations. But at the same time, you have such a notion as national interests. That is beyond any chemistry. But at the same if you have a chemistry, if you have mutual understanding and mutual liking, which is not going beyond your national interest, it's very helpful.

[Pozner] What if you have a mutual dislike? What happens then?

[Bogdanov] If you have a mutual [dislike], then it's bad; it's very bad.

[Pozner] It makes it more difficult.

[Bogdanov] It makes it not only more difficult; sometimes it makes it impossible.

[Plekhanov] Like in '61, the...

[Bogdanov interrupts] Like in '61, and we had such...

[Pozner interrupts] Meaning? Sixty-one, meaning what?

[Plekhanov] The meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy...

[Bogdanov interrupts] And Kennedy in Vienna.

[Plekhanov] Which had a very negative effect.

[Bogdanov] A very negative effect and which brought us back for many years in trying to build a bridge between us and them, the Americans. So I believe in chemistry, and at the same time, I believe in the limitation of national interest. How to combine both in such a way that you make your talks efficient, that's an art I would say, or craft. I don't know what.

[Pozner] Let us then say, let us agree that these regular meetings that are slated—and perhaps even regular summits—are basically a good thing and that they have come from a new understanding and a new approach, stepping away from the traditional, stepping away from the generally accepted and, if you wish, new thinking being applied in this area. Having said that, how do you feel about the fact that with all of this new thinking, with all of these new approaches, we keep getting very contradictory messages? Just recently, I believe it was, President Reagan spoke about the Bigeye binary chemical bomb, saying it is essential to the national security of the United States and that full-scale production would begin in 1990. Now this is the same President Reagan who is backing the INF Treaty, who is talking about annual summits? How do you marry these things? I mean, how does one put the two together and see a complete picture?

[Plekhanov] Well, it's not a unique situation when a political leader tries to be all things to all people, and President Reagan comes from a very hard right-wing tradition and a very hard right-wing movement in the United States which is hurt by this trend toward disarmament which was started of late, and hurt by other things which the right wing does not like. It sees the ground slipping from under their feet. And therefore, I think they apply their pressures, and they find a recipient ear from the President, who is still very much with them on a lot of issues. From the point of view of common sense—and not only here in the East but in West Europe, too—just the other day there was a conference in Geneva when a lot of Western European leaders spoke, including Genscher, the foreign minister of West Germany, and the Italian foreign minister—they all spoke in favor of a speedy conclusion of the chemical weapons talks, total elimination of chemical weapons. So there is a strong consensus in favor of elimination of chemical weapons....

[Bogdanov interrupts] But at the same time, this very President has to, all the time, to confirm to his political base that; I'm tough with those Russians! And my impression is that his choices are every day narrower and narrower. What is left for him, just to demonstrate how tough he is with the Russians...?

[Plekhanov interrupts] Well, he did try in Nicaragua; he lost!

[Bogdanov] Yes, he lost.

[Pozner] That is a very, very major defeat....

[Bogdanov interrupts] Very major defeat, and I think with very major political consequences. Then what is left to this President? Some toys like....

[Plekhanov interrupts] Bigeye.

[Bogdanov] Like Bigeye. Just to satisfy some people—we know them by names, I wouldn't like to cite their names here—but of course they feel very, very satisfied: Our President showed those Russians!

[Pozner] Dr Bogdanov, if you think that's the case, if you believe that it's a case of the President simply having to play a certain role, then don't you think that the people he's playing the role for can see through it and understand what he's doing? And isn't there a danger in that sense, on the one hand? On the other hand, is there not another kind of danger—that while we will destroy the INF forces and while we will discuss limitations and 50% cuts on offensive strategic nuclear weapons other weapons, very sophisticated weapons, very powerful weapons, are going to be built? Is there not this kind of, this two-pronged thing happening? I mean, the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before the committee on the INF Treaty that it is good; it's equitable; it's verifiable, but, but we should put a lot more money now into European conventional and nuclear weapons that are left in Europe. Now...

[Bogdanov interrupts] Yes, yes, you are right. I agree with you. But this is only the measure of both, the measure of both. I mean, both are there and an attempt to replace nuclear-going [as heard] toys with some new things on one hand. But on the other hand, it's a political gesture to satisfy his political spectrum. But I quite agree with you, Vladimir. That's an explanation, nothing else. It does explain, but it doesn't help. It is not less dangerous if you explain it. It is still dangerous.

[Plekhanov] That's right. There's a kind of competition between two lines in U.S. foreign policy, the old line and the new line if you will, to simplify it to the utmost. And of course the rearmament proponents, they will use every means possible in order to continue building up weapons, and they will cry bloody murder after things like the INF agreement, using it as a pretext in order to get some new things. Especially now that the budget

limits are becoming more stringent, there will be a lot of commotion in those circles in favor of some new arms systems. Like, for instance, the Stealth bomber, the recent decision to award a contract on the Stealth bomber, which could be a very dangerous development

[Pozner] Do you think that perhaps in view of this entrenched force in the United States that seeks to somehow, if not bypass, somehow deal with the fact that the two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, are finding ways to ban and to destroy nuclear weapons, this force is attempting somehow to get its thing done? Do you think in that area the fact that the leadership is going to be meeting regularly can play a positive role in somehow blocking this type of (?atmosphere)?

[Bogdanov] Look, if I were a congressman appropriating money for something, I know that my secretary of defense is going to meet the other guy in 2-3 days' time, then I come to know that they will be meeting regularly,

so I will think—and that's very, very, very human—why in hell I should appropriate bucks for something; maybe those guys will talk to each other, they'll get some disarmament agreement or something; instead of spending money we'll be saving money because of that.

In that sense all those meetings, I believe, have very big importance, psychological importance. But at the same time I'm not so naive as to believe that all American senators [chuckles] and congressmen will think along those lines. Our political leaders become every day more and more educated, more and more sophisticated, because they learn more they are themselves in the political process. They learn more. They are reaching, if you like, expert-like level and I believe that's very important.

[Pozner] Thank you very much, Dr Bogdanov, Dr Plekhanov. On behalf of "Top Priority," this is Vladimir Pozner wishing you all good listening. Tune in a week from today at the same time.

United States & Canada

'Full Text' of IZVESTIYA Editorial on SDI

LD081545 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1430 GMT 8 Feb 88

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Feb (TASS)—IZVESTIYA publishes an editorial article [redaktsionnaya statya] devoted to the progress of work on the draft of a new agreement on a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms. The full text of the article follows below:

"In the Soviet Union and the United States, the process of ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has begun. Meanwhile, in Geneva, the Soviet and U.S. delegations are working on the draft of a new agreement on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms.

The need to halve existing armories was stated by the USSR and United States at the summit meeting in Reykjavik. The chief obstacle, which at the time prevented good intentions from issuing in a specific accord, was Washington's stand on SDI. To reduce strategic armories on earth, only then to take an armada of nuclear strike weapons into space, as the United States insisted on doing, was an approach to disarmament which the USSR could not agree to.

All talk of the "defensive" nature of the SDI program is intended for the uninformed. Those who know of it other than by hearsay—scientists, politicians like former defense secretary R. McNamara—are convinced that there is sense in developing [sozdavat] the Star Wars program only if the United States puts its stake on inflicting a first nuclear strike. Only if this is opted for will it be possible to hope that the SDI will in some way help give protection from enemy missiles that get through intact. In any other case, the SDI will be no more efficient than sheltering from the rain under a sieve.

At the last summit meeting, the arguments of the Soviet side seemed at last to meet with understanding from the U.S. leadership. Evidence of this is the Soviet-U.S. joint summit statement, where it is written in black and white: "Taking account of the preparation for a treaty on strategic offensive weapons, the leaders of the two countries have also commissioned their delegations in Geneva to draw up an accord which would oblige the sides to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, in the process of carrying out research, development [razrabotki] and, where necessary, testing, which are permitted according to the ABM Treaty, and not to depart from the ABM Treaty during the agreed period."

On the basis of the accords reached in Washington during the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, both delegations in Geneva received precise instructions: to work on the draft of a new treaty on a 50% cut in strategic offensive weapons. The joint statement contains not a single word about any sort of "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty nor about a "green light" for the Star Wars program. Research, development [razrabotki] or even tests can be carried out, without going beyond the limits mapped out by the ABM Treaty, and without engaging in one-sided arbitrary interpretations of it. This relates primarily to Article V, in accordance with which the sides assume the obligation "not to create [sozdavat], test, or deploy [razvertyvat] systems or components or sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM."

It is stated, as we can see, with the utmost clarity: This is not permitted, without any "buts" or "neverthelesses."

And yet... at the end of January, the U.S. delegation in Geneva submitted a draft treaty between the United States and the USSR on certain measures to promote the transition, on a basis of cooperation, to the deployment of a future strategic defense against ballistic missiles. The title is enough to make it clear that the White House had again returned to its idee fixe of 'Star Wars'. It was as if the accord ratified at summit level had never been.

THE WASHINGTON POST, one of the newspapers most in the know about the secrets of the White House, explains the reasons for this sudden change of course: 'According to U.S. officials, in response to a secret protest from the joint chiefs of staff, President Reagan renounced the position adopted at the December summit meeting with the Soviet leader, M.S. Gorbachev....

Reagan secretly approved instructions to the U.S. representatives at the Geneva talks suggesting that they demand that the Soviet Union agree to the disputed "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, which will permit conditions close to the real ones for testing SDI elements in space."

The reality at present is this: Instead of speeding up the formulation of a document on eliminating half the stocks of strategic offensive weapons, which could be signed at the next summit meeting in Moscow in the first half of this year, the U.S. draft throws participants in the talks back to their old positions. There is a threat that the whole point will be lost in fruitless bandying of words about SDI, although this theme has already been "gone through" at the highest level. And at that time, the sides were not found to have any points that were not clear. The Soviet draft protocol to the treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons, a protocol based on the recent Soviet-U.S. summit accord, did not contain any, at any rate.

The current U.S. Administration knows full well that the USSR will not sanction the opening of a new channel for the arms race, this time in space. If the White House has seriously decided to go back on its recent pledges, it will have to explain for itself to the world community why the process of nuclear missile disarmament has come to a standstill.

As always in such cases, one would like to hope that the Americans have not yet said their final word at the talks. One would also like to hope that the policy of the United States will at some time become more predictable and not subject to sudden ups and downs, depending upon whether or not they are going to manage to develop some new "wonder weapon." After all, Washington has pledged itself before the whole world not to seek unilateral military advantages.

The hopes for a favorable outcome to the talks, which is awaited throughout the world, are not groundless: The United States has shown examples of political good sense. Why shouldn't they act in the same way on this occasion, too? The experience that has been built up in the nuclear age has shown that it is easier to create new types of weapons of mass destruction. But they have not added to anyone's security. On the contrary, it is precisely as a result of the postwar arms race that the world has found itself faced with the dilemma of whether it is to be or not to be. It is much more difficult to reach agreement afterwards on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The start to nuclear missile disarmament was made in Washington when the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed. Now the world has a right to expect reassuring reports from Geneva.

'Real Struggle' Seen in Senate Over INF Pact
PM081455 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 88 Second Edition p 3

[D. Klimov article: "'Ultras' Resort to Ruses. On the Course of the U.S. Senate Discussion of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Hearings on the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles began in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 January. It should be pointed out that the process of the U.S. Congress' examination of international treaties is sometimes not quite accurately called ratification, whereas under the U.S. Constitution this is just one element of it. The Senate, the chamber of the U.S. supreme legislative organ in which concluded agreements are discussed, considers them and gives its "counsel and consent" to the President, after which the latter has the right to implement the treaty's ratification.

Ultraright-wing U.S. forces, which invariably oppose any steps toward nuclear disarmament, are attempting to make the process of the Senate's examination of the INF Treaty as complex as possible. For the treaty to secure

Senate approval, at least 67 of the 100 senators must vote for it. It is essentially a question of a struggle for the 34 votes which could torpedo the treaty.

Long before this agreement was signed, a number of ultraconservative U.S. organizations attacked it fiercely. They were suggesting to the U.S. Joe Public that this agreement would lead almost to unilateral disarmament in the face of the Soviet Union's "huge military superiority" and urging him to pressure the Senate to persuade the legislators to oppose it. That campaign was given a new boost, as it were, on the eve of 25 January. Hundreds of thousands more messages—some of them tape-recorded—were sent to senators and their voters asking them to resolutely reject the treaty. Advertisements were also used, as is the tradition in such campaigns in the United States.

Nevertheless, a public opinion poll conducted by THE LOS ANGELES TIMES shows that, despite the right-wingers' vigorous activity, 72% of Americans support the treaty. Of all those polled, just 11% opposed ratification.

The candidates for the country's presidency have also been forced to take account of the positive attitude of the majority of Americans toward the treaty. Observers reckon that voters are more likely to support a presidential candidate who favors the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. This has also been shown by recent events in Iowa, where the election race has begun.

But what has happened in the Senate? The discussion that has gone on since 25 January about the treaty attests to the senators' growing support for it. Right after the treaty was signed, according to the assessment of Senator A. Cranston, deputy leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, something of the order of 20 senators might have opposed this agreement, but he now believes that just 10-12 of the 100 senators will vote against it. A similar opinion is also voiced by Republican Senator J. Danforth, who believes that the treaty will be approved by 85 to 15.

But this certainly does not mean that right-wingers have abandoned the struggle and laid down their "arms." On the very first day of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, Senator J. Helms submitted a 180-page memorandum stuffed with all sorts of "arguments" against the treaty. What is more, he tries to sow wild rumors when addressing the Senate. What, for example, is the worth of one statement by him that "it is a bad treaty because it does not provide for the destruction of nuclear warheads"?

U.S. right-wingers intend to push through all sorts of amendments to the treaty which would emasculate it of meaning and require a new round of talks. So-called "patriotic" amendments could also play a negative role in the process of examining this agreement. "The classic method for preventing ratification is to adopt 'patriotic' amendments to the INF Treaty that are impossible to

vote against," J. Fisher, president of the American Security Council, a conservative organization that actively opposed the SALT I and SALT II Treaties in the past, quite frankly explained in this connection.

Senators opposed to the treaty insist on the need to make ratification dependent on a number of points: a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, a link with conventional arms, the question of human rights—in the U.S. interpretation, of course—and so forth. Thus, Senator L. Pressler declared that he will, in all probability, submit an amendment linking the validation of the INF Treaty "with the attainment of parity in conventional arms in Europe."

Opponents of nuclear disarmament devote special attention to those verification measures which are designed to ensure the reliable fulfillment of all the treaty's provisions. Even though President Reagan has declared that "the most extensive verification measures in all history" have been envisaged, right-wingers are seeking to portray them as inadequate. Senator Helms, for example, discourses on the "considerable military advantages" which the USSR would acquire as a result of "secretly retaining SS-20 missiles." On the other hand, a certain section of the U.S. "hawks" expresses the directly opposite opinion. They believe that the monitoring measures "jeopardize U.S. security" because, from their viewpoint, they go too far.

Conservatives are also concerned about something else. Both in Congress and in the country as a whole, there is growing understanding of the treaty's significance also from the viewpoint that it marks the beginning of the overall process of nuclear disarmament. Congressman L. Hamilton declared that "the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has created a basis for strengthening international stability and is a precondition for new arms control agreements—which constitutes its chief meaning." Senator A. Cranston said that this is "a first step that could lead in the future to the elaboration of new accords on reducing strategic arms."

But this is precisely what the U.S. "hawks" do not like. Characteristic in this respect are statements by R. Viguerie, who aspires to the role of leader among right-wingers, and by G. Phillips, another U.S. "ultra." According to them, the President has "revived the disastrous policy of detente." With their statements against the INF Treaty, they are trying to prevent the further buildup of the nuclear disarmament process and the adoption of other agreements leading to the deepening of this process. This is precisely why they have activated their efforts aimed at preventing the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms.

It would be premature to say how further events will develop in the Senate. However, it is obvious that a real struggle is being waged over the INF Treaty in the Senate.

Senate Report on SS-20 Concealment Ridiculed
PM091005 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Feb 88 p 9

[Own correspondent Iona Andronov dispatch: "Top Secret. Solution of the Sinister Pseudonym"]

[Text] New York—Every evening from Monday to Saturday MCA radio transmits Barry Farber's 2-hour "talk show." A well-known publicist and public figure, he is at the same time an uncommonly convinced anticommunist. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reproduced an example of his utter anti-Sovietism last spring. That is possibly why he periodically invites LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's correspondent to take part in bitter radio disputes. Thus, last week Barry once again issued me with a challenge over the telephone:

"If you're not afraid, ha ha, then this evening try to dispute over the radio Senator Helms' call to abandon the flawed Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles between the USSR and the United States."

The Senate is into its 2d week of discussion of the upcoming ratification of this Soviet-U.S. Treaty. Six Republican senators headed by Jesse Helms virulently oppose it. However, strangely enough, he was not the subject of most of the irrepressible Barry's arguments with me over the radio. He tried to find out by every means possible: Who is Aleksandr Prokhanov? Does Prokhanov exist at all? Isn't a major Soviet military chief hiding behind the alias Prokhanov? Why has this mysterious Prokhanov suddenly—playing into Senator Helms' hands—publicly blabbed secret information about Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles?

All these mysterious questions have cropped up because Helms is urging senators not to ratify the INF Treaty in view of the fact that "the Russians are deceiving us even now and concealing SS missiles," despite the agreement to dismantle such missiles. Helms supposedly found out about this, as he affirms, from U.S. intelligence services. The NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE has also gleaned similar information. On 25 January it published a nuclear missile sensation:

"The preliminary draft of a special memorandum on the USSR's advance preparations to violate the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles exists within the U.S. Senate foreign policy committee. This memorandum is based on a PRAVDA article of 17 December 1987 about Moscow's plan to fraudulently conceal its mobile SS-20's. Nine days after the Washington agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, PRAVDA astounded and perplexed the U.S. intelligence services by publishing a lengthy article on the SS-20 nuclear missiles, which the Russians call the RSD-10. The article was signed by Aleksandr Prokhanov. He talks with obvious pride about the Soviet Army's ability to site its missiles 'unbeknown to the

enemy.' Imitating the florid style of Russian novelists, he writes: 'The missile division moved through the night past sleeping villages and snow-swept fields, through forests and wooded areas, over frozen lakes and rivers.... Military nomads on the move among the endless fields and forests, changing location, unbeknown to the enemy. It is futile to search for them from space, to feel for them with radar beams.' Aleksandr Prokhanov, as the memorandum says, is seemingly deliberately indulging in intrigue and teasing U.S. intelligence officers. They believe that Prokhanov is an alias for a military chief working in the Soviet General Staff in the strategic deception directorate."

"Fantastic nonsense," I burst out laughing when Barry read out these lines on the radio.

"No need for you to laugh," Barry said, offended. "I have complete confidence in the NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE, and I have often had things published in it myself."

"And I am personally acquainted with Prokhanov. He is an extremely popular writer in our country, the author of many novels, and not a sinister anonymous figure from the strategic deception directorate, which has been dreamed up by your friends. How can I help but laugh at such stupidity?"

"Why should we take your word about your Moscow Prokhanov?"

"Barry, I foresaw your incurable mistrust of everything Soviet, so I armed myself with THE NEW YORK TIMES of 21 January, and I will ask you to read aloud just one line of a report from Moscow about our journalists and litterateurs which mentions 'prominent writer Aleksandr Prokhanov.' Can you believe this?"

"But, of course, Iona, we just have to laugh at this accidental mistake."

"Just a mistake? Don't minimize this. It is as yet your accomplices' only piece of 'evidence' regarding imaginary Soviet machinations in defiance of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles...."

The Washington discussion of this treaty is really a very important matter, but nevertheless if the Muscovite Prokhanov found himself there in the Senate among the multitude of experts summoned from all over, all America would laugh until it dropped, as they say, over the clumsy treaty saboteurs.

U.S., Soviet Scientists Study Seismicity
PM081251 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 6 Feb 88 p 3

[Report by V. Khrustalev: "Struggle Against... Earthquakes"]

[Text] Frunze—In the region of the Toktogul hydraulic power complex, sensitive radiometric stations have long been keeping track of the seismic situation during the filling of the reservoir and the operation of the GES. What has given rise to Soviet and U.S. scientists' interest in this specific hydraulic power complex? Our correspondent put these questions to Candidate of Physico-Mathematical Sciences B. Ilyasov, chief of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Seismology.

"The practice of world hydraulic construction knows of many destructive earthquakes provoked by the creation of reservoirs. The Toktogul hydraulic center—one of the largest in the world—makes it possible to observe more fully the processes of the formation of seismicity caused by engineering activity.

"Research is being conducted within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. program for cooperation in the sphere of environmental conservation.

"Very rich material has been systematized, making it possible to understand the mechanism of the formation of induced seismicity.

"Until now the additional load of the mass of water on the earth's crust was considered to be the sole culprit in cataclysms. In reality their dependence on the procedure for operating the reservoir is far more complex. Induced earthquakes are provoked by several factors operating simultaneously: the block structure of the environment, additional loads, flooding, the redistribution of tectonic stress, jointing, creep of the environment [polzuchest sredy], and much else.

"An enormous amount of work still has to be done. A considerable proportion of the experimental items are at the development stage. But if the program is observed, then in about 5 years, we will be able to develop models of the mechanism of the formation of induced seismicity."

China

Bazhanov Reviews Taiwan Issue, Leadership Roles
PM081229 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 88
Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Yevg. Bazhanov under rubric "Continuing the Dialogue on Reunification is on the Agenda": "Changes in Taiwan"]

[Text] On 13 January 78-year-old Chiang Ching-kuo died in Taipei, administrative center of the Chinese island of Taiwan. The death of this politician, who bore

the title "president of the Republic of China," has prompted a mass of commentaries, articles, and interviews in the world press, all of which invariably ask the question: What next? What awaits Taiwan in the future? The search for the right answer takes us back over the events of the last 4 decades....

Fall 1949. China is celebrating the revolution. Its armed forces, led by the Communist Party, are closing in on the demoralized, dispirited troops of the former Kuomintang regime. The remnants of the Kuomintang flee to the island of Taiwan. But they experience difficulties even there, because the strait dividing the island from the mainland is by no means an insuperable barrier to the revolutionary armies. Washington intervenes, however. It refuses to recognize the PRC and its Government and decides to continue its support for the Kuomintang. A U.S. fleet is sent to the Taiwan Strait and the Pentagon builds military bases on the island.

Taking advantage of the White House's mood, the Kuomintang squared its shoulders a little. It backed up its claims to the whole of China: Its leader Chiang Kai-shek gave himself the title of leader of the "Republic of China," denounced the PRC Government as "unlawful," and set himself the aim of wresting power on the mainland from the Communist Party. Regarding the PRC he stated that there must be "no contact, no talks, no compromise."

The overwhelming majority of capitalist countries—many of them under pressure from the Americans—continued to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the lawful Chinese Government. But time passed and the situation changed. One after another, states all over the world refused to accept the myth that the Chinese Government was in Taipei rather than Beijing. Eventually even the White House was forced to suspend diplomatic relations with the "Republic of China" and to send its ambassador to Beijing in 1979.

But the Taiwan issue remained on the agenda nevertheless. The Chinese nation was still split into two hostile camps.

At the end of the seventies the PRC leadership put forward a detailed program for the peaceful unification of the country. The principle of "one state with two socioeconomic systems" was proposed as the basis of the unification program. It made provision for the capitalist economic system and the current political system to be retained in Taiwan for at least 50 years after reunification. The island would have its own armed forces and be given the right to conduct foreign economic ties independently. No troops or administrative personnel would be sent to Taiwan from mainland China. Taipei did not, however, respond to these proposals. But it is true that even the Kuomintang position underwent a certain evolution. Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 and his son Chiang Ching-kuo became head of the regime. He gradually

dropped the bellicose, unrealistic plans to seize mainland China. They were replaced by the three principles of unification: nationalism, democracy, and economic prosperity. Nevertheless, in practice the Kuomintang still refused to recognize the PRC Government and rejected any contact with the mainland.

Taipei was encouraged in this by the Americans. Although it had canceled official relations with the Kuomintang regime, the United States continued to act as its patron and—most important of all—continued to deliver large consignments of arms to the island. The PRC reasonably protested and demanded that the United States desist from treating Taiwan as an independent state and not stand in the way of its dialogue with Taipei.

...In the last years of his life Chiang Ching-kuo made additional amendments to Taipei's policy. Taiwanese firms were given the opportunity to trade with the mainland through intermediaries: In 1987 trade turnover exceeded \$1.5 billion. Some businessmen have now begun to invest money in PRC industrial enterprises. Since last year the Taiwanese have been allowed to visit their relatives on the mainland. Martial law has been lifted on the island, opposition parties have been legalized, and the press has been given "freedom to maneuver," that is, the regime is showing signs of becoming more democratic.

Then, just when the ice seemed to be beginning to break in Beijing-Taiwan relations, Chiang Ching-kuo died. One would have thought the sides were already under starter's orders and that even after his death the dialogue could develop both extensively and intensively. But it is not quite that simple.

There is another complicated aspect to the Taiwan problem. As far back as the fifties hotheads in the United States came up with the slogan "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan." The point of the slogan was this: The Kuomintang would not covet the mainland but the PRC must not lay claim to the island. Taiwan, they said, was an independent state. This idea has still not faded today. For members of the Kuomintang who came to Taiwan from the mainland, this is sedition. The propaganda of separatism on the island is forbidden, and those who break this taboo find themselves behind bars. But the old Kuomintang members are gradually leaving the stage and being succeeded by their children, who were born in Taiwan and have never even set foot on the mainland. The majority of the present Taiwanese population is made up of islanders whose forefathers left mainland China long ago to settle here.

Is their emotional bond with China really so strong, and do they all want unification? Opinions among the island's native inhabitants vary. Some Taiwanese simply have no interest in the subject of reunification. Others will not accept the possibility of unification for ideological reasons: Taiwan is capitalist, after all, and the PRC

is socialist. You can also meet Taiwanese who draw attention to the differences in living standards: In the PRC the per capita GNP is \$500, while in Taiwan it is \$3,600. Separatists are becoming increasingly bold on the island and are particularly active among the opposition.

It goes without saying, of course, that the separatists are in the minority among the Taiwanese population. But they do have influential patrons across the ocean. The U.S. Congress has passed several resolutions in recent years highlighting the idea of "self-determination" for Taiwan. The White House, on the other hand, does not go in for such courtesies regarding the champions of Taiwanese "independence." In practice, however, the Reagan administration is trying to retain the island as its "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and a "bastion of anticommunism" in the Pacific. The essence of Washington's policy has been accurately expressed by one of the leaders of the State Department: We must find a formula which "would make it possible to delay the actual merging of the two parts of China for another few generations."

In violation of Sino-U.S. agreements, the White House is still supplying Taipei with large consignments of arms (worth up to \$700 million each year) and helping it to develop its own military industry. White House spokesmen can still be heard giving assurances such as "guaranteeing the freedom of Taiwan is still one of the most important elements of U.S. policy" and the United States "must do all it can to ensure the island's security."

The Chinese capital regards this policy as interference in China's internal affairs. Beijing has repeatedly warned Washington that if it stands in the way of the PRC's organizing peace talks with Taiwan, the PRC will be compelled to resort to force. The Chinese leadership has particularly emphasized that under no circumstances will it tolerate the proclamation of Taiwan as an "independent state." This warning, incidentally, also applies to Tokyo—Japan is also making vague attempts to treat the island as a "separate state."

The future course of events depends to a considerable extent on the new Taiwanese leadership. In line with the constitution, the post vacated by the death of Chiang Ching-kuo has been filled by "vice president" Li Teng-hui. He will stay on in this role until the next election, due in 1990.

Li Teng-hui is 65 years old, received higher education in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States, and has held the posts of mayor of Taipei and governor of Taiwan Province. Unlike Chiang Ching-kuo, Li Teng-hui is a native of the island, and this fact has aroused doubts in the Western press regarding his commitment to the idea of reunifying Taiwan with China. There is, however, reason to believe Li Teng-hui will continue the Kuomintang line. The new head of the regime made this point, incidentally, when taking up his post.

Unification is also favored by those people who, together with the still-inexperienced Li Teng-hui, will determine the political line of the Kuomintang: Hau Pei-tsun, General Staff chief; Li Huan, Kuomintang Central Committee general secretary; Yu Kuo-hua, prime minister of the regime; and Lin Yang-kang, former minister of the interior, who has the reputation of being a strong personality. The island's business circles are in favor of economic ties with the PRC.

As far as the PRC is concerned, it is prepared to continue peaceful dialogue. The CPC Central Committee sent condolences to the Kuomintang leadership on the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and Zhao Ziyang, CPC Central Committee general secretary, made a statement in this connection. The Chinese leader noted that Chiang Ching-kuo was invariably committed to the concept of one China, opposed attempts to proclaim "Taiwanese independence," and made definite efforts to soften relations between the two shores of the Taiwan Strait. Zhao Ziyang voiced the hope that the new Kuomintang leaders will, "proceeding from the vital interests of the Chinese nation...., make a positive contribution to ending the division of our country as soon as possible and ensuring the peaceful unification of the motherland."

This is a noble aim but considerable obstacles—ideological, political, and economic—will have to be overcome on the way to achieving it.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Diet Debate on U.S. Nuclear Ship Calls
OW081031 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT
3 Feb 88

[[Igor Yurskiy] commentary]

[Text] Our talk this time concerns the calls made by nuclear-capable U.S. warships at Japanese ports. According to a KYODO report, the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine USS Salt Lake City made a port call at Yokosuka on 2 February. Our commentator (Igor Yurskiy) writes:

The USS Salt Lake City is of the Los Angeles class and has a displacement of 6,000 tons. As is known to every one, it is equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The previous call made by this ship at Yokosuka was on Thursday last week, when another U.S. nuclear submarine, the USS Flasher, cast its anchor at Long Beach [as heard], a U.S. military base in Okinawa. Thus began the port calls by U.S. nuclear submarines in Japan this year.

According to an annual survey by AKAHATA, U.S. nuclear submarines called at Japanese ports 40 times last year, including 34 calls by ships equipped with Tomahawks. It is only fair that the Japanese public should view those port calls by U.S. nuclear submarines and other U.S. warships as violations of Japan's three non-nuclear principles.

The fact is, in case of such port calls, the U.S. Navy command is required, under an agreement between the U.S. and Japanese Governments, to notify the Japanese Government in advance if the ship carries nuclear arms. The Japanese Government's spokesman insists that so long as there is no such notification by the United States, it is considered that the U.S. ship is not carrying nuclear weapons.

Nobody can swallow such logic. Therefore, at the current session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Japan Socialist Party Secretary General Yamaguchi asked the government to take steps to clarify if the U.S. warships are equipped with nuclear weapons. However, Prime Minister Takeshita refused to give a clear-cut answer. Therefore, Yamaguchi told the session that the port calls by surface ships and submarines of the U.S. Navy equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of carrying both nuclear and nonnuclear warheads, are being made with the approval of the Japanese Government.

Yamaguchi also charged that the Liberal Democratic Party government, while giving lip service to world peace, is actually increasing defense spending and expenditures for the maintenance of U.S. bases in Japan.

It should also be noted that the United States, in disregard of the protests by Japanese peace forces, is deliberately increasing the frequency of port calls by offensive ships to Japan in an attempt to turn Japan into a strategic stronghold for aggression in the Asian and Pacific region.

Besides nuclear submarines of all classes, the battleship USS New Jersey, the nuclear-powered missile cruiser and 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge, the up-to-date nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, and many other U.S. ships called at Japanese ports. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise has also made many port calls. This aircraft carrier just left Subic Naval Base in the Philippines and is heading full steam for the tension-packed Persian Gulf.

U.S., Japan's Policies 'Increase' Nuclear Threat
PM081431 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 88 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Washington's Policy—A Source of Tension"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 4 Feb—The DPRK's consistent position consists in preserving and strengthening peace in Korea and resolving the Korean question by peaceful means with the help of a dialogue and talks, the newspaper NODONG SINMUN emphasizes.

U.S. actions in Korea are the complete opposite of this peace-loving policy, the organ of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee points out. In violation of the armistice agreement Washington has stationed more

than 1,000 units of nuclear weapons and more than 40,000 U.S. servicemen in the southern part of the country and turned it into its major nuclear bridgehead in the Far East. This is a graphic expression of the U.S. policy of nuclear blackmail and strong-arm pressure. Washington maintains that the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea is a "defensive measure" and puts forward fabrications about the so-called "military superiority of the North."

The joint U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit military maneuvers, which have been held annually since the second half of the seventies, have led to a further increase in the nuclear threat in the region. The danger of a nuclear conflict arising here has become still more real with the active involvement of Japan in the provocative U.S. actions in the Far East. Japan has been turned into a transshipment base for U.S. troops being transferred to South Korea.

There are no nuclear weapons in the DPRK, NODONG SINMUN points out, and it threatens no one. The Korean people advocate the relaxation of tension in the region, the elimination of the U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Korea. This would help to establish lasting peace and to strengthen security in this region.

'Negative' Factors, Barriers in Trade With Japan
OW091328 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0135 GMT 5 Feb 88

[I. Vykhukholev video report from Tokyo; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The 11th joint meeting of the Soviet-Japanese, Japanese-Soviet committee on economic cooperation ended in Tokyo.

The level of cooperation that quite satisfied us in the seventies, is today no longer consistent with the huge potentials at the disposal of such economic powers as the Soviet Union and Japan. Many negative factors have accumulated, including the practically static, traditional trade structure under which our main export to Japan consists primarily of raw materials, while we import machinery and equipment from Japan. This leads to a constant bilateral trade imbalance and causes our country to have a negative balance in conducting trade with its neighbor. The absence of a stable and long term base for developing trade relations in terms of intergovernmental agreements is keenly felt.

Finally, there are artificial barriers. Let us recall the scandal blown all out of proportion last year at the prompting of the United States involving the Toshiba Company and the tightening of controls on exports to the USSR of the latest technology and equipment which

followed. Due to this alone, bilateral trade last year decreased by almost 20 percent. [Video cuts to shots of the committee meeting showing speakers and participants]

The resultant impasse was precisely what the joint committee for economic cooperation discussed at the week-long session here. The participants expressed their intention to apply their efforts to step up trade in the interests of strengthening goodneighborly relations between the two countries. Attainment of this goal will facilitate the establishment of joint enterprises, development of cooperative production, and other progressive forms of cooperation, including the possible participation of Japanese firms in the modernization or reconstruction of industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union.

[Begin video recording of Tanaka, chairman of the board of the (?Oji Paper) Corporation in Japanese fading into Russian translation] Presently, Japanese business circles are observing, with keen interest, perestroika and radical economic reforms taking place in your country. In our opinion, these processes are opening up broad prospects for cooperation. Certainly, it would be too much to expect that all the problems will be resolved immediately. In the long run, however, bilateral economic ties will undoubtedly receive a good boost for further development [end recording].

Toshiba Incident Used as Control 'Pretext'
*OW082340 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT
5 Feb 88*

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Excerpts] Japanese newspapers this week reported on Prime Minister Takeshita's remarks that sanctions were levied on Toshiba Machine Co for violating Cocom rules, not for impairing U.S. security. Radio Moscow Commentator Dmitriyev makes the following comments in this connection:

Prime Minister Takeshita made the remarks in answer to a question by JSP Secretary General Yamaguchi at an interpellation session of the Diet. The prime minister cited Norwegian Government data indicating that Toshiba Machine's export of milling machines to the Soviet Union through a Norwegian company had nothing to do with quieter Soviet submarine propellers. However, as was seen in all propaganda activities surrounding the Toshiba incident, the biggest pretext under which the United States levelled criticism against Toshiba Machine and Japan's entire business world was that the sounds of Soviet submarine propellers had become quieter as a result of the export.

Of all the numerous criticisms against Toshiba Machine, remarks by [name indistinct]—special assistant to the secretary of defense in charge of Japan—draw particular

attention. He pointed out a link between milling machines and [word indistinct] of submarine screws, using [word indistinct] document [word indistinct] as if swearing upon the Bible.

At that time it was already clear, however, that this theory was contradictory to various known facts. That is, the Soviet Union had already developed related technology without assistance from Japan and put the technology into practice several years before it imported the four units of milling machines from Toshiba.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government ultimately failed to formally endorse this U.S. theory. [passage omitted]

A recent high-level Cocom meeting on policies in Paris again took up the U.S.-fabricated story of quieter Soviet submarines to use it as a pretext for stepping up control on trade with socialist countries. Unlike Japan, at the meeting European countries expressed opposition to stepped-up control, saying that stiffer control on trade with socialist countries is detrimental to international trade.

In the meantime, concerning the result of a recent joint meeting of the USSR-Japan and Japan-USSR business cooperation committees in Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN pointed out that the Japanese side showed an inactive attitude at the meeting, influenced by Cocom's regulatory measures. This was not an unexpected attitude at all.

The British paper THE SUNDAY TIMES recently said that enterprises in some countries get off with a small fine for violating Cocom rules, while those in other countries face penal servitude. Japan clearly belongs to the latter group. It may be said that this is largely the result of the fabricated story that there is a link between Toshiba Machine's export of milling machines to the Soviet Union and a Soviet military threat.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Indonesia's Mokhtar Continues Moscow Talks

Gives Dinner Speech

*PM080941 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4*

["Soviet-Indonesian Talks"]

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, staying in the Soviet Union on an official visit, delivered a speech at a dinner given today in his honor by Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said: First of all, allow me personally, and also on behalf of my wife and all members of the delegation, to express profound

gratitude to Your Excellency and the Government of the Soviet Union for the invitation conveyed to me to visit Moscow, a city famous for its beauty and historic past. I also want to avail myself of this opportunity to thank Your Excellency for a warm and friendly welcome and for the excellent organization of our visit, which we hope, will be to the benefit of both states.

Soviet-Indonesian relations have been developing in an ever more positive way in recent years. This is shown by the exchanges of visits at a high level, including visits of Soviet delegations led by the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, vice-presidents of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the visit of Your Excellency to Indonesia early last year. Indonesia is interested in the development of cooperation for the sake of the interests of the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The widening of relations of cooperation in the trade and economic area was marked by the signing of the agreement on setting up the mixed commission on economic and commercial cooperation in 1985, which supplemented the 1984 protocol on trade and economic cooperation. The Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Indonesia and the USSR signed an agreement on cooperation in Moscow and Jakarta. Though the development of commercial and economic cooperation has not yet brought the expected results, the treaty-legal basis is very important for filling relations of mutually advantageous cooperation with concrete contents. In the framework of these efforts, an Indonesian commercial delegation visited Moscow a few days ago, before my visit, in order to step up commercial relations between our countries, for which, we believe, there are possibilities.

From the day of its foundation, the Republic of Indonesia has been striving to participate in every effort for the creation and maintenance of peace and world order. In these efforts, Indonesia always had its independent stand, was not connected with external forces, as it would contradict our interests, and was establishing friendly relations with the largest possible number of states.

Last year, when you visited Indonesia, we expressed together the concern of all humanity regarding the possibility of nuclear war, which can destroy life on earth and our entire civilization. It is with a feeling of relief that we note now the positive aspects which kindle fresh hopes. I mean the treaty between the USA and the USSR on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We hope that this treaty will be followed by other agreements between the two great powers on strategic armaments and conventional kinds of arms. We also hope that the improving atmosphere between the two countries will have a positive effect on the solution of other matters of disarmament at the conference on

disarmament in Geneva, above all in the drafting of a convention on chemical weapons, in which considerable progress has already been achieved.

Like other developing countries, Indonesia hopes that the achievement of arrangements will lead to the channeling of large funds for needs of development, above all of developing countries. We believe that this is not just a humanitarian obligation of developed countries, particularly great powers, but also of all states. This obligation is a necessity if we really want to live in peace. But we all realize that the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor is fraught with various upheavals which, in their turn, can undermine peace and stability.

The ASEAN member countries concluded the third summit meeting in Manila with results which we assess as quite positive. It adopted a number of decisions and advanced ideas and action programs which are essentially aimed at the widening and development of cooperation among ASEAN countries in various areas. ASEAN, which was initially viewed as a body of economic, social, and cultural cooperation, demonstrated during its evolution the possibilities for the strengthening of cooperation also in the political area. Solidarity among ASEAN countries promoted the growth of political will and awareness as regards establishing cooperation not only in regional, but also in global interests.

Cooperation among ASEAN countries in the political area has become more tangible after the emergence of the Kampuchean problem. In the question of Kampuchea, ASEAN has shown a consistent stand aimed above all at helping the Khmer people find a political solution which would enable it to decide its own destiny and create a free, nonaligned, and neutral Kampuchea. In this context, a comprehensive political solution of the Kampuchean question by the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the exercise of the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination will guarantee the achievement of political stability in the area of Southeast Asia.

Indonesia continues to have great hopes that the Soviet Union can make a weighty contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean question. I emphasize this deliberately, as I remember what you said during your stay in Jakarta: There are no problems in this area which cannot be resolved by political means, at the negotiating table, on the basis of the principles of reciprocity, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual consideration for the lawful interests of each of the sides.

I am very glad that I had an opportunity to meet with the Soviet leader, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. I appreciate most highly the most important talks that took place during this visit. We also assess as very valuable the negotiations and exchanges of opinions with you on different matters of mutual interest. We hope

that this visit will contribute to the development of relations of mutually advantageous cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.

Talks Continue

PM080937 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4

["Soviet-Indonesian Talks End"]

[Text] Talks continued 6 February between Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja.

The two ministers' examination of the situation in various parts of the world revealed a similarity in the two countries' views as regards the need for resolving existing conflict situations by political means.

The ministers stressed the essential need for a political unblocking of the Afghan problem in the interests of peace and stability in Asia. The Indonesian side was told of the initiative of the Afghan and Soviet Governments which have recently been undertaken with regard to achieving an Afghan settlement. They create the necessary prerequisites for working out final accords at the Afghan-Pakistani talks currently underway in Geneva through D. Cordovez, personal representative of the UN secretary general.

The participants in the talks are united in their view that the achievement of an all-embracing and just settlement in the Near East is possible only on the basis of convening an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all interested sides, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The ministers stressed the need for the speediest possible cessation of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq and its transfer to the channel of a political settlement. The attention of the Indonesian side was drawn to the USSR's proposals for a normalization of the situation in the Persian Gulf, including the withdrawal of the ships of nonlittoral states from the zone and the formation of a UN naval force.

In the context of strengthening peace, security, and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region, attention was paid to matters relating to the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet side outlined ASEAN's standpoint, confirmed at the third meeting of the heads of states and governments of the association's member countries, dealing with the present situation in the region and prospects for its normalization.

E.A. Shevardnadze welcomed the constructive measures of the countries of Southeast Asia aimed at improving the situation and affirming an atmosphere of genuine peace and good neighborly cooperation. He noted the great importance of the Vietnamese-Indonesian dialogue for seeking a universally acceptable political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. It was stated that the Soviet Union is prepared to further the progress of such efforts in this direction.

Having compared their approaches to the issue of Kampuchea, the participants in the talks noted that a number of new and heartening aspects have emerged in the situation around a settlement of this problem recently and expressed the intention to facilitate in every way their strengthening and development. The ministers stressed that the settlement of this issue is possible only by political means, by the Kampuchean people themselves, and through negotiations among all the parties concerned.

The two sides expressed support for the policy of national reconciliation in Kampuchea. The ministers assessed the meetings between Hun Sen and N. Sihanouk, which marked the start of a direct dialogue between the various Kampuchean sides, as a significant step toward the achievement of national reconciliation, and came out in favor of continuing them. They also expressed the hope that the situation which has arisen on the border between Laos and Thailand could be settled by peaceful means.

The growing significance was noted of the Nonaligned Movement in ensuring universal peace and security, the strengthening of the national independence of states, and the establishment of a new international economic order.

The participants in the talks confirmed their adherence to and support for the lofty principles and aims of the United Nations, and declared their readiness to promote the effectiveness of its activity, above all in ensuring peace and universal security and arranging broad international cooperation to resolve global problems.

At the conclusion of the talks, E.A. Shevardnadze and M. Kusumaatmaja signed a protocol between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia on bilateral consultations.

A joint report was adopted on the outcome of the visit and it will be published.

Talks End

LD061228 Moscow World Service in English
1200 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Soviet-Indonesian talks have ended in Moscow. They were conducted by the Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his Indonesian counterpart Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, who came to the USSR on an official visit. [passage omitted]

In an interview for Radio Moscow, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja expressed satisfaction with his talks.

Mokhtar Comments on Talks

*LD061829 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT
6 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—"Talks with the Soviet leaders were intensive, friendly, constructive and open, and I am very much pleased with this", Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja told Soviet and foreign journalists in the press-centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry today. "The talks in Moscow helped us understand each other better", he said. The minister is staying on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

"The political dialogue between Indonesia and the Soviet Union develops successfully", Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said. "As to economics, it should be noted that our relations have not yet reached the required level. I believe we could do more in this respect. Our country has advanced two lists for exchanges in the area of trade and we, certainly, shall study with much interest what the Soviet Union proposes us in return". The minister said that an important result of the visit is that "the foundation has been set for the future development of bilateral relations also in the area of trade."

"We declare for the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South East Asia. It is not only statements but also concrete deeds that are the point of the matter", the Indonesian foreign minister said. He emphasized that the treaty signed recently by the USSR and the USA on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles is a good beginning, a step to a world in which there will be less nuclear weapons.

"The Kampuchean problem was actively discussed in Moscow and both sides agreed that the matter should be carried to a political solution within a reasonably short period of time", the Indonesian foreign minister said. "But these problems, naturally, should be resolved by Kampucheans themselves and the parties concerned should merely promote the quest for solutions".

The minister answered numerous questions from journalists.

Mokhtar Departs

*LD071300 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0942 GMT 7 Feb 88*

[Text] Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja departed Moscow today. He was staying in our country on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

At the airport the guest was seen off by Comrade Shevardnadze and other officials.

Near East & South Asia

PRAVDA on Najibullah Statement on Pullout

*PM091501 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Statement by Najibullah"]

[Text] Kabul, 8 Feb—President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan made the following statement on Afghan television today:

For a number of years now, a war has been forced on the Republic of Afghanistan, a war which has taken various forms of interference, including armed interference, and has caused our country's people tremendous hardship and suffering, created problems around Afghanistan, and seriously and painfully aggravated the situation.

From the very outset, the Republic of Afghanistan's government, pursuing its peace-loving course, strove with the utmost seriousness to resolve by peaceful methods and by means of talks the problems which had arisen without resorting to military methods, which are futile. Thanks to that policy, the process of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan began in Geneva in June 1982 with the assistance of the UN secretary general and through the mediation of his personal representative, a process which continues to this day. It must be noted that even though Iran does not participate directly in the process of the Geneva talks, the UN secretary general's personal representative regularly informs the Iranian authorities about their progress. The Afghan side at the Geneva talks has invariably shown political goodwill and the necessary flexibility with the aim of achieving the earliest settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. All this is being done for the sake of peace on Afghan soil and in the interests of stabilizing the situation in the region.

Now that the Geneva talks process has reached its decisive and final phase, I should like to restate the Republic of Afghanistan's position on this matter.

Despite the continuation and expansion of the armed imperialist interference against our country, considerable progress has been achieved in the Geneva talks process thanks to the Afghan side's constructive stance. The Republic of Afghanistan has always highly appreciated and continues to appreciate the efforts of the UN secretary general and the mission of his personal representative in the successful holding of the Geneva talks.

At the same time, to end the war and the fratricide and to ensure peace throughout the country's territory, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan has proclaimed and begun to implement a policy of national reconciliation in various spheres. Its aim is to establish peace and security: It is a manifestation of our republic's strength, wisdom, and farsightedness. The proclamation

of this policy fundamentally helped to accelerate a peaceful settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. As one of the measures to achieve peace within the country, it enabled the Republic of Afghanistan to put forward a concrete plan for the creation of a coalition government involving armed opposition groups and forces opposed to the Afghan Government. Afghanistan is an independent, nonaligned, and sovereign country. The country's fate has been and continues to be determined by the Afghans themselves alone. No one will resolve Afghanistan's problems for them and no one should be in any doubt on this clear question.

Those who want peace in our country cannot fail to accept the policy of national reconciliation as the basis of peacemaking activity. The Afghan people are noble, bold, courageous, and freedom-loving. They are the true masters of their glorious and free country, which produces heroes. Our people want peace and are working for the prosperity and progress of their motherland. At this important stage in the development of life in the country, our political relations are based on a multiparty system and our economic relations are based on the observance of the interests of society's various social strata.

There now exist great hopes and possibilities that the upcoming round of the Geneva talks, which is aimed at settling the external aspect of the problem, will be fruitful and conclusive and lead to the signing of documents as soon as possible.

The political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan includes the following documents: A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan on noninterference, an agreement on the voluntary return home of Afghan refugees, a document on the linkage between the aforementioned questions on the one hand, and the resolution of the question of the return home of the limited contingent of Soviet troops on the other, as well as an accord on the mechanism for implementing the agreements reached. The elaboration of these documents at the Geneva talks, which have gone on for 5 and 1/2 years now, is almost complete.

As for the return home of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, it must be noted that the conditions for their withdrawal were defined in the speech by the leader of the Afghan delegation at the ceremonial session marking the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow, and that the deadline for the withdrawal was agreed upon during the talks between the leaders of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. It should be stressed that the question of the Soviet troops' return home is directly linked to the ending of interference and the supply of arms to the antigovernment extremist groupings. To promote the earliest possible, successful conclusion of the Geneva talks, the Governments of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have agreed that if the Geneva agreements are signed on 15 March 1988, the withdrawal of the limited contingent

will begin on 15 May 1988 and will be carried out over 10 months. In that event, the Afghan side would find acceptable the withdrawal of quite a large section of the Soviet troops in the initial stage. If the Geneva agreements are signed before 15 March 1988 the withdrawal will begin ahead of schedule.

We believe that after the Soviet units have returned home, military confrontation will not intensify in our country. It is our opinion that it is possible to prevent the escalation of the military conflict so long as the opponents of the Republic of Afghanistan's Government, who in the present situation are continuing to fuel the flames of war, show a responsible approach and make a tangible contribution to the peace-loving activity aimed at ensuring a peaceful life for our people. They must know that if they do not heed common sense, they will face the iron will of the Afghan people, who hunger for peace and tranquility in the country, and will also be in contravention of the commitment of the states to end the interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Pursuing this constructive line, the Afghan side intends at the next round of the talks to show a sense of responsibility, common sense, realism, political courage, firmness, and goodwill.

We hope, of course, that the other side will take the same approach.

If some governments and certain politicians adopt a stance designed to delay the signing of the Geneva agreements on any pretext, this will be yet further evidence of their desire to maintain the tension in the region, discredit the mission of the UN secretary general and his personal representative, and ultimately nullify the Geneva talks process. In that event, all responsibility for the consequences will be borne by those whose actions create deadlock in the Geneva talks process. However, we hope that this does not happen. It should also be emphasized that the conclusion of the Geneva talks and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops should not be linked to the completion of the efforts to create a coalition government in Afghanistan. National reconciliation and the creation of such a government are a purely internal Afghan question and must be resolved by the Afghans themselves.

It is quite appropriate to recall here the selfless, multifaceted internationalist assistance of the Soviet Union. On the basis of traditional historical relations of friendship and good-neighborliness, the Soviet Union unflinchingly extends a helping hand to the Afghan people in their difficult times. Particular note should be made of the Soviet Union's military assistance during difficult times for the Afghan people and Government, when the sons of the Soviet people stood by them regardless of the losses. As the limited contingent of Soviet troops is withdrawn, it will be the duty of all patriotic Afghans, in token of profound gratitude to the courageous sons of the Soviet land who devoted their lives and all their efforts

to protecting our motherland's freedom, independence, and territorial integrity, to show fraternal Afghan gratitude and respect to those emissaries of peace, justice, and progress. No other people or state in history would have done as much for our people in their days of sorrow as the Soviet Union and its people have done.

In accordance with its traditional role in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and in fulfillment of the decisions of the Loya Jirga, and, in particular, the historic Loya Jirga of 1366 (1987), Afghanistan will not allow its territory or part of that territory to be transformed into a bridgehead for aggression against neighboring countries. We want to live in peace and to be friends with all neighboring states.

I fully concur with the stance taken by the Soviet Union's leadership, headed by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on the issue of the normalization of the situation around Afghanistan by political means and highly appreciate that stance.

We expect our neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, to show goodwill and make constructive moves. We hope that Iran will not stand aside from the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, and we count on its positive contribution. It is quite obvious that the ending of the interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs serves the interests of neighboring countries and their peoples and the interests of peace and stability in the region and throughout the world.

Let Afghanistan be the first country on the present crucial path to play its historic role in the settlement of regional conflicts and show profound responsibility for the fate of international peace and for the strengthening of peace and stability in the region. The peaceful settlement of regional conflicts is one manifestation of the struggle for world peace and security, favorable conditions for which were ensured as a result of the talks in Washington between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States and the treaty that they signed.

We appeal to true patriots of Afghanistan, no matter which population groups, tribes, and ethnic groups they belong to, and we appeal to the country's noble and patriotic clergy to be active participants in the struggle to achieve the noble goal of peace and tranquility on Afghanistan's soil. Then the Afghan people will be rid of war and will gain peace.

Najibullah Addresses Cotton Growers' Assembly
LD071914 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT
7 Feb 88

[Text] Kabul February 7 Tass—Afghanistan's first ever jirgah (council) of cotton growers was held in the town of Mazari-Sharif. It was addressed by the President of the Republic Najibullah. He said that the policy of national reconciliation was the only way out of the bloodshed,

fratricidal war and poverty. The past year has produced considerable successes in pursuing the policy of national reconciliation, he said. The state has established by peaceful means its control over 3,200 villages, more than 110,000 refugees returned to the country and more than 40,000 members of armed groups went over to the side of the people's government. The president described as important the proclamation of "peace zones" in 145 counties and districts and 1,150 villages with a total population of three million.

Najibullah also dwelt on questions of Afghan-Soviet cooperation stressing that enterprises built and operated with soviet assistance accounted for 75 per cent of the country's earnings.

The chairman of Afghanistan's Council of Ministers Keshtmand delivered a report on the economic situation in the country and plans to boost agricultural production. He pointed out the difficulties caused by the undeclared war unleashed by imperialism and reactionaries against Afghanistan. But the economy continues to develop even in these conditions. Capital investments and spending on social needs have grown considerably. The wages and salaries of industrial and office workers and of men of the armed forces have been raised, the system of selling goods to the population at regulated prices is being expanded. On the whole, the head of government said, measures to raise the population's living standards have already benefited more than four million people. Keshtmand spoke highly of the assistance given by the Soviet Union to the development of Afghanistan's economy. He dwelt on the problems of the country's agriculture and spoke about the government's plans to encourage the production of cotton and other farm produce.

After Keshtmand's report the jirgah discussed in detail questions of increasing cotton production. The participants in the jirgah called on all peasants in the country to contribute their utmost to boosting the national economy and restoring peace.

Najibullah Receives UN's Cordovez in Kabul
LD071608 Moscow TASS in English 1541 GMT
7 Feb 88

[Text] Kabul February 7 TASS—The President of Afghanistan Najibullah today received the personal envoy of the United Nations secretary general at the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva Diego Cordovez, who had arrived here earlier in the day to hold consultations with the Afghan side and prepare the resumption of the talks.

Questions related to the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan were discussed during the meeting.

Later in the day Diego Cordovez left Kabul for Islamabad, BAKHTAR agency reported.

More on Supreme Soviet Delegation Visit to Iraq

Talks with 'Aziz

LD061614 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1435 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Text] Baghdad, 6 Feb (TASS)—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by Gaibnazar Pallayev, a deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, met with Tariq 'Aziz, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, a deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of Iraq. The sides expressed satisfaction with the achieved level of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation and confirmed the undeviating and reciprocal desire to further expand and strengthen ties in various areas between the USSR and Iraq on the firm basis of the treaty on friendship and cooperation.

T. 'Aziz set out the Iraqi leadership's appraisal of the situation which has developed in the region and provided information on the steps taken by Iraq toward seeking ways to end the Iran-Iraq war.

The head of the Soviet delegation stressed that the USSR will continue to assist all efforts aimed at the rapid political settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Soviet Union conducts active work to this end in the UN Security Council, striving for an increase in the role of the international community in terminating the war and effectively implementing decisions adopted by them. The talk was conducted in a friendly atmosphere.

The same day, the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet had a conversation with Najih Muhammad Khalil, head of the Iraqi Scientific Research Council and chairman of the Iraq-Soviet Friendship Society. It was noted that the public organizations of both countries can and should play an important part in the enrichment and all-round development of Soviet-Iraqi relations.

Review of Talks

LD071737 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT
7 Feb 88

[Text] Baghdad February 7 TASS—A delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR headed by Vice President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gaibnazar Pallayev paid an official visit to the Iraqi Republic from January 31 to February 7 at the invitation of Iraq's national council.

The delegation was received by Saddam Husayn, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and president of Iraq and had conversations with members of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Chairman of the National Council Sa'dun Hammadi. The sides expressed much satisfaction with the level of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq, and declared for continued contacts at various levels, including between the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the National Council of Iraq.

When topical problems of the present international situation were discussed the common view was expressed of the pressing need to build up efforts in order to avert the nuclear threat, stop the arms race and prevent it from spreading to outer space. The Iraqi side spoke highly of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, stated its support for the USSR's firm and consistent course directed at improving the international political climate and deepening the process of detente.

The Soviet side welcomed Iraq's readiness for a political settlement of the conflict with Iran on the basis of the U.N. Security Council's Resolution 598. The Soviet side confirmed that the USSR will further work, including within the framework of the United Nations Security Council, for the implementation in full volume of the Resolution 598 and will take all the necessary practical measures to bring about a termination of this tragic war.

The chairman of Iraq's National Council dwelt on the question of the causes of the Iran-Iraq conflict and confirmed Iraq's right to protect its sovereignty, independence and national choice. He noted that Iraq opposes all foreign interference and patronage, firmly keeps to its principled peaceloving course of settling regional conflicts by way of talks on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty.

The Soviet and Iraqi members of parliament firmly condemned the mass repressions of the Israeli authorities against the peaceful Palestinian population in occupied territories and expressed solidarity with the must struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, its sole lawful representative, against the occupation and for the implementation of its inalienable national rights.

The sides supported the idea of the speediest convocation of a plenipotentiary international conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations with the equal participation of all interested sides, including the PLO, and also the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The sides said it was necessary to overcome the Lebanese crisis on the basis of a rational accord of the Lebanese themselves in conditions of preserving the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Leaves Iraq for Home

LD080124 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2155 GMT 7 Feb 88

[Text] Baghdad, 8 Feb (TASS)—A visit to the Republic of Iraq by a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Gaibnazar Pallayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, has ended. It was in Baghdad at the invitation of the National Assembly of Iraq.

The delegation was received by Saddam Husayn, president of Iraq, and other members of the country's political leadership. Talks took place with Sa'dun Hammadi, speaker of the National Assembly of Iraq. The sides expressed satisfaction with the level of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq, which are based on a treaty on friendship and cooperation, and spoke in favor of the further development of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the National Assembly of Iraq.

On Sunday the Soviet delegation departed for home.

Possibility of Sanctions

*LD081311 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1200 GMT 8 Feb 88*

[Text] Baghdad, 8 Feb (TASS)—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by G. Pallayev, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has ended its visit to Iraq.

Before leaving, the head of Soviet delegation made the following statement for the press: The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation was on a visit in Iraq at the invitation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Iraq. We had fruitful meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn; T.Y. Ramadan, first deputy prime minister; T. 'Aziz, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; S. Hammadi, chairman of the National Assembly; and H. 'Ali, secretary general of the Progressive National and Patriotic Front. During the talks, which were distinguished by a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding and passed in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, we discussed problems related to the current situation in the international arena and the Near East.

The conversations with the Iraqi friends once again demonstrated the coinciding proximity of the sides' positions on many important problems and, first of all, on what concerns the struggle for universal peace, for disarmament. This undoubtedly is a good base for expanding cooperation between our countries in the international arena.

Various aspects of Soviet-Iraqi relations were examined in some detail. Both sides confirmed their striving for developing and strengthening them on a mutually advantageous basis.

Considerable attention was paid in the course of the talks to the Iran-Iraq conflict. Our side expressed confidence that UN Security Council Resolution 598 is the most acceptable basis for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict. We also confirmed the preparedness of the USSR to discuss the possibility of adopting the second resolution, which would envisage imposing sanctions against any side that would refuse to comply with Resolution 598.

Arrives Home

*LD081103 Moscow TASS in English 1054 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Gaibnazar Pallayev, deputy president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, returned to Moscow from Baghdad today.

Soviet parliamentarians visited Iraq at the invitation of the national council of the country.

Further on DFLP's Hawatimah Visit to Moscow

Holds News Conference

*LD051551 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT
5 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—"The current uprising of the Palestinian people is not some spontaneous action of despair, but a qualitatively new stage in the fight of the Palestinians for their rights under the single national leadership exercised by PLO," said Nayif Hawatimah, secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). He was addressing today a press conference given by the delegation of the front at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The DFLP leader stressed that the uprising is continuing and will continue, despite the terror and toughening of repressions by the Israeli occupation authorities, until the ultimate victory and implementation of its main political aims—putting an end to the Israeli occupation, self-determination and creation of a national state in the native land. Nayif Hawatimah cited facts illustrating the scale of the criminal actions by the Israeli occupation authorities: Since the outbreak of the uprising 92 Palestinians were killed, nearly a thousand injured and more than 7,000 arrested.

"The Israeli as well as some western mass media are trying to picture things as if behind the insurgents are allegedly the "forces of Moslem fundamentalism and extremism". They needed those lies in order to try and frighten the public of the Western and the Arab countries," Nayif Hawatimah noted.

The USA and Israel are building up their attempts at suppressing the uprising and making the Palestinians retreat. Washington has issued a "new" plan of Palestinian autonomy, which was earlier rejected by the Palestinians. Washington has proposed that a regional conference be convened with the participation of Israel, Jordan and Egypt under the U.N. aegis, as a substitute for the convocation of an international peace conference with the participation of all the sides concerned, including PLO, on the basis of equality. We are against Washington's and Tel Aviv's manoeuvres. We need today, more than ever before, support and solidarity of the world's democratic and progressive forces, Nayif Hawatimeh said.

In the course of the visit to the USSR our delegation discussed the situation in the occupied territories and questions pertaining to a Middle East settlement, he continued. The guest spoke highly of the Soviet Union's consistent stand on the Palestinian issue which was reaffirmed in the letter addressed by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to the U.N. secretary general. In conclusion Nayif Hawatimeh expressed gratitude to the Soviet public organizations, the whole Soviet people for their support for the just struggle of the Palestinians.

Ends Moscow Visit

*LD061014 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0910 GMT 6 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—A delegation from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP], led by its secretary general, Nayif Hawatimah, visited Moscow from 30 January to 6 February at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries [SCSAAC].

The delegation was received in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and in the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Members of the delegation held talks at the SCSAAC, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the editorial boards of the newspaper PRAVDA and the journal KOMMUNIST. They also attended a solidarity meeting with the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine held at the First State Ball-Bearing Works.

The Palestinian visitors laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

During the conversations, the delegation members showed great interest in the revolutionary transformations taking place in the USSR and commended the Soviet Union's peaceloving policy, the agreements reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington, and the USSR's principled line aimed at attaining a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

The Soviet and Palestinian representatives resolutely condemned the Israeli authorities' excesses with regard to the Arab population in the occupied territories. It was stressed that without a just solution of the Palestinian problem and without any guarantee of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, there is no lasting peace or stability in the Middle East, nor will there be. Moreover, the sides noted unanimously that the way to a settlement of the explosive situation in the region lay through the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security

Council and all interested sides, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

PLO Rejects U.S. 'New Middle East Initiative'

*LD081011 Moscow TASS in English 1001 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Cairo February 8 TASS—The Palestine Liberation Organization rejects a so-called 'new Middle East Initiative' put forward by the U.S., as well as other attempts of the U.S. Administration to put an end to the Palestinian uprising on Israeli-occupied Arab lands, says a statement of the PLO Executive Committee circulated in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

According to reports reaching here, the statement pointed out that the uprising would continue till a lawful right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the creation of their own state was recognized. An international peace conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is the only way to resolve the Middle East problem, the statement said.

Yemen's Al-Bid Receives Treatment

*LD082006 Moscow TASS in English 1843 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 8 (TASS)—It was officially announced here today that 'Ali Salim al-Bid, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemen Socialist Party, had arrived in the Soviet Union for treatment late in January.

On February 5, he underwent an operation for acute cholecystitis. The operation was successful. Al-Bid is feeling well.

Vorontsov Briefs Gandhi on Afghan Initiatives

*LD081025 Moscow TASS in English 1010 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] New Delhi February 8 TASS—On the 8th of February, the prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, received the first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov.

On instructions of the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, the prime minister was informed of the new initiatives of the Soviet Union in regard to the political settlement of the issue relating to Afghanistan.

India and the Soviet Union have been in close and continuous touch on the developments in regard to Afghanistan. India has consistently stood for the resolution of the issues in a manner that would ensure the status of Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned country. The Soviet leadership has always shown a sympathetic understanding of India's point of view.

In this context the prime minister welcomed the new initiative to be taken by the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that it would pave the way for an early resolution of the issues in Afghanistan. The two sides will remain in close contact regarding future developments and further steps to be taken.

Indian Defense Arrives in Moscow

PM052043 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Feb 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed profile of Indian Defense Minister K. C. Pant: "Regarding the Visit to the USSR of K.C. Pant, Minister of Defense of the Republic of India"]

[Excerpts] At the invitation of the Soviet Government, K.C. Pant, defense minister of the Republic of India is arriving Moscow on 6 February on an official friendly visit. [passage omitted]

In welcoming K.S. Pant, the Soviet people express confidence that his visit to our country will promote the further development and consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India in the interests of peace and the security of the peoples.

Greeted by Yazov

PM081121 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Feb 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Official Friendly Visit"]

[Text] Indian Defense Minister Krishna Chandra Pant arrived in the Soviet Union on 6 February on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

At Sheremetyevo Airport the visitor and his retinue were greeted by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Defense minister; Army General I.M. Tretyak, Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, and Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, USSR deputy defense ministers; and generals, admirals, and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Indian and Soviet state flags were flying at the airport, an honor guard was drawn up on the apron, and a band played the two countries' national anthems.

The Indian defense minister received the honor guard commander's report and inspected the Soviet troops.

Talks with Yazov

PM091039 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Feb 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meeting at USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 8 February Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, had a meeting with K.C. Pant, defense minister of the Republic of India. Questions of mutual interest were discussed during friendly talks.

Participating in the talks were:

on the Soviet side—USSR Deputy Defense Ministers Army General I.M. Tretyak, Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, and Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin; Colonel General V.N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and other officials;

on the Indian side—T.N. Kaul, ambassador of the Republic of India to the USSR.

Army General D.T. Yazov gave a dinner in K.C. Pant's honor.

On the same day Krishna Chandra Pant, defense minister of the Republic of India, who is in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit, laid a wreath at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum. A wreath was also laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall.

Colonel General V.M. Arkhipov, commander of Moscow Military District, was present at the wreath-laying ceremony.

Kamentsev Receives India's Menon

PM091229 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In the Interests of Cooperation"]

[Text] On 5 February V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received K.P.S. Menon, secretary for external affairs at the Indian External Affairs Ministry, who is in Moscow in connection with Soviet-Indian political consultations.

The state of and the prospects for the development of Soviet-Indian trade and economic cooperation and also questions of the activity of the Soviet-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation were examined in detail during the friendly talks.

K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, and T.N. Kaul, Indian ambassador to the USSR, participated in the talks.

East Europe

Shevardnadze Receives Poland's Orzechowski

LD081558 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT
8 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Marian Orzechowski, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and foreign minister of Poland, arrived in Moscow today on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

He was welcomed at the airport by Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, and other officials.

Warsaw TV Report

LD082028 Warsaw Television Service in Polish
1830 GMT 8 Feb 88

[Text] [Announcer] Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski has arrived in Moscow on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The press announced the visit earlier. Television crews, correspondents, and reporters are waiting at the airport. A special plane from Warsaw has just landed. Let me remind you that the foreign minister's previous official visit to Moscow took place more than 2 years ago, in December 1985. In the meantime, Minister Orzechowski has paid working visits to Moscow.

Marian Orzechowski, accompanied by his wife, Lucyna, is being welcomed at the bottom of the airplane steps by Eduard Shevardnadze and his wife (?Manuli) and Soviet party and state authorities. Włodzimierz Natorf, Poland's ambassador, and representatives of Polish institutions in the Soviet capital are present.

Minister, how would you define the aims of your visit?

[Orzechowski] I would like to remind you that this is the first visit after the declaration, signed last April by Comrades Gorbachev and Wojciech Jaruzelski, which not only signifies a new stage and climate in mutual relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, but also outlines new horizons and frontiers for these relations, if one can put it this way. Also, this visit is taking place after the Washington agreement. Both our countries have much to discuss and to do to consolidate the trends won in Washington for the benefit of Europe and mankind.

[Shevardnadze in Russian fading into Polish translation] We meet often. Events develop so rapidly, both in Europe and the world, that we again need to examine and discuss international issues and bilateral relations. The agenda is extensive and very interesting: our talks

and Comrade Orzechowski's meetings with the party leadership, Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. I think the visit will be very interesting, effective, and useful.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much. [end recording]

Polish Council of Ministers on Foreign Issues

LD082328 Moscow TASS in English 2257 GMT
8 Feb 88

[Text] Warsaw February 9 TASS—The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington has created a favourable climate for expanding Poland's diplomatic and economic contacts in the world, the Polish Council of Ministers said at a meeting here Monday.

The meeting discussed key issues pertaining to foreign policy and cooperation with other countries.

It was noted at the meeting that the stabilisation of the social and political situation in the country, the introduction of the second stage of the economic reform, the consolidation of Poland's positions within the socialist community, normalisation of relations with capitalist countries, and active participation in the East-West political dialogue had created more favourable conditions for Polish influence on matters related to the building of security in central Europe.

All these factors have helped toward the popularisation of the initiative on reducing armaments and building trust in central Europe, advanced by Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

Poland will continue to centre its foreign policy efforts on the creation of a climate promoting the socialist renovation policy in Poland, which is similar to the perestroika (restructuring) drive in the Soviet Union.

Efforts to invigorate contacts with Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries will be an inalienable part of the Polish foreign policy line.

The campaign against the arms race and for stronger security and cooperation with various countries will remain top priority tasks of Poland's foreign policy.

CPSU Secretary Medvedev Receives RCP's Mihai

PM091231 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 88
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline "Official Reports"]

[Text] A group of RCP officials led by N. Mihai, RCP Central Committee candidate member and RCP Central Committee Foreign Relations Department deputy chief, visited the Soviet Union 27-30 January.

An exchange of views was held with the Romanian comrades on questions of the further development of ties between the CPSU and the RCP. They also acquainted themselves with the work experience of Kalinin CPSU Obkom in the leadership of restructuring.

N. Mihai was received by CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Medvedev. A conversation took place which passed in a friendly atmosphere.

Zaykov Attends Bulgarian Culture Center Opening
LD060024 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] The further strengthening of friendship and deepening of the multilateral cooperation between the Soviet and Bulgarian publics is to be facilitated by a culture and information center of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the USSR, the official opening of which took place on 5 February in Moscow.

Taking part in the ceremony were Comrade Zaykov, Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and Moscow City CPSU Committee first secretary; Comrades Voronov and Grigoriyev; heads of departments of the CPSU Central Committee; and others. Members of a Bulgarian Government delegation were present, headed by Yordanov, Bulgarian minister of culture, science, and education.

Further on Participants

PM091203 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4

[Ye. Spekhov report: "Opened for Friends"]

[Excerpts] The Bulgarian Culture and Information Center has opened in an old detached building on Moscow's Leningradskiy Prospect. [passage omitted]

A Bulgarian language study room will be opened at the center. A rich library and a reading room will open their doors.

Participating in the center's opening ceremony were L.N. Zaykov, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary and Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary; Yu.P. Voronov and V.A. Grigoriyev, CPSU Central Committee departments chiefs; P.Ya. Slezko, a CPSU Central Committee department first deputy chief; R.P. Fedorov, a CPSU Central Committee department deputy chief; and I.T. Frolov, Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society Central Board chairman.

Members of a Bulgarian governmental delegation headed by G. Yordanov, BCP Central Committee Politburo candidate member and Bulgarian minister of culture, science, and education, and G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, attended.

Ukrainian Official Receives New Bulgarian Consul
AU090942 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
5 Feb 88 p 1

[RATAU report: "A Conversation in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] On 4 February Yu.N. Yelchenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and secretary, received I. Georgiyev, who has assumed the mission of consul general of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Odessa, at the latter's request.

During a warm and friendly conversation, questions of mutual interest were discussed.

SFRY Firm Supplies Moscow Telephone Exchange
PM081151 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 6 Feb 88 p 3

[B. Lyanov report: "Computer Will Link Subscribers"]

[Text] Moscow—The USSR's first quasi-electronic automatic telephone station will be fully loaded with the transfer of the last few hundred telephones in the capital's center from the code "228" to the code "928." Representatives of the Yugoslav firm "Iskra"—which supplied the equipment—helped in its installation. The replacement of the obsolete devices with more modern ones has made it possible to make do with half the number of working areas which would have been required by automatic telephone stations of the previous generation and to reduce the number of servicing personnel by a factor of four. The no less complex stage of assimilating the new equipment now faces the communications workers.

West Europe

FRG's Spaeth Continues Visit to Moscow

Cooperation Accord Signed
LD081514 Hamburg DPA in German 1407 GMT
8 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Moscow, (DPA)—Lothar Spaeth, prime minister of Baden-Wuerttemberg, met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow on Monday. Details of the meeting are not known at the moment. Prior to this, Spaeth and Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Bureau for Machine Building in the USSR Council of Ministers, signed a memorandum by means of which the Soviet Union and Baden-Wuerttemberg wish to strengthen their economic relations, in particular in the sphere of heavy engineering. [passage omitted]

Individual passages of the memorandum, according to Manfred Zach, spokesman for the Stuttgart government, were put together "at the last moment". The two sides strive in the memorandum for closer cooperation in the

field of machine tool construction, electronic engineering, equipment construction, building technology, road building machinery, and agricultural machinery, as well as in the automobile industry. In this, "new forms of economic cooperation between the enterprises of the two sides" are to be developed. [passage omitted]

Meets Shevardnadze, Others

*LD081752 Moscow TASS in English 1735 GMT
8 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow February 8 (TASS)—Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today received Lothar Spaeth, minister-president of Baden-Wuerttemberg Land (the FRG), deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, on a visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation.

Some questions related to the development of the situation in Europe in the light of the results of the Soviet-American summit in Washington, as well as some problems of security and disarmament were discussed during the conversation.

Questions of practical cooperation, above all in the area of commercial, economic, scientific and technological ties, were in the focus during the discussion of bilateral relations. Both sides emphasised the need to break fresh ground in interaction in the area of economy, perfection of forms and structures of goods exchange. The important role of Baden-Wuerttemberg, one of the most industrialised lands of the FRG, in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union was noted. A solid basis has been created there for the further development of mutually advantageous ties between enterprises of that land of the FRG and Soviet foreign economic organizations.

Eduard Shevardnadze noted that the lifting of unjustifiable discriminatory restrictions and creation of optimal conditions for cooperation in the sphere of science-intensive products would breathe new life in commercial, economic, scientific and technological ties between the USSR and the FRG.

Lothar Spaeth showed interest in the processes of perestroika in the USSR, in its social and economic aspects. The Soviet side emphasised that the profound transformations in the USSR economy, creation of new foreign economic structures open the broadest of opportunities for the development of economic, scientific and technological ties before the Soviet Union's Western partners, the FRG included.

On the same day Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme

Soviet Anatoliy Dobrynin met with Lothar Spaeth. During a meeting which passed in an easy [nepriuzhdannyy] atmosphere, they had a conversation on a wide range of matters of the further constructive development of relations between the USSR and the FRG.

Member of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet Vadim Zagladin and FRG Ambassador to the Soviet Union Andreas Meyer-Landrut took part in the meeting.

Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ivan Silayev had a conversation with Lothar Spaeth and a group of businessmen from Baden-Wuerttemberg Land who arrived in Moscow together with him. A wide range of questions related to the state of and prospects for the development of mutually advantageous economic, scientific, technological and industrial cooperation in machine-building between Soviet enterprises, amalgamations and organizations and firms of Baden-Wuerttemberg Land was discussed.

Noting with satisfaction the progress reached in the development of cooperation and setting up a number of joint ventures the sides focused their attention on the problems which should be resolved in order to expand and deepen cooperation.

The talks passed in the spirit of openness [otkrovennost] and mutual understanding.

Ivan Silayev and Lothar Spaeth signed a joint memorandum reflecting the results and arrangements reached during the talks.

Received by Gorbachev

*LD091021 Hamburg DPA in German 0920 GMT
9 Feb 88*

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev received Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister-President Lothar Spaeth, for an exchange of views in Moscow today. The head of the Stuttgart government and deputy CDU chairman is the first Western politician to have the opportunity to talk to the general secretary after the announcement of a possible withdrawal date for the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

At the start of the talk in the Kremlin, Gorbachev recalled that he visited the Federal Republic in 1975 as a member of the Central Committee. On that occasion he heard the bells ringing in Stuttgart on 8 May (the day of the German capitulation). "In such a situation one thinks about where that is all going to head and where it is all going to end. But the fact that we are sitting here shows that something is changing."

Spaeth, who is accompanied by a high-ranking business delegation, presented the general secretary with a simulation robot, which is put together from a Soviet computer and a German mini-robot. "That is the model to which we are working," Spaeth said.

Comments on Gorbachev Meeting

LD091508 Hamburg DPA in German 1344 GMT
9 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev has stressed the USSR's interest in an expansion of German-Soviet relations on all levels. Gorbachev made clear that the USSR was "very interested in the intensification of the political dialogue and the development of a political climate which reveals new opportunities in the Soviet-German relationship and which, according to his ideas, should be filled actively by both sides," Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister-President Lothar Spaeth told newsmen today, after an exchange of views lasting just about 2 and 1/2 hours with the Kremlin leader.

The USSR also had a very strong interest in an expansion of economic relations, Spaeth said. Not only the political leadership was pressing here for things to be changed. This insistence—"Let us make headway"—had run through all his talks in Moscow. This was a clear difference, compared with his last visit to the USSR 3 years ago. Spaeth, who has come to the USSR with a large business delegation, intended to travel on to Lenin-grad on Thursday.

Gorbachev worked on the basis "of a very realistic way of looking at things" and wanted "to break out somewhat from the relatively rigid position of the security strategies," in order, "perhaps by disregarding ideological barriers considerably", to make the attempt to reach a positive overall European development," Spaeth said. With Gorbachev, this sounded not only like a "euphoric vision", but like "an advance", which Gorbachev thought was possible, despite all problems, given goodwill from all those involved.

Gorbachev shared the view that the bilateral relationship should not be restricted to the issues of disarmament and security but that a "constructive component"—the expansion of economic, cultural, and scientific and technical cooperation—should be added, Spaeth said. This had "met with very open interest" from Gorbachev. Both sides believed that the chances for confidence-building and the solving even of complicated political problems were all the greater, the more constructively the bridges were built.

Gorbachev evidently wanted, whether with the Berlin issue or with his latest decision on Afghanistan, "to give signals in all areas that there must be a more constructive opportunity for international balance and international collaboration than the strategic security position which is tailored purely for the superpowers," Spaeth said. The

Kremlin leader attached "a particular role" to the Europeans here, "and my impression is that this also quite clearly includes the Federal Republic".

The dialogue which had now been set in motion would "with certainty" find "its benchmark" in Gorbachev's meeting with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He had not spoken to Gorbachev about the date; however, this would take place "via the diplomatic channels envisaged for that purpose", Spaeth said. He had met Kohl in Stuttgart before his 5-day visit to the USSR.

Spaeth said that he had also addressed "the topic of Berlin in the European context" with Gorbachev. However, Spaeth declined to give more precise details of this. "We exchanged views on that," he said. "I'm sorry, but I do not wish to be more precise."

Interviewed on INF Treaty

LD090859 Moscow TASS in English 0825 GMT
9 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—Lothar Spaeth, prime minister of the West German Baden-Wuerttemberg Land and deputy chairman of the Christian-Democratic Union who is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, has said that his talks here have covered both general political problems and bilateral economic cooperation.

Speaking in a TASS interview, he said both sides were unanimous that the INF Treaty must be ratified as soon as possible.

"We are for banning chemical weapons at the earliest possible date and for the ABM Treaty to be preserved. We want the next Soviet-American summit to play the decisive role in cutting back strategic offensive arms.

"I think one can hope that this will be so and then it will be possible on this basis to take further steps in the European policy of disarmament," Spaeth continued.

He said that the talks in Moscow had produced an understanding on closer economic cooperation.

"We held intense discussions on improvements in cooperation and on training personnel and upgrading their qualifications. I have the impression that there is a good possibility to take advantage of the general tenor of relations between the two countries and build as many constructive bridges as possible in economic and cultural fields.

"This will be a contribution to the positive developments we are now witnessing," the Baden-Wuerttemberg prime minister said.

"i think we should broaden our relations soberly and pragmatically, without making two mistakes, namely falling into euphoria, on the one hand, and yielding to scepticism, on the other, so as not to miss opportunities for cooperation," Spaeth added.

Pogodin Comments on Visit

*LD081712 Moscow World Service in English
1410 GMT 8 Feb 88*

[Aleksandr Pogodin Commentary]

[Text] The minister-president of the West German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Lothar Spaeth, is on an official visit in Moscow. Aleksandr Pogodin comments, and this is what he writes.

Mr Spaeth is going to be received by the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, which is evidence that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to relations with Federal Germany. Mikhail Gorbachev's recent meeting in Moscow with the minister-president of Bavaria, Franz-Josef Strauss, and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to West Germany are other examples. Both sides are unanimous that a Soviet-West German summit should be held in the near future.

Intensive contacts are of major importance not only to the USSR and Federal Germany. The state of affairs between the two countries has always been one of the main factors of the European political climate and the international situation in general. Stability in Soviet-West German relations, Mikhail Gorbachev said, means stability in Europe and meets the interests of both countries and the European and world community of nations. The USSR does not call for reconsidering the roles and places they have in the systems and alliances they are affiliated with. Even if they stick to their current commitments, they can act together on behalf of peace.

The Soviet Union appreciates West Germany's efforts that have promoted the INF Treaty with the United States, eliminating intermediate and shorter-range missiles. Both countries stand very close on the issue of signing an early chemical weapons ban. The Soviet Union and West Germany are confident that the problems yet unsolved must be settled without delay. Naturally, their positions are not as close on all crucial issues. There are quite a few major differences. The Soviet-West German relations not so very long ago were marked by mistrust, suspicion, and hostility which seriously affected the international situation. But if we compare those times with today, we'll see the fruitful results a new way of political thinking can lead to. I am convinced that the latest Soviet-West German contacts will continue this vital process.

Kohl Addresses Arms Control Conference

*LD062231 Moscow TASS in English 2212 GMT
6 Feb 88*

[Text] Bonn February 6 TASS—The 25th international conference sponsored by the West German military science society Wehrkunde opened in Bavaria's capital, Munich, today. The main items on its agenda are the problems of disarmament and arms control, the course of the Soviet-U.S. talks in the area of disarmament, the further steps along the road of disarmament and arms reduction, discussed by strategists of the NATO military bloc in new historic conditions.

Speaking at the conference, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl highly assessed the state of East-West relations, noted that they develop in a positive direction. He said the Soviet-American summit meeting signified the beginning of a new stage in international politics, promoted the achievement of progress in every area of East-West relations, bringing closer the positions of the sides in the area of disarmament and arms control. Emphasizing much importance of concrete steps in this direction, including the Soviet-American treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles signed in Washington, the chancellor said that the development of international relations is closely linked with the Soviet leadership's policy of new thinking, with Soviet initiatives, at the same time he tried to ascribe the chief merit in reaching progress to Western countries, to the tough stand of the NATO bloc.

The FRG Government, Helmut Kohl said, declares for the undelayed coming into force of the INF Treaty. The chancellor urged representatives of the Senate of the U.S. Congress to promote an early ratification of the treaty, suiting the interests of the security of all European peoples. He also welcomed the efforts of the USSR and the USA in the area of achieving arrangements on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms and emphasized special interest of the FRG in the successful conclusion of the Geneva talks on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

At the same time the head of the Bonn cabinet declared against the elimination of missiles of a range less than 500 kilometres, viewing them as an important composite part of the NATO strategy of "nuclear deterrence". As one of the pretexts of the refusal of the "third zero option", he advanced the thesis of "considerable edge of the Warsaw Treaty-countries in conventional armaments".

Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared for the further strengthening of the NATO military bloc and cooperation of the West European allies with the United States, emphasized the need for the presence of U.S. forces in the European territory. The head of the West German

Government also declared in support of the creation of Bonn-Paris axis and spoke highly of the development of relations between the FRG and France in the area of military cooperation.

The two-day conference is attended by leading statesmen and politicians of the FRG, among them chairman of the CSU Franz Josef Strauss and Defence Minister Manfred Woerner. Among the foreign participants there are six defence ministers of the NATO member-countries, including Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense Frank Carlucci, other high-ranking military and politicians.

FRG 'Can Play a Positive Role' in Disarmament

*PM081445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 88
Second Edition p 4*

[Own correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch under the rubric "FRG: Disarmament Is a Topical Subject": "When Will the Sinister Shadows Disappear"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, February—[passage omitted] During and after the Soviet foreign minister's recent visit to Bonn, many statements were made in support of the INF Treaty in the FRG (we are not only talking about the ruling Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union-Free Democratic Party coalition but also about the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the "Greens" Party, and the German Communist Party). Moreover, it has frequently been said that the disarmament process must be continuous and that such important and urgent questions as achieving an accord on conventional and tactical nuclear arms, a reduction in strategic offensive systems, and a universal ban on chemical weapons are next.

As for the latter, USSR and FRG positions were seen to coincide here, to many people's surprise, and Bonn has been seen to disagree with its main overseas partner, which is continuing to pile up obstacles on the path of ridding the earth of chemical weapons under cover of references to the imaginary imperfection of verification measures.

The USSR and the FRG also found certain points of contact on problems of tactical nuclear weapons. This is understandable: For, apart from the FRG, there is no other country in Western Europe on whose territory so many U.S. nuclear systems would be concentrated. It is no coincidence that the Hamburg liberal weekly DIE ZEIT has warned: "People who intend to destroy intermediate-range missiles in earnest must not circumvent the treaty by deploying new air- or sea-launched missiles: The Soviets will pay us back in our own coin. Everyone who is actively committed to disarmament must also help reduce the arsenal of 4,600 mainly tactical nuclear charges—approximately 4,000 of which are located on FRG territory—which are capable not of protecting our country but only of devastating it."

Yes, there are people in the Western camp who would like to "compensate" for the loss of the Pershing-2's and the cruise missiles. Thus, U.S. General Galvin, NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, supports outright "arms upgrading" in the tactical weapons sphere. He is also supported by M. Woerner, present FRG defense minister and NATO secretary general elect.

In a recent interview with DIE WELT, Federal Chancellor H. Kohl pointed out that it is the FRG's aim to "create by and large a stable correlation of forces at the lowest possible level, for which NATO must work out an integrated concept."

But as yet none has been forthcoming. The North Atlantic bloc has still not been able to work out a unified concept either on tactical nuclear weapons or on conventional armaments, although people in Brussels are well aware of the Soviet proposals in these directions, including a readiness to remove the imbalances.

It has emerged that Bonn, like its NATO partners, does not want a "third zero," that is, the complete elimination of tactical nuclear systems. But will the dynamics of dialogue be halted because of this? The main thing, the supporters of an "uninterrupted" disarmament process think reasonably, is that there is a desire to seek and find a practical compromise solution on a balance in conventional forces and tactical nuclear systems. Therefore, when the USSR proposed a new approach to unraveling this knot of problems—the initiation of talks on conventional arms, including so-called dual-purpose systems, and separate discussion of questions associated with the strictly nuclear components of such systems—the Soviet option, judging by press coverage, met with interest on the Rhine.

But interest is one thing and practical steps are another. Disarmament problems must be solved, but not only by talking about them. Here a great deal depends on official Bonn, which has already demonstrated, as happened in the course of the elaboration of the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles, that it can play a positive role in this important matter.

FRG's French-Supported Nuclear Ambitions Hit

*PM081519 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 88
Second Edition p 5*

[Own correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch under the "Press Testimony" rubric: "On a Nuclear Basis?"]

[Text] Bonn, 30 Jan—It is not without alarm that the West German public is watching how certain circles in the country, taking advantage of the "Friendship with France" slogan which is popular among the people, are forging a military axis between Paris and Bonn.

Recently the 25th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty between France and the FRG was marked with pomp in Paris. Bells rang, jubilee speeches were heard, choirs

sang, and the crisp step of the honor guard company consisting of French and West German soldiers rang out. The latest edition of the weekly STERN just off the press begins its article under the "Military Policy" with a description of these celebrations. The headline of the article involuntarily arouses alarm: "Nuclear Trigger Partner."

It is a question, STERN writes, not only of symbolic celebrations. Socialist Francois Mitterrand and conservative Jacques Chirac, the head of the French Government, want to change France's defense strategy. The Germans are to play a decisive role in this and give their assent to the siting of new weapons of mass destruction in the FRG.

As yet Mitterrand and Chirac—possible future rivals in the spring presidential elections—are concealing their intentions behind the formula: France's independence will henceforth be defended not on the Rhine but on the Elbe. And again: Not a single French missile is to go off on German soil. However, the president and prime minister's trusted security advisers say, without beating around the bush, that the French intend in the near future to change their defense policy: After the withdrawal of the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, the vacuum is to be filled by French nuclear missiles. Paris strategists are even thinking about siting neutron weapons.

True, the magazine continues, the socialist C. Hernu, former French defense minister, answers in the negative the question whether France is endeavoring to install its tactical nuclear missiles in the FRG. But everything will change, however, when the new "Hades" missile with a range of 350 km is commissioned as of 1992: "I say that the 'Hades,' armed with a nuclear warhead, must stand on German soil. I do not see any reasons why we cannot equip the Bundeswehr with 'Hades' missiles."

STERN writes that in order to make the siting plans more attractive, the French are seducing conservatives on the other side of the Rhine by promising that they will also have their finger on the nuclear trigger. By way of an intermediate stage in the creation with the FRG's full and equal participation of "European nuclear-capable armed forces," Paris is offering Bonn the right to a voice in the decision on employing the French missiles.... The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which is close to the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], predicts in a report on recent security problem debates in France that as a result the FRG "will in a roundabout way acquire the right to own nuclear weapons."

The weekly points out that at present certain representatives of the FRG's ruling conservative bloc, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU], are frightened by "overt nuclear cooperation with France." They believe it is necessary to start first with the sphere of "conventional armaments."

In 1984, STERN recalls, Juergen Todenhoefer, then CDU/CSU Bundestag group expert on disarmament questions, demanded the creation of a European nuclear defense council with German participation.

"Among allies in the West, as in the Eastern bloc, anxiety is growing in connection with the German-French games," the weekly continues, referring to utterances by British Prime Minister M. Thatcher and statements by spokesmen from The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Spain, and other countries. "The GDR leader Erich Honecker used his visit to Paris to make Mitterrand understand that 'new military structures' will not bring 'anything good'..."

In order to block the creation of the Bonn-Paris military axis, the "Green" party is seeking to enshrine in the country's Constitution a point about the FRG's renunciation of nuclear weapons. "But the CDU/CSU," STERN writes, "does not want this. Hardliners from the CDU and the CSU are, on the contrary, impatiently awaiting 1995, when the term of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty banning the FRG from owning and producing such weapons expires."

Certain politicians in the FRG are already in a hurry to seek to give a nuclear foundation to the talks on friendship with France. This is a dangerous undertaking.

Soviet-French Symposium on Disarmament Held
LD081508 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1130 GMT 8 Feb 88

[Text] Paris—A symposium has taken place here of scientists from France and the USSR. Under discussion were current international problems. Those taking part in the symposium emphasized the measures aimed at reducing nuclear and conventional arms. In spite of the divergence of views that exists in approaching the solution of a number of problems, it was noted that the positions of the representatives of the USSR and France coincide on the question of the need to preserve the ABM Treaty, on the impermissibility of setting up SDI, as well as on several regional conflicts.

U.S. Attempt To Move F-16's To Italy Viewed
LD051950 Moscow TASS in English 1920 GMT
5 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The United States is annoyed at Spain's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. F-16 fighter bombers from the U.S. air base of Torrejon de Ardoz. But they intend to take advantage of these developments to deploy those planes, capable of being nuclear delivery vehicles, still closer to the borders of socialist countries.

U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci who held talks with chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers Giovanni Goria on the question of moving 72 F-16 U.S. aircraft from Spain to the Apennines said at a press conference in Rome that the United States does not intend to reduce its armed forces in Western Europe by a single plane, by a single soldier.

According to press reports, Italian Defense Minister Valerio Zanone said that Italy is prepared to study the question of the basing of U.S. planes in its territory, since Italy is aware of its importance as NATO's southern flank.

In an effort to justify their readiness to grant the United States new air force bases in Italian territory, Rome's official representatives try to create the impression that the situation in the southern flank also for front aviation, helicopters and artillery. [sentence as received]

Reports appeared in the Italian press that U.S. F-16 fighter bombers will be deployed in the area where U.S. cruise missiles, to be eliminated under the INF Treaty, are based now. U.S. planes with a range of about 1.5 thousand will now be based 1,000 kilometres east of Spain and will perform the same tasks as "Tomahawk" missiles that are to be eliminated. Thus it will be another measure aimed at a "compensation", another attempt at emasculating the essence of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty.

The newspaper RINASCITA that appears in Rome says that if the U.S. fighter bombers are based in Italy, this will inevitably lead to the further heightening of tension in the Mediterranean.

Portuguese Resistance to Pentagon Plans Viewed

LD051631 Moscow in Portuguese to Portugal
2100 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Commentary by observer Yuriy Konstantinov]

[Text] The 1-day visit by the Pentagon chief to the Portuguese capital did not bring about the corrections in bilateral relations which Sao Bento [prime minister's official residence] expected. Frank Carlucci even hinted that the best way of paying the compensations that the Social Democratic government insists upon so much is to increase the supply of U.S. military equipment to Portugal.

(?And what about the) Lajes military base? Shortly before Frank Carlucci's visit, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva said that his government will be studying the problem of cancelling the agreement on the Pentagon's lease of this large base in the Azores. The head of government stressed that the United States is obliged to increase both the payment for the lease as well as the military funding to Portugal which, over the last 3 years, has gone down by about \$100 million. We shall continue to staunchly defend our position, the prime minister said on the eve of the Pentagon chief's arrival. But it seems

that abroad the proposals of its Iberian partner are not taken seriously. Taking its interests into account is not Washington's wont. The eloquent example of this off-hand approach was given last year by the Pentagon when it considered itself free from the annual payment of [number indistinct] for the Lajes base.

Now Sao Bento would like to obtain the greatest amount of dollars possible from the Americans, both for the Lajes base as well as for the future construction of a space tracking station in Almodovar and for the Beja base so coveted by Frank Carlucci's department. But for the time being, the talks have not produced the desired results. The drawn out haggling will go on. But this is only the financial facet of the problem. There is still the problem of Portugal's security and its sovereignty, which are not even being touched upon during this haggling. But it is a cause of concern for many Portuguese. This is proved by the antiwar movement in the country, by the proclamation of nuclear-free zones by municipalities and Azorean public opinion's demand that the archipelago should be demilitarized.

Latin America & Caribbean

Castro Sends Message of Thanks to Soviet Leaders

PM091213 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 88
Second Edition p 1

[Cuban President Fidel Castro undated message thanking Soviet leadership bodies for Cuban anniversary greetings]

[Text] To the CPSU Central Committee

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

The USSR Council of Ministers

On behalf of our party, the Council of State, the government, and the entire Cuban people we express gratitude for your fraternal message voicing solidarity on the 29th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution's victory.

That message attests once again to the unbreakable bonds of friendship between our peoples, parties, and governments and confirms that our relations will enjoy further development in the course of the joint struggle for peace and social progress.

Fidel Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee and president of the Councils of State and Ministers of the Republic of Cuba.

Educational Agreement Signed With Cuban School
LD071415 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 7 Feb 88

[Text] An agreement has been signed in Havana on cooperation between the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee and the Nico Lopez Higher Party School in Cuba during the current year and ensuing years.

Under the agreement both higher party institutions have undertaken to enhance the effectiveness of their cooperation by practical steps using reciprocal exchanges of teaching and research cadres and the participation of scientists in international conferences, symposiums, seminars, and scientific-practical conferences. The two sides agreed to carry out a number of joint research tasks.

Nicaragua Prepared for Direct Talks With Contras
LD090917 Moscow TASS in English 0717 GMT
9 Feb 88

[Text] Managua February 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Kurguzov:

The Nicaraguan Government has again said it is prepared for direct dialogue with the chiefs of armed counter-revolutionaries.

The president's office reported in a communique that at a Monday meeting between representatives of the government and Cardinal Bosco Vivas, intermediary at talks with the contras on a reciprocal end to military activities, Rene Nunez, minister of the presidency, conveyed to him the government's proposal to Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo and the contra leadership for another round of the negotiations on February 10-12 in Guatemala in keeping with an earlier agreement.

This would help bring about an early end to bloodletting in Nicaragua and prevent the deaths of hundreds of civilians.

Vivas said that Cardinal Obando y Bravo asked for the round to be postponed until February 18-20 as he would not be able to attend the planned sessions.

It became known that the contra leadership decided to put off the talks with the Sandinista government in view of the refusal of U.S. Congress to approve further millions upon millions of dollars to the mercenary forces. Alfredo Cesar, one of the contra chieftains, said that this does not mean any renunciation of the talks and only postpones them.

The communique described the decision of the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary leadership, which prefers a military solution to the problem to a peaceful settlement, as contradicting the Guatemala peace accords.

Peru CP Leader Cabled After Assassination Bid
PM091439 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 88
Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee cable to Peruvian Communist Party Secretary General Jorge del Prado; undated]

[Text] To Comrade Jorge del Prado, secretary general of the Peruvian Communist Party Central Committee

Dear Comrade Jorge del Prado!

Soviet Communists learned with indignation of the attempt on your life during which your party comrades were wounded.

We express our fraternal solidarity with you, a staunch fighter for the interests of the Peruvian working people, for peace, and democracy. We wish you good health and success in your work.

CPSU Central Committee

Briefs

Chamber of Trade With Brazil

Brasilia, 8 Feb (TASS)—A Brazil-USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry has been set up in Brazil on the initiative of the country's business circles. It is headed by Silvano Valentini, an influential Brazilian businessman and general manager of the Brazilian branch of the Fiat concern. Among the chamber's vice directors are leaders of major Brazilian companies and representatives of the governments of the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The headquarters of the Chamber of Trade and Industry is situated in Belo Horizonte, the administrative center of the State of Minas Gerais, occupying premises of the Federation of Industry of Brazil's second most important industrial center after Sao Paulo. The aims of the chamber are to promote the development of Soviet-Brazilian trade and the exchange of information and to seek new forms of trade and economic cooperation, primarily by means of setting up joint enterprises. [Excerpt] *[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0855 GMT 8 Feb 88 LD]*

Political & Social

Comparison of Gorbachev Statement on Afghanistan

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 9 February 1988 carries in its Second Edition on page 1 a statement on Afghanistan by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The PRAVDA version has been compared with the Moscow Domestic Service Russian version published in the 8 February Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 34-36, revealing the following variations:

Page 35, column one, paragraph four, last sentence reads in PRAVDA: Well, we would be only too happy to have.... (rewording)

Page 35, column two, paragraph eight, first sentence reads in PRAVDA: The earth is literally spotted with such dangerous wounds. (supplying "dangerous")

Same paragraph, second sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...the Middle East, in connection with the war between Iraq and Iran, in South Africa, in Kampuchea, or.... (supplying additional elements).

'Truth' Restored in Bukharin Case

PM081725 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 88
Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Chernyak: "Reestablishing the Truth. Notes on the Proceedings of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum"]

[Text] The air is becoming increasingly pure and it is becoming easier to breathe in our common home. Windows are being carefully cleaned so that as much light as possible can pour in, stuffy back rooms are being aired, and cobwebs are being removed. Everything is being put in its place and "blank pages" in our history are being filled in. One testimony to this was the USSR Supreme Court Plenum on 4 February, which examined the USSR prosecutor general's appeal on the case of N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, A.P. Rozengolts, M.A. Chernov, P.P. Bulanov, L.G. Levin, I.N. Kazakov, V.A. Maksimov-Dikovskiy, P.P. Kryuchkov, and Kh.G. Rakovskiy, who were tried as members of the so-called "Anti-Soviet Rightist-Trotskyist bloc."

Our path as trailblazers was far from simple. It was full of questing, heroism, and drama too. The difficulties of that period were described in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the festivities devoted to the 70th anniversary of October. The burden of the material and moral legacy of the old world and the innovative nature of the transformations all had a full impact.

The search for the right path took place in conditions of acute struggle, in an atmosphere of political debate. Before and after the revolution and during the first years of Soviet power, by no means all party leaders shared

Lenin's views on a number of key problems. Moreover, Lenin's recommendations could not embrace all the specific questions of building the new society. The nature of the struggle was also considerably complicated by personal rivalry in the party leadership. The old differences which had existed while Lenin was still alive also made themselves felt in the new situation, and in a very acute form.

As is known, extremely crude deviations from the principles of socialism occurred and many innocent people suffered. We know now that the political accusations and repressions against a number of party and state leaders and against many Communists and nonparty people, economic and military cadres, scientists, and cultural figures were the result of deliberate falsification and crude arbitrariness.

The party has made a principled assessment of these facts. Many of the charges were revoked, especially after the 20th party congress. Thousands of innocent people who had suffered were rehabilitated. However, this process was not completed. Now, in accordance with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee October (1987) Plenum, it is being continued. A Central Committee Politburo commission is working on the further examination of materials connected with the repressions that took place in the thirties, forties, and early fifties, and the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the country's Supreme Court are thoroughly investigating cases.

Time has unquestionably left its mark and made the task of finding a correct, just, and lawful solution in these cases more difficult. More difficult, but not impossible. Documents are being scrupulously examined and facts checked and rechecked. Facts, as is known, are stubborn things and there is no getting away from them. In the case in question, hundreds of volumes and thousands upon thousands of documents have been studied.

V.I. Terebilov, presiding, gave the floor to M.A. Marov, member of the USSR Supreme Court, who briefed the assembly—38 authoritative judges—on the results of the work that has been carried out. And although they were familiar with the details of both the USSR prosecutor general's appeal and the materials of the case, they listened with the utmost attention.

"Around 50 years ago, the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium, chaired by V.V. Ulrikh and with A.Ya. Vyshinskiy as state prosecutor, began examining the case in which an appeal has now been lodged by the USSR prosecutor general," Mikhail Alekseyevich Marov reported. "Twenty-one people were committed to trial in this case."

This group, referred to as the "Rightist-Trotskyist Bloc" in the indictment, is alleged to have pursued the aim of abolishing the existing social and state system in the USSR, restoring capitalism, and restoring the power of

the bourgeoisie. These aims were supposed to be achieved by means of espionage, sabotage, wrecking, and terrorist activities aimed at undermining the economic and defense might of the Soviet Union.

The rapporteur gave brief personal data about each of the accused.

N.I. Bukharin joined the revolutionary movement in 1905, took part in the 1905-1907 revolutions, and joined the party in 1906. He was arrested by the tsarist authorities several times and was exiled to the north, from where he escaped abroad. He took part in the October armed uprising in Moscow, and from December 1917 he was editor of PRAVDA and later IZVESTIYA. He was elected candidate member and member of the Politburo. He was a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

A.I. Rykov was the son of a peasant and had been a party member since 1899. He was arrested nine times by the tsarist government for revolutionary activities. After the revolution, he was people's commissar for internal affairs, later chairman of the All-Russian National Economic Council, deputy chairman and later chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars, and people's commissar for communications between 1931 and 1936. He was a member of the Politburo between 1923 and 1930.

A.P. Rozengolts had been a member of the party since 1905. He was a participant in the Great October Socialist Revolution and the civil war and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic. In the twenties, he joined the Trotskyists, but later broke with them. Prior to his arrest he was chief of an administration of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

M.A. Chernov had been a member of the Menshevik Party between 1916 and 1920. From 1920 he was a member of the VKP(B) [All-union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], Ukrainian people's commissar for trade, member of the collegium of the USSR People's Commissariat for Trade, and from 1934 USSR people's commissar for agriculture.

Kh.G. Rakovskiy was born in Bulgaria, had been a member of social democratic organizations since 1889, and headed Bulgarian and Romanian social democratic delegations at congresses. He had been a party member since 1918, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, and ambassador to Britain and France.

P.P. Bulanov had been a party member since 1918. He served in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and from 1929 worked as secretary at the People's Commissariat.

Among those sentenced were two doctors. L.G. Levin, consultant in the Kremlin medical and hygiene administration and doctor of medical sciences, and I.N. Kazakov, a nonparty man, director and scientific leader of the State Scientific Research Institute of Metabolism and Endocrine Disorders. V.A. Maksimov-Dikovskiy was chief of the central bookkeeping department of the People's Commissariat for Railroads at the time of his arrest, and P.P. Kryuchkov was director of the A.M. Gorkiy Museum.

The sentences were passed 13 March 1938. For betraying the motherland via espionage, wrecking, sabotage, and terrorist activities, the aforementioned were sentenced to be shot and have their property confiscated.

Readers have no doubt noticed that on this occasion, the USSR Supreme Soviet Plenum examined the cases of 10 of the people who were sentenced. The verdicts on 10 others were quashed earlier. I.A. Zelenskiy, Tsentrosoyuz chairman, V.I. Ivanov, USSR people's commissar for the timber industry, P.T. Zubarev, USSR deputy people's commissar for agriculture, G.F. Grinko, USSR people's commissar for finance, F. Khozdzhayev, chairman of the Uzbek Council of People's Commissars, S.A. Bessonov, counselor at the USSR embassy in Germany, D.D. Pletnev, professor at the Institute of Functional Diagnostics, N.N. Krestinskiy, USSR first deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, A. Ikramov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, and V.F. Sharangovich, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, had already been rehabilitated.

However, let us return to the examination of the case in question. The speaker noted that, according to the demands of the law, a verdict of guilty can only be based on the sum total of mutually consistent evidence that has been checked out during the trial and whose authenticity is not open to question. Each individual piece of evidence must be carefully checked by the court and objectively assessed in the verdict. These demands were not met in the case in question.

In the assessment of evidence by the investigative organs and the court, key requirements of the law stating that no evidence, including the testimony of the defendant, possesses any preestablished force or advantage over other evidence were ignored. An admission of guilt by the defendants can only be used as a basis for a verdict of guilty in conjunction with other evidence.

In succession, members of the USSR Supreme Court I.M. Alkhazov, R.K. Brize, R.G. Tikhomirnov, and A.N. Yakimenko took the floor. A discussion in legal language took place. No one in the hall gave way to emotions. It was just facts, more facts, and proof. The methods used by the investigation, the ways in which confessions had been obtained, and the course of the legal proceedings were examined.

On what did speakers focus attention above all? The indictment of the defendants was couched in general terms. It was based on confessions. There was no other evidence. And the manner in which those confessions were obtained is reflected in the materials. Much of the testimony was extorted as a result of crude violations of legality, infringement of the defendants' legally guaranteed rights, and failure to observe procedural rules. Some records of interrogations and confrontations of witnesses and other procedural documents were falsified. Defendants were forced by means of threats, violence, and deception to give false evidence against themselves and others, and interrogation records and explanations were drawn up in advance and arbitrarily amended.

Having examined the materials relating to the case and heard the report of M.A. Marov and the speeches delivered by USSR Prosecutor General A.M. Rekunkov, members of the Supreme Court, and USSR Supreme Court Chairman V.I. Terebilov, the plenum unanimously adopted a resolution rescinding the verdict and dismissing the case against N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, Kh.g. Rakovskiy, A.P. Rozengolts, M.A. Chernov, P.P. Bulanov, L.G. Levin, I.N. Kazakov, V.A. Maksimov-Dikovskiy, and P.P. Kryuchkov due to the lack of elements of crime in their actions.

G.G. Yagoda, former people's commissar for internal affairs, was also sentenced in the case. No appeal was lodged in his case.

...A great and righteous deed. Truth has been reestablished. However, there is no need to make a sensation out of this. This has been done on the initiative of the party itself, which is leading the restructuring and restoring justice in everything.

Interest in our history is great at the moment. "Over the past 2 years, I have learned more than during the previous 50," Muscovite A. Vasilyev told me. Another person I spoke to remarked: "What is the use of stirring up the past?"

It is impossible to agree with the latter's viewpoint. To think like that is to scorn the historical truth, to fail to honor the memory of innocent people who fell victim to lawlessness and tyranny. We must not forget that people learn from mistakes, and nations learn from tragedies. A truthful analysis of the past will help us resolve our current problems, the problems of democratization, legality, glasnost, and overcoming of bureaucracy—in short, the crucial problems of restructuring.

Stalin-era Prosecutor's Legacy Condemned
PM031401 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jan 88 p 13

[Article by Arkadiy Vaksberg under the rubric "Morals and the Law": "The Queen Of Evidence"; first five paragraphs are LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] The other day the French paper LE MONDE carried the following report:

"During a discussion evening on problems of history—it was on Thursday 7 January at the A.A. Fadeyev House of Writers in Moscow—the Soviet dramatist Shatrov said that an article which was to have been published in the next issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA about Andrey Vyshinskiy, the general prosecutor who had a part to play in the 1936-1938 Stalin trials, had been banned by the official censor.

"I am very worried about the future of restructuring," Mikhail Shatrov said in the presence of several hundred people, mainly members of the intelligentsia, brandishing Arkadiy Vaksberg's article."

This incident did occur at the Central House of Writers. What was USSR Writers' Union Board Secretary M. Shatrov doing "brandishing" an article that was not yet ready for publication?! All it needed was one telephone call and he would have found out that the text was being subjected to the normal editorial process, which consists of tidying up and checking facts. This has now been done and the article is presented for the reader's scrutiny.

We hope that LE MONDE will report this too.

They had been waiting for him since the morning, but matters of exceptional state importance had prevented the important visitor from arriving at the appointed time. The participants in the All-Union Lawyers' Conference strolled uncomplainingly around the corridors, suspending for a time the heated encounters that had been taking place for several days: The man himself would come and present his argument. He would have the last word....

I was not a conference participant, but I was not a gate-crasher either: Law students were welcome then at any scientific forum.

"He has arrived," "he is coming," "he is coming up"—I can still hear the whisper that suddenly went round the room. I can remember my heart pounding alarmingly but deliciously when there appeared below his noble head, hair flecked with gray, almost matching his mouse-gray uniform and shoulder straps the color of burnished steel—at that time the diplomat's strange garb seemed the height of good taste and a model of elegance. The whole of Soviet justice lined the stairs, forming a broad gangway. The guest strode smartly (document case under his arm) up the steps and—surely not!—suddenly stopped. "Again I cannot. Tomorrow too," he told someone standing right next to me. "Be so kind as to excuse me, I simply cannot." What was he referring to, who was he apologizing to? I don't know. I did not see. I only saw him, standing two steps away from me: short of stature, solidly built, fragrant-smelling. A beautiful gray fleck in his hair. Narrow mustache. Spectacles in an elegant frame. A strong, piercing, penetrating gaze behind the glasses. Slightly narrowed eyes—steely too.

A minute, no more, that I have remembered all my life.

The assembly hall of the law institute was named for him. The popular, not the official name. It was known as Vyshinskiy Hall. Why? The explanation was that he had spoken there. Not just once, perhaps. But once he had spoken, the hall was immortalized. And there he was again, giving everyone his deserts. He fulminated against someone, leaning forward, his steely eyes glinting behind his glasses.

I do not recall against whom he was fulminating or why, but it is the simplest thing in the world to get hold of the journals of those years and read them. But what I remember, I did not read in them.

And what I remember is the smooth manner of speaking, without notes, without any hems and haws, without any as it were's and having said that's—grammatically precise, no editing needed; they were almost forgotten even then, the now long-gone fine oratorical devices—modulation of the voice, measured rises and falls, telling pauses, the sound grounding in logic and rhetoric, and the passion skillfully injected into every sentence; the memory and erudition—extensive quotations by heart from ancient and modern treatises, complete mastery of names, dates, and facts. And, finally, most important of all, most amazing of all: an unprecedented combination of erudition, learning, and an extravagant display of education and foul-mouthed abuse hurled in such a natural and unconstrained way, as if the explosive mixture was normal, everyday patois.

And the abuse was no ordinary abuse. Each term acquired a touch of the sinister. Because the meaning invested in it had a political foundation. The person being criticized by the man himself had not simply made some mistake or other (if there had been a mistake), but was certainly under a bad influence or working for foreign capitalist sharks.

Anyone wanting today to learn about the career of a man whose name spread horror throughout the country for many years would have to work rather hard, piecing together a mosaic of skillfully gleaned data contained in reference works, encyclopedias, and dictionaries. Time governs the biographer's choice of milestones amid the welter of events, illuminating certain facts at various stages of history, while leaving others in obscurity. But, when drawn from various publications and put together, they enable one to see odd zigzags in a career of obsequious mediocrity elevated to the kind of level where it was able to revel in its might, trampling on the down-trodden and toying with the destinies of millions.

We would learn from the 1951 Grand Soviet Encyclopedia that Vyshinskiy became active in the revolutionary movement in 1902, and the information is not untrue, but it is not clear either—to those who do not read the biographical data contained in the previous edition of

the encyclopedia 22 years before. It gives a far more accurate picture of his past: a Menshevik who decided to go over to the Bolsheviks only when power was firmly in their hands.

This past was obviously a nagging thorn. Psychologically he was in a state of tension throughout his life. In such situations people behave differently (I am not counting those who have honestly changed their views). Some crumple, withdraw into themselves, find a quiet corner somewhere: Perhaps they will be forgotten. Others curry favor, obsequiously demonstrating their utter devotion to their new masters. Yet others—the most base and corrupt—themselves become the butchers, trampling on their former comrades who have kept their dignity and basic honor. And, finally, the ultimate: the unscrupulous turncoat, elbowing his way to the helm and desecrating those who all their lives have been true to themselves, to their ideas and principles, who have fought against the shape-shifters and time-servers and are therefore especially odious.

Vyshinskiy had become the ultimate.

But it would be wrong to believe that he climbed by himself to the point where he had power over people. He had been assiduously pushed there. To be more accurate, someone had pushed him there. The one who had shrewdly pinpointed his incomparable qualities: malice, cruelty, and a willingness to do anything. Absolutely anything....

Alas, people possessing these qualities were not exactly thin on the ground. Vyshinskiy had the added quality of education. The combination of these rather incompatible properties sharply distinguished him from the common herd, giving his villainy a sound, solid quality.

Having graduated from the Kiev University Law Department at the age of 30 (too late in those days), Vyshinskiy was left in the department to train as a professor: a prototype of today's postgraduateship. Doctorate even. At that time the demands on candidates were far tougher than today and the academics who made the decision did not bother to consider any police suspicions. So the mature graduate was indeed promising....

But it did not work out: The police won and the candidate left for Moscow to become an assistant attorney at law. No trace of his practice as a lawyer has been found.

But 2 years later, after February, on the crest of the revolutionary wave, he emerged as a modest but nevertheless prominent member of the new administration which had removed the czarist officials and started implementing the Provisional Government's directives. He was particularly zealous in implementing one of them. This act had an ominous effect on his entire life: As chairman of the First Yakimanskiy Rayon authority,

Vyshinskiy signed an order on the unswerving implementation of an extremely important government order on the territory in his charge. The order was as follows: Find, arrest, and bring to trial the German spy Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (Lenin).

Setting aside the perfectly understandable emotions this preposterous order arouses in us, one can probably say that it was perceived differently at the time, that the average official, a lawyer at that, was simply carrying out his duty, obeying an order from on high.

However he was no ordinary official, but a social democrat who considered himself a revolutionary. A man who knew full well that he was dealing with the leader of a political party whom everyone already acknowledged as a leader of the Russian proletariat. Let us imagine that October had not followed February. What kind of career would this old hand from the Yakimanskiy authority have made for himself?

It was a tragic twist of history that it was he, only 20 years later, in the post of the country's prosecutor, who branded Lenin's closest comrades, saying that they—they, not he!—had been scheming to do away with Ilich. For them Vyshinskiy demanded the death penalty. He taunted them. He was the authority's old hand again, playing his part with ardor and passion. Wholeheartedly, if you can use the word "heart" in this context.

Once I read his prosecution speeches as a source of legal wisdom and a model of legal eloquence. I decided to reread them. I spent several evenings wrapped in the oppressive atmosphere of those years, in which overt political banditry went hand in hand with pretty, well-honed legal wording, high-flown phrases, and hysterical fervor—with subtle legal analysis and an undoubted ability to understand the labyrinth of contradictions and disparate facts.

Those who associate Vyshinskiy's name only with the crimes of the "cult period" will certainly be surprised when I acknowledge my contradictory feelings today on reading the "literary legacy" of this monster and thug. But the "political trials" of the thirties were preceded by many years as a successful lawyer in prominent trials of a different kind. Indeed the twists in his career are strange and unexpected. In the hardest, leanest years—directly before the New Economic Policy—he had been head of the Russian People's Food Commissariat Distribution Administration. Then he became prosecutor, acquiring senior rank straight away—at the USSR Supreme Court Criminal Cases Collegium. It was there that he made his first speeches, some of which were kept in shorthand for future generations.

The subjects of those—first—trials at which Vyshinskiy tested his voice are amazingly reminiscent of painfully familiar subjects: investigators and judges who got embezzling grocers to pay money to them and then let

them off as a result; the bigwigs of mushrooming departments and officials with party cards who turned their offices into second-hand markets; economic grandees from the legendary Famine Relief Committee who grew fat on the unfortunate plight of the people: feasting during the plague....

The terrible convulsions of the times, entirely meriting the prosecutor's zealous anger, were bound to attract the widest public attention. They started talking about the prosecutor. His name earned him popularity. His voice cried for justice. He denounced the shape-shifters and degenerates and they deserved it: Stupefied by booze, card-playing, and extortion, the nouveaux riches in their leather jackets sickened any normal person, and not even the harshest word against them seemed excessive.

However.... Only now, with the benefit of bitter historical experience, rereading this blood-drenched "oral literature," one notices what one scarcely noticed at the time. And if one did notice then, one certainly considered it natural: a constant desire to give a political coloring to nauseating, but, alas, commonplace criminal acts. "Agents," "spies," "spiritual saboteurs," and "all manner of bourgeois filth" suddenly flash by, timidly, gradually, like alien elements, edging their way into conventional criminal law analysis. These phrases, which were only just coming into everyday use and which were more in the nature of an oratorical device and speaker's metaphor than real entities, did not then grate on the ear: What all this "revolutionary" scum had perpetrated (perpetrated indeed!) was too vile and dirty.

There was a new twist in the career: Vyshinskiy was obviously well liked. He had been noticed and appraised: He went straight from prosecutor to rector of the Moscow State University. The title of professor, which he had not succeeded in training for, now came automatically. Without writing a single scholarly line, he immediately became an "eminent scholar."

But the lines soon appeared. Many lines: The rather plump tome "A Course in Criminal Procedure." Its "revolutionary" scholasticism makes the head spin today. But there is one passage that attracts attention: "It would be a big mistake to see the prosecution work of the prosecutor's office as its main occupation. The chief task of the prosecutor's office is to implement and watch over the rule of law." Golden words! Particularly when you remember what came later. Not in the "course," but in life.

Frankly, I do not know how valiant a rector Vyshinskiy was and how the sacred cradle of humanism prospered under his leadership.

The switch to science and education did not distract Vyshinskiy from the main task for which he was evidently destined. The end of the twenties saw the start of the grand court spectacles which were to culminate some 10 years later. And from the very beginning it was none

other than Vyshinskiy who emerged as their bloody director. The choice was an immediate one and it was no mistake, as it turned out. It is true that the director was working in a different department. Totally different. But formalities are no obstacle.

When preparations were being made for the so-called Shakhty trial—the first of its kind in terms of size and public impact and far-reaching consequences—the number one problem was not so much the selection of an eloquent prosecutor as the selection of obedient and committed judges. If they were to follow the law too closely, display the skepticism that any honest judge must display, and reject groundless demagoguery, falsifications, supposition, and attempts to relax a ruling or stretch a point, they might wreck a very important action. Vyshinskiy was the most suitable figure, but he had nothing to do with the functions of the judiciary, as we know.

Nothing formal.... But the boss is the boss! With a flourish of the pen he revived a substitute for the normal court, known from the darkest pages of history, which has the high-sounding name Special Judicial Office. Basically it was an illegal, nonjudicial body whose procedural functions are not indicated anywhere. And the head of the mysterious office was Vyshinskiy.

...Sentence: Several times the professor uttered the words "to be shot." A brief notice in the newspaper: "Carried out." Immediately followed by another notice: Comrade Vyshinskiy has been appointed member of the People's Education Commissariat collegium.... A reward for zeal: another step up the ladder. How did the valiant people's education commissar make out on the commissariat? How did he get on with Lunacharskiy—in daily contact now? What accomplishments does our education (primary, secondary, higher) owe to his indomitable energy? And how many unmourned victims were there in that—that alone!—period: exiled because of what they did in the past, spurned because of their origins, accused of having links with "hostile elements"? How many talented people did we lose? How many nobodies, acquiring diplomas and titles, found their way to the helm? How many brains were clogged up with the dross the People's Education Commissariat member started feverishly spreading around? Together with the others, together with the others.... But on very scholarly grounds. With inevitable reference to the law. With quotations from Socrates and Hegel, Montaigne and Marx, Voltaire—and the one who was already trying on the jacket of "father of the peoples."

However, they were all steps to the top, but not the very top yet. An important area, but a foreign one.... Not the one that lay in store for him and in which—why hide it?—he made his name in diabolical style. Three years later Vyshinskiy returned to his roots—the place where (remember his words) the rule of law is implemented and protected. In 1931 Vyshinskiy became Russian prosecutor. From there (in a series of spurts) the rising wave of

lawlessness carried him to the very top in the tragic year of 1935: He, none other, was given the post of USSR prosecutor (Vyshinskiy's predecessor, the old Bolshevik Ivan Akulov, deemed unsuitable for the actions they had in mind, was "removed": first from the prosecutor's chair and, not long after, from life). A post in which, in the name of the law, he would flout the law. He would create a fancy facade behind which the executioners could perform their bloody task. He would act the orator on the platform, infecting the credulous (them alone?) with his fervor, scorching passion, and faith in the triumph of justice, for that is what he appealed to, that was his sole concern, referring always to the supreme interests of the people.

The most nightmarish part of his career was beginning, but we will stop there to recall an episode once widely known, but now completely forgotten.

Three months before the start of the first of the three celebrated "Moscow trials," which has gone down in history as the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, the whole country's attention was attracted by a far more ordinary case. Despite the tragic nature of the situation, it was in no way anything more than an ordinary criminal case: The murder of two doctors by hopeless drunks, petty tyrants, and sadists—leaders of the polar station on Wrangel Island—did not have any underlying political cause, and—how typical!—even Vyshinskiy, prosecuting at the trial, did not resort to his usual verbiage.

My words, which may have piqued certain people—about subtle legal analysis and the ability to grasp the complex interplay of disparate facts—apply to that very case, that long-forgotten case, in which Vyshinskiy presented himself not as a fanatic and dissembler, but as a high-caliber criminal scientist. In no way does this make him less sinister—on the contrary, it explains a great deal.

I cannot here tell the story of how two bandits, absolute rulers of a remote island in the Arctic Circle, Semenchuk and Startsev, mocked two selfless servants of professional duty—the husband and wife Vulfson and Feldman, who went there, to the earth's end, into the fierce cold, not to get drunk, swagger, and rob, but to cure the sick. Fearless enemies of the Semenchuk gang that tormented the local inhabitants, they were destroyed by it, because when the sea routes reopened, they would without fail have made public everything that took place on the island under cover of the Arctic night.

This spine-chilling story rocked the country. The case involved no stretching of points or juggling with facts. The bandits were called bandits. Both the legal truth and the human truth were on the side of the prosecution. Not a single person had the remotest reason to doubt its correctness. I believe that even today the prosecutor's restrained, detailed speech can serve as a model of fine analysis of circumstantial evidence, linking a large number of minor and very minor pieces of evidence into an

unbreakable chain. Of all Vyshinskiy's published speeches, this is perhaps the only one in which he remained a lawyer and only a lawyer, in which he was able to allow himself not to indulge in demagoguery, but to fulfill his duty as prosecutor to a high standard.

The opportunity to conduct a trial like that on the eve of the nightmarish melodrama in which Vyshinskiy was assigned the role of chief director was a really lucky chance, and it was not for nothing that so much publicity was given to the trial, and that the Union prosecutor himself acted as prosecuting attorney in a republican Supreme Court, contrary to the established traditions. Three months before the mysterious curtain of the century rose, revealing to the whole world the start of the first act of a political drama in several acts that was offered to the public, Vyshinskiy provided a conspicuous reminder of his existence. The man who took his place at the prosecutor's desk in the case of the "Trotskyist-Zinovyevist terrorist center" was a lawyer who had just won recognition and popularity, a scholar, analyst, and legal expert, the very personification of truth and justice. The organizer of this melodrama needed not a mechanical performer, but a masterly, impassioned one, not a faceless "function," but a popular name.

He got it.

As is well known, this and other similar cases are now being investigated by a commission set up by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The espionage charges will, of course, be dropped, but it will be necessary carefully to analyze the political platform of everyone whose case is being reviewed. We will have to wait for the commission's objective assessment—which will concern both the trials and each of the participants. But one detail hits you immediately when, trying desperately not to give way to turbulent emotion, you read the transcripts of these trials, and especially the prosecutor's speeches: There is no evidence to support the charges, its place is taken by abuse.

"Scum," "stinking carrion," "filth"—that is what Vyshinskiy calls the former Politburo members herded into the dock, Bolsheviks from the end of the last century and the beginning of this century who had suffered tsarist penal servitude, prison, and exile, the organizers and leaders of the October Revolution. Let us pick at random a few more examples of the prosecutor's eloquence, so that we can picture the atmosphere in what was then called a "court": "reeking heap of human garbage," "the most inveterate, most arrant and degenerate dishonest elements," "despicable heap of adventurers," "mad dogs," "filthy curs," "accursed vermin".... Of Nikolay Bukharin—"accursed half-fox, half-pig." Mikhail Shatrov, in the drama documentary "Onward.... Onward.... Onward!", claims that this "formula" was suggested to Vyshinskiy by Stalin. That is very possible. But how well it fitted into the prosecutor's

speech, how naturally and easily it fell from the professor's lips! And what a striking choice of verbs: For Vyshinskiy, the defendants do not speak, they "croak," "grunt," "bark"....

To insult and humiliate, and not merely physically to destroy the vanquished—that was the cherished dream of the supreme director. In implementing it, Vyshinskiy created a previously entirely unknown type of criminal trial, where there simply is not the slightest need for any evidence: What is the use of evidence, when you are dealing with "stinking carrion" and "filthy curs"? It is curious: After abusing and taunting people who could not reply and not having produced a single piece of evidence, Vyshinskiy solemnly sums up: "...The proof is too strong and the evidence is too convincing!" Too strong....

To be fair, it must be said that abuse instead of arguments was first heard not in the courtroom, but in the press. It was there—before the trial and instead of a trial—that the psychological indoctrination of public opinion began, in the tone required by the director. Future victims, vying with one another in the treachery of their foul language, slung mud at their own comrades who had come to the scaffold earlier than they. Vyshinskiy later made use of this with cynical virtuosity at the court tribunal. He mocked Radek, who had denounced Zinovyev and Kamenev in the press as a "gang of bloody murderers." He mocked Pyatakov, who publicly called for "their destruction as carrion," and only 5 months later himself appeared in the role of a "bandit" and "carrion."

Writers also joined in the general refrain. The last thing I want to do is to reproach, from the distance of the present day, those who found themselves then, by a whim of fate, in the midst of the raging elements. True, many (even the most honest) joined their voices to those who "fully approved," cursed, and abused. But some people immediately stand out, those who rapturously adopted the prosecutor's vocabulary, hurrying to become the top pupil, to excel in the quest for the most trenchant insult, the most painful kick, to commit mocking outrages on those who were already dead. "Bestial abomination"—said Lev Nikulin, echoing Vyshinskiy. As for Bukharin—he is a "hypocrite," a "foolish scoundrel," with a "quivering beard" and a "squeaky tenor voice." Feeble, not striking enough. Humiliating, but not utterly.... Stronger words follow: a "poseur," "as affected as a provincial tenor" (a real writer here!), he "wags his tail," which the "state prosecutor pulled." And others—along with Nikulin, on the same page of the newspaper: "typhoid-ridden lice," "bloodthirsty apes."

Why am I recalling all this now? In order to settle old scores? To create a frisson? No, of course not; I am doing it in order to identify the origins of the deformations we seek to rid ourselves of today.

Where does it come from, this desire, which still persists, to forestall a future trial with accusations in the press? To "get personal"? To humiliate, rather than to prove? To be in a hurry to regard someone as a criminal if he falls within the orbit of an investigation ("we don't lock people up for nothing")? It all comes from the same source....

How many times within our memory (and even today—let us not dissimulate) has a prosecutor, coming up against a defendant who withdraws his own former testimony, "rebuffed" the troublemaker and demanded that the court reject the "slander on Soviet investigative practice," instead of looking into the matter objectively! Where does this traditional approach come from? The same source....

When Nikolay Krestinskiy, a member of Lenin's Politburo, withdrew at his trial the "confessions" forced out of him during investigation by "brute force" ["*yez-hovymi rukavitsami*," literally "iron-spiked gloves," here possibly a pun on the name of NKVD chief Yezhov], did the prosecutor take steps to establish the truth? No, he simply denounced Krestinskiy's action as a "Trotskyist provocation." There was nobody and nothing to check on: We do not lock people up for nothing....

How many times have I seen (I dare not say always and everywhere, because, of course, I do not know about every case of this kind) defendants trying to explain some established fact while the prosecuting attorney, unwilling to listen to any explanations, describes this as an attempt to "confuse the issue" and "evade responsibility." As a result, a totally distorted picture of reality is created, while the truth is outwardly adhered to: After all, the fact is certainly true, only it is turned upside down. Where does all this come from? The same source....

One of the defendants at the third "Moscow trial," Khristian Rakovskiy, whose name has gone down in the history of the revolutionary movement of Russia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania, was a landowner's son. He gave all the money he inherited to the party's needs. He financed the Social Democratic Party of Romania and its newspaper, which he himself edited. A significant proportion of the money went to help Russian revolutionaries persecuted by tsarism, including the seamen of the battleship "Potemkin," whose rescue at the Romanian port of Constanza he organized. Rakovskiy tried to explain this in court, but Vyshinskiy did not allow him to say a word. With mocking questions, he sought to obtain only one thing—a confession that Rakovskiy "had money," and was therefore of "enemy origin" and "noxious bourgeois morality."

And today, when we are forced to go back to the most elementary rudiments of law, to its fundamental concepts, without which there is and can be neither law nor justice, when we are waging war on bias in favor of the

prosecution, on the tendency to give priority to information from a preliminary investigation carried out without the observance of proper guarantees for the defendant, when we are debunking one thing after another, but cannot succeed in debunking in practice the notorious theory of the defendant's confession of guilt as the "queen of evidence"—when we are doing all this, on whom and on what are we really waging war? On "individual errors" and "certain shortcomings"? On "certain lawyers' misunderstanding" of the latest instructions? No, on a system of views emanating from that same source....

About 2 years ago, one prominent legal figure, answering a journalist's question before a very prestigious audience, denounced the presumption of innocence as "bourgeois trash." I think he said this sincerely and involuntarily, using a term that was firmly entrenched in his mind. Because he studied in the forties, and no doubt he studied conscientiously, and in those days that is what they taught. Vyshinskiy was a master of biting, belligerent aphorisms which were easy to remember and easy to master, because they greatly "simplified life."

The formula that has been firmly established for a long time, since the mid-fifties, is: Vyshinskiy's theoretical errors (!) led in practice to violations of legality. Is that true? Or could the reverse be true? It seems to me that the need for such "violations" (I am putting that word in quotation marks, because the deliberate destruction of totally innocent people cannot be regarded as a "violation") required the provision of a firm foundation for them. This could only be done by an erudite thinker and reader like Professor Vyshinskiy.

His work "Theory of Court Evidence in Soviet Law" ["*Teoriya Sudebnykh Dokazatelstv v Sovetskom Prave*"], which was honored with a Stalin Prize and acknowledged as a classic in its time, contains assertions which today sound absurd, inconceivable, improbable, but they were taken as the legal bible by thousands of lawyers who are practicing to this day. Letters which the editorial office receives from some of today's teachers at law VUZ's contain passages which can sometimes be horrifying: Perhaps their authors never even suspect that their cherished formulations in fact still come from him—the unforgotten Andrey Yanuaryevich.

This book, peppered with Latin formulas and references to dozens of foreign sources and equipped with substantial reference material, asserts seriously that "the defendants' pleadings.... inevitably take on the nature and significance of the main evidence, the most important, decisive evidence"; that the adversarial principle, like the principle of equality of prosecution and defense at the trial, is a bourgeois legacy; that the old formula "let the world perish, but let justice triumph" is nothing more than legal pedantry; and that another Latin formula, "the law is strict, but it is the law," which demands strict and universal observance of the law, "leaves no room for flexibility in the application of the law."

Everyone whose legal views, however self-evident, hampered total tyranny was seriously and firmly declared by Vyshinskiy to be a "double-dealer" and an "enemy of the people." Ye.V. Pashukanis, a major legal theorist and USSR deputy people's commissar of justice, was so branded solely for "imposing a formal approach to legality," or, in other words, calling for legal norms to be observed, rather than discarded. For that appeal, the scholar lost his life.

Even then, risking much, the outstanding Soviet lawyer Professor M.S. Strogovich upheld the principle of the presumption of innocence (if only as a principle, because its introduction into judicial practice could not even be dreamed of), entering into open polemics with Vyshinskiy. Not bothering to reply, the leader of legal science (here too he was the leader) shrugged aside his opponent, observing vaguely that such assertions are "without foundation."

To this day many investigators stubbornly seek to obtain from defendants testimony in their own handwriting (usually written under the investigators' dictation), naively believing, contrary to the law, that being written in a person's "own hand" gives the testimony greater authenticity. That is what their senior comrades taught them—a bad tradition can easily be handed down. They can hardly know that such recommendations were introduced by lawyers of the Vyshinskiy "school." They believed, evidently not without foundation, that psychologically this creates an appearance of authenticity: It is better to have a half confession in the defendant's own handwriting than a full one in the investigator's writing.

Back in the sixties the then USSR Deputy General Prosecutor N.V. Zhogin established from archival material that many victims of the "personality cult" demanded both during investigation and in court that their statements on torture and other "violations of socialist legality" be entered in the protocol. There were, just imagine it, prosecutors who treated such statements with due seriousness. "This became known," N.V. Zhogin writes, "to Beriia, who demanded that Vyshinskiy ensure that prosecutors refrain from insisting on recording the statements of defendants on unlawful interrogation methods.... Vyshinskiy, in a letter to Beriia, obligingly reported that he had issued instructions not to record such statements...."

In protocols on criminal cases of recent years where abominable lawlessness on the part of the investigators, leading to tragic and sometimes irreversible consequences, has been uncovered, once again we do not find the slightest sign of statements of this kind, although the defendants claim that they made such statements repeatedly: concerning beatings, threats, and blackmail. When they spoke about it in court, the reaction was always the same: A slander on our glorious investigation system. So where does this persistent criminal practice come from? The same source....

In 1939, having become an academician and—for his very difficult work involving nervous strain—a holder of the then rare Order of Lenin, Vyshinskiy left the post of USSR prosecutor. Another step upward: Now he was deputy chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars. In this new capacity Vyshinskiy immediately gladdened the hearts of people in the world of culture. At the All-Union Conference of Producers, after conveying to the audience cordial greetings from the theater workers' best friend, Comrade Stalin, and explaining to major actors and directors that formalism is the condition of art in which content lags behind form, he took his seat on the presidium and listened to Meyerhold's farewell speech—the tragically inspired testament of the Master to his friends and colleagues. Vyshinskiy did not like the speech (hardly surprisingly)—and a few days later Meyerhold was arrested.

But of course, even Vyshinskiy himself could not feel safe for a moment. In the early sixties, in the apartment of the prominent lawyer A.I. Poltorak, author of the very interesting book "Nuremberg Epilogue" ["Nyurnbergskiy Epilog"], I met two or three times with L.R. Sheynin—at one time they worked together in the Soviet section of the Nuremberg tribunal secretariat and prosecution. Sheynin, as an investigator on important cases and later chief of the USSR Prosecutor's Office investigation department, served for many years directly under Vyshinskiy and took part in the investigation of exceptional cases.

I remember Sheynin's testimony: Right up until the death of the "boss," Vyshinskiy expected arrest every minute. And that is probably how it was: He knew too much, he had personally been involved in too much. After all, did not tens and indeed hundreds of the butchers follow their victims? And Vyshinskiy's Menshevik past provided the opportunity to invent a suitable story. People prepared to invent it could always be found.

It is easy to imagine Vyshinskiy's terror when, while in the highly honored post of foreign minister, he was suddenly stripped of his deputy's seat on the Supreme Soviet. What lay behind this "joke" in 1950? A warning? A hint? Intrigues and machinations by someone or other? Who knows.... Stalin loved to frighten people, after which the slaves would lick his boots even more zealously.

The "boss" was living out his last days when, on a denunciation by a vile provocateur—Professor Serafim Pokrovskiy, with whom Stalin was in correspondence (two "replies to S. Pokrovskiy" are published in his collected works)—one of the most talented and promising young legal scientists was condemned to death: He planned—no more and no less—to kill the "leader" ["vozhd"].... In despair, his mother, a professor and also a lawyer, sent a telegram to Vyshinskiy, who knew her well as a colleague. No answer came. But no, there was

an answer after all: The sentence was carried out. Not much time passed before the young scientist was posthumously rehabilitated: He was one of the first—on that endless and tragic list.

After the death of the "leader", Vyshinskiy lived on for 18 months. He regained his deputy's mandate, becoming deputy foreign minister (to Molotov) and the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations. As an intelligent and sober man, he was well aware that exposure could not be far off. After the 20th congress he would inevitably have had to give an account of himself. Sincere or false, but anyway an account. Fate decreed otherwise.

Recently a reader—an old communist and a veteran of war and labor—sent me a letter suggesting that it be demanded that the remains of the criminal orator be cast out of the Kremlin Wall. I do not think we should do that. Not only because people's remains—anyone's remains—should not be disturbed. His place in the wall, his titles, his awards, as well as his speeches and actions—all these are characteristic of the era, an ineradicable sign of his time, and he must remain in his time. As he was.

But the present must be protected against this monster's overlong influence on justice, on the real practice of investigations and trials. We must not allow his sharp claws, stealthily, on the sly, brazenly to invade our present day. Still less our tomorrow.

Shcherbitskiy Attends Ukrainian Presidium Session
AU091003 Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAINA in Ukrainian
4 Feb 88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "A Session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Excerpts] A routine session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium was held on 3 February.

The results of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's activity in 1987 were examined. (A detailed report on this subject will be published.)

The work of Lvov Oblast soviets of people's deputies in utilizing budgetary allocations and funds provided by enterprises and organizations for the comprehensive development of the social sphere was discussed. Reports were delivered by M. I. Kirey, oblispolkom chairman, and V. G. Malomuzh, chairman of the Budget and Planning Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Preparations for the next session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and some other issues were examined, and appropriate decrees and decisions were adopted.

V. V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, addressed the session.

Participating in the discussion on the items on the agenda were V.S. Shevchenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, and V. A. Sologub, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Trade Unions Council chairman.

Nikonov Visits Sovkhoz in Alma-Ata
LD090424 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 8 Feb 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Viktor Petrovich Nikonov arrived in Alma-Ata today. We have just received a report from our special correspondent.

[Correspondent] Restructuring, the transfer to economic methods of management, in any sphere of production requires qualitatively new approaches and a profound analysis of both achievements and shortcomings. This is precisely how the workers of the (Tamarovskiy) Sovkhoz, which was visited today by Viktor Petrovich Nikonov, aspire to work. The transfer to full financial autonomy and team contracting has enabled this collective sharply to improve the situation in recent years. In his conversation with Comrade Nikonov, the director of the soukhoz (Aleksey Trofimovich Boyko) cited these figures: Each hectare of grain crops, for example, supplies the farm with more than 40 quintals; for soya, nearly 35. This is the best indicator in the republic. In dairy farming the sovkhov has managed over a period of several years to raise the milk yield per forage cow by more than 1,000 kg and reach an average level of 4,734 kg. Such are the real results of working in the new way, in conditions under which people receive the opportunity, not just in words but in practice, to apply their labor and creative efforts.

Here the question arises: How is the experience of such advanced farms as the (Tamarovskiy) Sovkhoz shared, and is it possible to say today that such a phenomenon is becoming typical both for Alma-Ata Oblast, where this farm is located, and for the other oblasts of Kazakhstan? Unfortunately not. Many matters and problems, in both dairy farming and fodder production, were discussed today in the conversation between Viktor Petrovich Nikonov and the soukhoz's milkmaids and specialists. Sore points were exposed, and specific possibilities were determined both for increasing the output of the fields and livestock units within the farm itself and for extending real aid to its lagging neighbors. The (Tamarovskiy) Sovkhoz possesses such possibilities. Comrade Nikonov also visited the Oktyabrskiy Sovkhoz today.

Spokesman Comments on Human Rights Conference
LD081801 Moscow TASS in English 1707 GMT
8 Feb 88

[Text] Moscow February 8 (TASS)—A TASS diplomatic correspondent reports:

The meeting in Venice reflected the growing interest in the world in the processes taking place in Soviet society as a result of the policy of openness and democratization", Alexey Glukhov, chief of the Department for Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs of the USSR foreign ministry, said in an interview to TASS correspondents. "A talk on problems of human rights was held there. It attracted everybody's interest".

Alexey Glukhov just returned from Italy, where the international symposium "On Human Rights and Freedom of Creed in Europe—For Peace in the Helsinki Spirit" was held on San Giorgio Maggiore Island in the lagoon of Venice. The symposium ended on Friday.

"Many things at the symposium were unusual. Consider the composition of the Soviet delegation, which included not only officials, but also a Catholic clergyman, a metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church, writers and public figures. And every member of the Soviet delegation expressed his own viewpoint and did this freely and openly", Alexey Glukhov said. "Such an approach of Soviet representatives to the work of the conference helped to set a moderate and balanced tone. The participants in the meeting managed to avoid the exchange of standard recriminations. There were actually no didactic speeches".

The constructive approach of the Soviet delegation, attention to the reasoning of the interlocutors set the basis for the change of the attitude of some Western countries to the Soviet initiative for holding in Moscow a regular conference on a wide range of humanitarian problems. "There are, perhaps, reasons for saying that the meeting in Venice to a certain degree disrupted stereotyped views of the Soviet Union and paved the way for a new meeting in Moscow", Alexey Glukhov said.

The USSR foreign ministry spokesman said that during the symposium in Venice, there were separate manifestations of hostile attitude towards Soviet participants—outcries from the audience, attempts to distort objective information. Adversaries of the socialist system, who as a rule gather for such symposiums, presented rather a sordid picture this time. "As a rule, they are people of the past. They cite outdated information and their calls to distrust the Soviet Union no longer attract serious attention. And the reason for this is that the Soviet delegation gave fresher, more exhaustive and profound information reflecting the real state of affairs in the country", Alexey Glukhov said. "At the same time, Soviet representatives made no secret of the difficulties which our society is experiencing at the present stage in its development".

As to religious problems, the audience heard with much interest the information that 263 new prayer houses were opened in the Soviet Union from 1983 to 1987, that St. Daniil's Monastery and the monastery in Optina Pustyn were placed at the disposal of believers. New religious communities have formed in the country. There are 15,000 religious communities in the USSR at present, and some 450 of them were formed during the past five years. The communities represent 40 various creeds.

In conclusion, Alexey Glukhov referred to the pronouncements of Chairman of the international Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights Von Schwarzenberg, who recently visited Moscow. The latter noted that the delegation he led had had an opportunity to hold various meetings in Moscow without any restrictions which he believed was a significant factor.

More on Prosecutor's Office Collegium Session
PM091119 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 88
Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report under the rubric "At the USSR Prosecutor's Office": "Enhanced Role of Prosecutor's Office Supervision"]

[Text] Progress made in restructuring the activity of public prosecutor organs in light of the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum requirements and the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Measures To Enhance the Role of Prosecutor's Office Supervision in Strengthening Socialist Legality and Law and Order" was discussed at an enlarged USSR Prosecutor's Office collegium session held 5 February. Prosecutors from the union and autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts and military and transport prosecutors took part in the work.

A report was given by A.M. Rekunkov, USSR prosecutor general.

He noted that now, in the second stage of the restructuring process, prosecutors should organize their work so that their actions make the maximum contribution to the further democratization of social relations and the implementation of radical economic reform. The struggle to reinforce the legal system must be waged in an uncompromising, unrelenting way, making use of extensive glasnost, working closely with other law enforcement and monitoring organs, local soviets, and people's control, and relying on labor collectives.

The session participants drew particular attention to the tasks of enhancing the role played by prosecutor's office supervision in the protection of citizens' rights and legal interests and stepping up the struggle against antisocial phenomena, bureaucracy, local favoritism, and departmentalism.

The following took part in the collegium work: A.V. Vlasov, USSR minister of internal affairs; V.I. Terebilov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; N.P. Malshakov, chief state arbiter; V.A. Abolentsev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Administrative Organs Department; F.D. Bobkov, first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB; A.V. Romantsov, deputy chairman of the USSR Committee of People's Control; V.T. Gubarev, USSR deputy minister of justice; and senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers.

Rostov Oblast Legal Officials Disciplined
*PM081045 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 31 Jan 88 p 1*

["Answer to Newspaper's Criticism" by RSFSR First Deputy Prosecutor N. Trubin: "'Haven for the Unsinkable' (25 October 1987)"]

[Text] The RSFSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium has examined the conclusions stemming from the article "Haven for the Unsinkable."

The article correctly expounded the major shortcomings that have taken place in work with cadres in the Rostov Oblast Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation of criminal cases regarding certain officials' abuses and embezzlement conducted in 1981-1985 by the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office, a number of Rostov Oblast Prosecutor's Office personnel, including Kamskiy, former Rostov-na-donu deputy prosecutor, were exposed and brought to trial for bribery.

In view of the results of the check and the investigation of the cases, the question of serious shortcomings in the work of the Rostov Oblast Prosecutor's Office in selecting and training prosecutor's office investigative cadres in 1983 was examined by the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium, and the personnel of the oblast prosecutor's office apparatus to blame for this were disciplined. Measures were determined to normalize the situation. Exactingness toward cadres was stepped up, the leadership of leading apparatus organs and most city and rayon prosecutor's offices was reinforced, and work was carried out to rid oblast prosecutor's office organs of unworthy people. It was carried out with the active participation of Comrade A.D. Yanyushkin, who was appointed to the post of Rostov Oblast Prosecutor in 1980.

The complicity of A.I. Korochenskiy, the former oblast deputy prosecutor, in committing the crimes was verified by investigative means. No grounds for criminal proceedings against him were found, and the case was dismissed owing to the absence of corpus delicti. At the same time, he had compromised himself as a worker in the prosecutor's office by maintaining unofficial relations with Yu.I. Bobrov, against whom criminal proceedings were subsequently taken. By order of the RSFSR Prosecutor, A.I. Korochenskiy was dismissed

from the prosecutor's office organs for turpitude. Subsequently, Comrade A.D. Yanyushkin, while drawing up the dismissal notice, unjustifiably consented to the request of the "Rostselmash" Production Association leadership to transfer A.I. Korochenskiy to work in the association.

Criminal proceedings against G.A. Mushenko have been rightly stopped, owing to the absence of corpus delicti in his actions.

The article correctly indicates shortcomings in the implementation of supervision by the prosecutor's office over the investigation of a number of cases.

The material facts regarding the criminal case against S.M. Samoylenko still remain unclear. Following a protest from the oblast prosecutor, the invalid ruling by the people's court regarding the application of medical measures to Samoylenko has been repealed. Information concerning the influence of M.G. Samoylenko, a former worker in the prosecutor's office, on the course of the investigation into his son's case will be checked during an additional investigation.

The collegium also pointed out that the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office Cadre Administration and Investigative Administration did not exercise the proper control over the activity of the oblast prosecutor's office.

The collegium demanded that Oblast Prosecutor Comrade V.N. Panichev ensure a radical improvement in work with cadres and boost the responsibility of prosecutors and investigators.

The Rostov Oblast Prosecutor's Office has investigated and sent for trial the criminal case regarding the manufacture of substandard output on a large scale at the State Bearing Plant.

The Rostov Oblispolkom Criminal Investigation Department is investigating the criminal case concerning embezzlement of state property at the Bataysk Knitwear Factory to the sum of more than R1 million. The results of the investigation are being monitored by the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office.

Activity of Informal, 'Diverse' Groups Viewed
*PM081301 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 31 Jan 88 p 2*

[Article under the "Viewpoint" rubric by V. Gubenko and N. Piskarev: "The Self-Styled and the 'Home-Grown'"]

[Text] Have you ever met a real live opponent of restructuring? Someone who has declared his opposition for all to hear? The boorish bureaucrat, the brazen bungler, the barefaced botcher, the deafening demagogue, the slick speculator, and the worshiper of wage-leveling—they all try to adapt to their surroundings.

Some silently slip into the shadows, hoping to hide from the "searchlight of restructuring." Others, on the contrary, arrogantly aspire to a solo spot in the revolutionary renewal of society. But listen closely, and the false note in their voices becomes clear....

Recently an article by G. Pavlovskiy appeared in a respected newspaper. He urged that the territorial-production principle of Komsomol building be rejected and that it essentially be transformed into an association of special interest clubs.

In practice, this means diverting young people away from large-scale socially meaningful work into cliquish activities. And this at a time when society is particularly interested in their creative role.

You get the impression that for these "champions of restructuring," the very process of distinguishing between and uniting various small groups, societies, and clubs is extraordinarily important. They love fine talk....

Let us go back to August last year when a few dozen independent [samodeyatelnyy] groups of the most diverse kinds met in Moscow: environmentalists, lovers of historical and cultural monuments, initiators of the development of production self-management, and sociopolitical associations ranging from schoolchildren's political clubs to the fragments of so-called dissident groups. The organizers of this meeting called it the "information meeting-cum-dialogue 'Social Initiative in Restructuring.'"

Many of those taking part in the meeting were sincere believers in restructuring and keen to make their personal contribution to it. But the 4-day discussion showed for all to see not only the different directions of their activities but also a considerable diversity in their sociopolitical orientation. Their chosen aim—"For the unity of general democratic values within the framework of a socialist perspective"—was as wide-ranging as possible but did not prevent some speakers from expressing politically naive or simply ill-informed theses. In addition to loud assurances of support for the party's restructuring course, demands were also heard from the platform for the deideologization of the Soviet Constitution, these being put forward by the so-called "Democracy and Humanism" seminar. To be fair, let us note that the proposal put forward on its behalf by V. Novodvorskaya, that the 70 years of socialist building in our country be called a complete mistake, was rejected by the meeting.

At the final plenary session, B. Kagarlitskiy and O. Rumyantsev read out declarations from organizations supposedly created at the meeting: the Federation of Socialist Social Clubs (FSOK) and the Social Initiatives Circle. Since then those declarations have been disseminated ostensibly as having been approved by the meeting's participants. But this is crude pragmatism: The organizing committee did not put them to the vote and the meeting-cum-dialogue did not approve them.

The true meaning of the event was clear only to the a few initiates.

Let us take a closer look at one such person. He is B. Kagarlitskiy, a former CPSU member who was dismissed from the A.V. Lunacharskiy State Institute of Theatrical Art and who "suffered during the period of stagnation" for his anti-Soviet activity. For confessing his sins, he was pardoned by Soviet power.

Now he is a "leader of the movement for socialist reforms" and is well-known far beyond the borders of our motherland (see: THE NATION, 5 December 1987). His views on the social situation are not particularly original, it is true: "The old structures are already beginning to be dismantled; the new ones are not working yet or, in any event, are not producing results.... What we can see is a clear process of the emergence of a reactionary bloc." At an enlarged session of the Social Initiatives Club Council, B. Kagarlitskiy gave his remedy for eliminating the contradictions and complexities. In his opinion, the most important thing now is to destabilize the situation in production collectives at any price. He advises that this aim be achieved by cooperating with the dissatisfied, troublemakers, shoddy workers, and idlers, who should be used to learn what has been going on within enterprises, to sow discontent in collectives, and to disorganize work....

B. Kagarlitskiy often attacks those "who swell the ranks of the bureaucracy—the self-sufficient caste of functionaries who are out of touch with their people's needs and aspirations." Let us not be swayed by this righteous anger (who does not throw stones at bureaucrats?) but instead look at B. Kagarlitskiy's activity from a somewhat unusual angle.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia highlights three symptoms of bureaucracy as a specific form of social organizations within society.

The first symptom is the isolation of centers of executive power from the will and decisions of the majority. In simpler terms, the bureaucrat is someone who represents people without adequate authority. This seems to be one of B. Kagarlitskiy's favorite activities. Without false modesty, he calls himself a sociologist, even though he graduated from no university and works in municipal services in another department.

Recently, the name of B. Kagarlitskiy as a representative of the "new left" has appeared constantly in THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE GUARDIAN, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, and other publications. No one has the right to say who should speak to foreign journalists and in what way, and whom they should choose to interview. But have the many well-known scientists, cultural figures, young writers, artists, and other interesting and brilliant individuals produced by our time

earned such close foreign press attention as B. Kagarlitskiy is receiving? We believe that this is not a question of his exceptional personal qualities but of the way in which many Western reporters want to represent Soviet youth.

Foreign journalists showed no particular interest when the members of youth international voluntary labor detachments met in Moscow last September. Yet this was a movement that has been in existence for many years. It unites thousands of people who are not hungry for easy glory and personal advantage but year after year have contributed thousands of hard-earned rubles to the fund of solidarity with the Latin American peoples struggling for freedom. No picture of this far from small section of our young people was offered to foreign readers. Let us not be deceived about which group interests B. Kagarlitskiy is defending when he ensures that foreign witnesses attend his meetings with representatives of social and state organizations.

He poses as sole leader of the entire "informal" movement [dvizheniye "neformalov"]. Active organizers of the meeting-cum-dialogue such as S. Skvortsov, M. Mal-yutin, and A. Isayev are forgotten and discarded. This is no coincidence. While Kagarlitskiy gives interviews, the real supporters of restructuring are doing practical work. Furthermore, "blank spots" have already appeared in the as yet brief history of the "informal" movement.

Let us note that Kagarlitskiy and company present the meeting-cum-dialogue itself as an expression of the ideas of the whole "informal movement," which, in turn, allegedly represents the interests of advanced members of society. Thus there is a "hierarchy of representation" and Kagarlitskiy, it seems, is the main spokesman of our entire people.

The second symptom of bureaucracy is the predominance of form over content in an organization's activity. Well, there is not much content to be seen yet, if by content you mean concrete work rather than attempts to manipulate the results of someone else's activity for your own political ends.

While our "coordinators" labor over paper projects and gather their "contribution" in the form of information, the laboratory of self-management (whose leader is Moscow State University lecturer A. Buzgalin) of the "Social Initiatives Foundation" has introduced an interesting technique for electing labor collective councils at large Moscow production units, such as "Kauchuk," "Moskva," and three publishing houses.

Getting down to hard work in the face of competition in the form of initiative groups at enterprises themselves, and when labor collectives may reject what is offered to them, is clearly not the intention of functionaries such as Kagarlitskiy. It is easier to skim the cream off the upsurge in the masses' social and political activeness. Now another "coordinator" is actively joining the representation game—namely G. Pavlovskiy, the self-styled

"leader of the informal youth groups' press center." When it comes to the struggle for news, or rather to see oneself in the news, the leaders of the Social Initiatives Club spare no effort. The actual introduction of initiatives falls to the lot of other clubs and associations. For B. Kagarlitskiy, the "coordinator's" functions are quite adequate, as is the function of "social mediation" for the Social Initiatives Club.

Finally, there is the third symptom of bureaucracy: the subordination of the rules and tasks of an organization's functioning to the goals of preserving and reinforcing the organization. When the meeting-cum-dialogue was in preparation, the object was to make a public statement about the Social Initiatives Club and to secure an opportunity to speak "on behalf" of others. The task now is to strengthen it, and to that end any means will do. How do you like the inclusion of 14- and 15-year-old schoolchildren on the various organizing committees, for example? We are not opposed to schoolchildren's political clubs; we are not opposed to the inclusion of adolescents in society's labor and political life. The question is whether they are capable themselves of seeing beyond the fine titles of "liaison officer" and "press center spokesman" to their own real role in the games played by these very experienced adults.

K. Marx noted bureaucracy's characteristic desire to reduce a state cause to personal advantage. The most important state cause now is the initiative of young people. Thus it is no wonder that in Kagarlitskiy we see before us a latter-day bureaucrat who is a parasite feeding off initiative, glasnost, and democratization. He is a very experienced political functionary with far-reaching aims.

Indeed, those who try to cope without the "coordinators'" assistance have plenty of problems.

The range of work of the independent associations (including the so-called "informal groups") covers about 200 areas. Their noteworthy feature is their propensity for creative work and for a cause which is clear and useful to society.

At the beginning of 1986, several young poets, artists, musicians, and art critics in Baku formed a creative club. They were united by a desire to enliven the intellectual atmosphere in the city and the republic. In October they called themselves the "Association of Creative Youth" of Azerbaijan and adopted a charter defining the aims and tasks and the principles of membership and activity.

For some reason, not a single creative union in the republic recognized the new organization; still less gave it help or cooperation.

The association's members did not despair but continued to seek ways to establish their organization. They were supported by the Komsomol Central Committee, articles appeared in the central press, and favorable

comments were made about them from the platform of the 20th Komsomol Congress. At last the city authorities helped the association: It was allowed to use the Floral Pavilion, which was transformed into an extraordinary exhibition hall in central Baku. New people joined the leadership of the creative unions. After gaining the approval of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, the association has finally acquired official status.

Of course, this is just a summary of an as yet short career. But already one can see the typical obstacles placed in the way of a socially worthwhile initiative, requiring the abandonment of stereotyped thinking and adjustments to the unwritten rules governing the functioning of social institutions.

It is interesting that the majority of the "societies," "associations," and "unions" of creative young people now emerging set themselves tasks that go beyond the bounds of professional interests. They also campaign for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments, development of forms of contact between nations, and creation of discussion centers, urban environmental museums, and information and education clubs.

Very difficult and sometimes sensitive social problems have arisen in connection with the activities of those youth associations interested in regional studies, cultural and linguistic history, and aspects of national identity. Until recently, when they discovered these often pretentious youth groups in their city or kray, Komsomol committees felt a certain unease: What are they dealing with—a real problem and concern for the vitality of unique national and cultural assets, or arrogant localism? For too long now the Komsomol's work on internationalist education has been mainly rhetorical.

These problems must be discussed in the most competent, logical, and sensitive way possible.

Just such a discussion took place at a conference of representatives of historical-cultural youth associations in Belorussia recently.

These groups have increased considerably in number in the republic in the past 2 years. There is no doubting the sincere concern of the majority of their members at the fate of the Belorussian language or at the danger of the decline of national traditions. At the same time, one can also see a simplification of the real historical processes, superficial evaluations of them, and a negative attitude toward official institutions. These attitudes often occur because of inadequate information about their activity. Some clubs, first and foremost "Talaka" and "Tuteyshyya" in Minsk, have begun to gamble on outward show: rallies, demonstrations, and other mass events.

It is to the credit of the republic's Komsomol and its Central Committee that they did not hide their heads in the sand but involved the organizing committee of the

independent associations in the preparation for the republic seminar. A large group of academic experts, cultural figures, and party and soviet workers were involved in this.

The keen debate at the conference was constructively reflected in the final documents. The concept of "Soviet patriotism" linked together the development of national self-awareness and internationalism. It turned out that there is no contradiction between concern to rebuild churches as architectural monuments and to build monuments to servicemen and partisans who gave their lives for the motherland.

Yet some of the "older friends" who incited the young "fighters for national rebirth" threatened to hold the next meeting in a wood without "the Komsomol." It is obvious to anyone prepared to see that the Komsomol is ready to cooperate with everyone who wants to work and not merely spout big words.

Until quite recently, Komsomol organizations did not have an adequate arsenal of means for work with independent associations. Life necessitated a restructuring. The statute on the amateur association adopted at state level offered an opportunity to create formations based on initiative, voluntary membership, and self-management and, as a rule, with the Komsomol's participation. There are youth initiative foundations and centers in Novosibirsk, Salekhard, Perovski Rayon in Moscow, Liepas, and Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy. There are youth club associations in Odessa, Khabarovsk, and Navoi, and youth cultural centers in Ulyanovsk, Lipetsk, and Leningrad.

For example, the Leningrad Komsomol Obkom and Gorkom analyzed the essence of the new processes in the youth environment. There were "contact" telephone numbers in operation, open days, and meetings with leaders of youth associations. An open Komsomol Obkom plenum was held in which representatives of independent formations took part. A laboratory for working with them was set up based on the Ilich culture center, and an information service and a discussion center are in operation. A whole series of associations have been given permission to use the Komsomol raykoms' youth centers and many have been given concrete organizational and financial support.

More and more youth initiatives are arising in the social sphere. In the past few years, the youth housing complex movement has assumed a truly statewide scale, embracing hundreds of thousands of people. Within the movement, a new way of life is taking shape, absorbing the best features of socialism.

The Komsomol has taken a substantial step in defense of youth initiatives in production and the labor sphere. The decisions of the Second Komsomol Central Committee Plenum authorize the creation of labor association staffs. There are new initiatives in the area of services and

goods for young people, and there are increasing opportunities for the creation of youth scientific and technical creativity centers and young people's cooperatives.

The Komsomol gives support to those social organizations and associations that are really working to unite the supporters of restructuring. It is ready to cooperate and enter into dialogue with them.

It was in just such an atmosphere that the all-union rally of young reservists was held in Ashkhabad in November 1987. The expressions of support for restructuring and the democratization of our society and of approval for the Soviet leadership's resolute steps in the disarmament sphere carried special weight when uttered by our contemporaries who have performed their military and internationalist duty.

We should also continue to heed their fervent appeal to improve the country's social and spiritual life and inculcate in young people a spirit of patriotism and a conscious sense of internationalism.

It probably did not please everyone that the idea for this rally did not come from above but was suggested by young people themselves and supported by the Komsomol Central Committee. Nor is it any wonder that certain "activists" in the informal groups were the most vigorous opponents of the independent military-patriotic movement.

Opposing the "new patriotic movement" in a statement to the mass media, V. Novodvorskaya and company indiscriminately accuse its participants of misanthropic views and antidemocratic actions and label the internationalist servicemen's councils "hit squads." On this occasion V. Novodvorskaya and company gave themselves the pretentious title "Group for the Establishment of East-West Trust."

It probably suits some people very much to portray Soviet youth as advocates of the ideology of the pogrom, and not simply to portray them as such but to foist that stereotype on the world public. Accusations of "Stalinism" are even bandied about. In V. Novodvorskaya's opinion, this should sound "in tune with restructuring": timely and convincing. It is hardly a coincidence that the statement itself appeared on the eve of the December summit in Washington. It was then that the opponents of agreements mounted a noisy anti-Soviet campaign in the West and tried to inspire distrust of the Soviet Union.

It is amusing that the very text of the statement, by its abundant use of initials and its terminology, is reminiscent of a translation from a foreign language. We could not find the word "gumanitet," which the statement's "authors" use, in our Russian dictionaries. Or, for that matter, the word "neformalitet," used by B. Kagarlitskiy.

Nevertheless, it is usual to judge people not only by what they say but also by what they do. The criterion remains the same: the interests of socialism and the interests of the people.

There is essentially nothing to say from that standpoint about B. Kagarlitskiy, G. Pavlovskiy, V. Novodvorskaya, and a number of others because they have never done nothing of use to society.

Perhaps that is why the number of titles and posts held by our "coordinators" is increasing faster than the number of their supporters.

Time will tell. Even talented "social imitators" will remain nothing more than pretenders.

Economic

Gladkiy Analyzes Effects of 'Right To Work'
PM081321 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jan 88
pp 1, 2

[Interview with I.I. Gladkiy, USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems chairman, conducted by V. Karpov and B. Leonov under the rubric "Restructuring: The Social Angle": "Right To Work Guaranteed"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and AUCCTU resolution "On Ensuring Effective Employment of the Population, Improving the System of Job Placement, and Reinforcing Working People's Social Guarantees" has generated wide interest among our readers. We asked Ivan Ivanovich Gladkiy, USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems chairman, to describe this important document in more detail.

[Gladkiy] The last unemployed were taken off the register of the Moscow and Leningrad labor exchanges at the end of 1930. Full employment was not only a very great achievement of socialism but formed an organic part of it. It is now almost 60 years since we last knew unemployment, and it must not be allowed to reappear on any pretext. The measures of an organizational, economic, and legal nature provided for in the resolution are directed to that end. The document's constant theme is a concern for working people, their present and their future, a concern to ensure that people will always be able to feel confident that no one will be forgotten, overlooked, or deprived of the real right to work. The fate of each person lies in the hands of the whole country. That has been and continues to be our point of departure.

But why precisely have we begun talking about this today? Is it not premature? It is well-known that many enterprises are ready to welcome workers with virtually outstretched arms. Yes, that is so. The country still has more than 1.5 million unfilled jobs (according to figures

as of last 1 October). Our cadre requirements are colossal. But life itself answers all doubts about timing. The switch to economic management methods and self-capitalization, the introduction of economic accountability [khozaschet], and structural changes in the administrative apparatus are creating a fundamentally new situation in the country. Redundancies are becoming not merely a short-term measure or campaign but part of our daily reality, a long-term phenomenon. We must make this process systematic and clearly organized in character. There are already strong bases for this. New work payment conditions have been introduced in the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, for example, and around 100,000 additional workers obtained through redundancies. For the first time in decades industry has seen a reduction in personnel—by 140,000—rather than an increase. For the first time, the construction organizations of Siberia and the Far East have sharply decreased their appetite for labor. The economy forces us to be thrifty, make calculations, and produce substantial economies. But these are only the first steps.

The resolution was prepared in an atmosphere of extensive glasnost, and it cannot be otherwise when a document of such importance for the fate of the country is involved. The draft document was discussed in 350 labor collectives. At the Riga Railcar Construction Plant, the Cherepovets Metallurgy Combine, the Volga Truck Plant, the Kalinin Printing Works, the Penzagorgaz Trust, the Tula Combine Plant...

Workers, engineers, employees, and leading workers gave their opinions. Specialists from the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the AUCCTU visited people where they worked. We wanted to learn people's wishes and comments as accurately as possible.

[Journalists] What specific refinements did the participants in the discussion contribute? What was included in the resolution?

[Gladkiy] We proposed the following option, for example. If a veteran reached pensionable age, the administration was authorized to conclude a fixed contract with him to continue working another 2 years. No, the collectives corrected us, adopt a differentiated approach to the question. If someone is a conscientious worker, is active, and makes an appreciable contribution, let him work without any provisos. But as for others the administration can, with the agreement of the trade union committee, conclude a fixed contract or send them off for a well-deserved rest. That principle is now enshrined in the resolution.

[Journalists] We have talked about work guarantees. But guarantees of what precisely? Today I am, say, a technical engineer, whereas tomorrow higher education is forgotten and I am working as a janitor in a housing

office. But, after all, it is state resources and not the individual's that have been spent on education. These resources have been quite considerable ones.

[Gladkiy] No one disputes there is a problem. The restructuring of the economy is bound to cause some pain. Exceptionally optimistic attitudes and assessments are not appropriate here—and all of us, without exception, must understand that. There will be some suffering and disappointment. The skills and level of training of laid off workers will not, of course, always match society's needs for particular specialists. That is why, I repeat, major psychological restructuring is inevitable and necessary. But is this really all bad? Surely this is not the first time we have spoken about such processes? When discussion turns, say, to the need to retrain and upgrade skills on the introduction of new equipment and technology, you sometimes hear aggrieved voices talking about interests that have been encroached on. Although no one objects to progress and modernization....

Nevertheless, we will for the most part be seeking to use laid off workers in the same enterprises, taking maximum account of their expertise and specialization. Let us not forget that redundancy is in no way an aim in itself, as some people may think. We need to make fuller and more effective use of production potential. Surely the second and third shift is a reserve? Under conditions of economic accountability enterprises will be able to earn money for modernizing shops, building accommodation using their own resources, building hostels.... There they will need skilled specialists, not janitors. Last year, for example, there was a sharp increase compared with the previous year in the amount of work carried out using own resources at rubber footwear plants in Tomsk, the Tambovpolimermash, production associations of the Angarsknefteorgsintez and Bashneftekhim plants, and others. That is where the reallocated people are going, and the trend is for a clear increase in this this flow.

It can, of course, also happen that people will have to change their location and trade. People must also be prepared for this. Our committee recently received a letter from Karaganda in which a former sanitation specialist demanded that he be found a job only as a sanitation specialist. The specialist would hear of nothing else, although he was offered a job where he could make use of his knowledge. This strikes me as a pretty typical example of an outdated understanding of one's place and role in solving national economic problems.

[Journalists] On the one hand, that is true. It is relatively easy for a young person to change his place of residence and enterprise. But what when you are getting on in years? When you have children, grandchildren around.... Moreover, you surely cannot ignore the fact that we do not have identical conditions of work, life, and everyday activity everywhere?

[Gladkiy] Excuse me, but no one is ignoring that. I would reemphasize the complexity of the process, its multifaceted character. But we have everywhere and in all respects given first consideration to people and their rights. Take retraining. Absolutely everyone is being given the opportunity to retrain by attending special courses at their enterprise or within the system of the USSR State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, either on release from their job or while continuing to work normally. Whichever is more suitable. The laid off worker who has concluded a new labor contract retains the average wage of his previous job throughout training. It is possible that his initial earnings will be lower—you do not master a trade immediately. But this is taken into account. Workers can have their pay topped up to their previous level during the first 3 months.

Incidentally, a sociological survey conducted by the labor scientific research institute has shown that as a whole more than 60 percent of workers laid off remained at the same plant or factory. There was no need to move. But what if it does prove necessary? Then you do have to start racking your brains.

Previously moving from one city to another caused many people to fear that they would lose the apartment in their old place of residence and not get one in their new location. The resolution pays special attention to this aspect of the matter. It obliges the leaders of enterprises, ministries, departments, and local organs of power to create the requisite housing and other social and consumer conditions for workers who arrive as a result of transfer within a sector, organizational recruiting, public appeal, or agricultural resettlement.

Additional measures are envisaged to provide incentives for specialists to relocate in Siberia and the Far East. For example, they are given the right to reserve an apartment at their permanent place of residence.

[Journalists] We are now examining a number of model options. However, life is considerably more complex. For instance, could it not happen that the process of shedding labor becomes a kind of scourge in the hands of management, enabling it to get rid of people it does not like or to pick on people who have given it trouble? Sometimes, as our editorial mail indicates, workers are shed while management personnel remain virtually intact.

[Gladkiy] If labor collectives stand aside from what is happening, if they remain indifferent onlookers, then mistakes, and major mistakes at that, cannot be avoided. Why, for instance, are workers laid off while administrative personnel numbers are not reduced? As a rule this is the result of people's passive attitudes. This is no longer permissible today. Trade union committees, councils, and central committees are doing the right thing when

they combat bureaucracy, sluggishness, and indifference—and I say this not just as chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems but as also a recent AUCCTU secretary. Encroachments on the working people's right to work and on their interests cannot be tolerated. An active civic stance by everyone is a reliable guarantee that all our initiatives and changes will succeed. Anyone who is honest and hardworking has nothing to fear, but the "job-hoppers" and slackers ought to give this some thought. Their free and easy lifestyle will come to an end.

The essence and spirit of the resolution aims at protecting people. Take the dismissal procedure, for instance. Management is obliged to warn the employee of his upcoming dismissal at least 2 months ahead of time.

The dismissed person receives a severance allowance which will total a month's pay rather than 2 weeks' pay, as at present. Furthermore, if he does not manage to find work immediately, the dismissed person receives wages from his former employer for a period of 2 months.

Some of the people laid off will be resettled in the service, trade, cultural, and leisure spheres. Extra jobs are to be found in the sphere of cooperative and individual labor activity....

[Journalists] As for the latter proposition, are we not deluding ourselves? According to current statistics there are some 13,000 cooperatives in the country employing just over 130,000 people. The establishment of virtually every new cooperative is accompanied by excessive difficulties. Alas, so far we cannot speak of any cooperative wave. Yet there is a prospect of some 16 million lay offs....

[Gladkiy] I believe, nonetheless, that the difficulties of cooperative growth are temporary. Psychological attitudes and stereotypes are the obstacle. They are too deeply rooted in our consciousness to be discarded overnight. But things will change, believe me. I would like to add that the question of a new type of cooperative to be established at enterprises has been resolved. These will be primarily cooperatives for the production of consumer goods and the provision of services not merely for employees but for the population at large. Why not? Some enterprises have a lot of space, unused equipment, and raw material resources and waste products at their disposal. Cooperatives of this kind could build premises and roadways for horticultural associations and provide them with tools and equipment.... This would also benefit the enterprises.

Furthermore, individual cooperative activity is only part of the overall reserve, not the whole reserve. For instance, the siting and establishment of specialized enterprises, branches, and workshops for processing and storing agricultural products and producing goods from local raw materials is envisaged in small population centers in the countryside. In most oblasts intensive

socioeconomic development is currently under way, and there will be an influx of people. There is no need to engage in conjectures here. In Orel Oblast the so-called "Program-100" is under way. One hundred neglected villages in "terminal decline" are today being comprehensively reconstructed. Clubs, schools, stores, polyclinics, housing, consumer service combines, and children's establishments are being built. Pleasant surroundings, amenities, comfort.... People from cities and even other republics are flocking in.

[Journalists] What about the privileges of workers in certain sectors and professions? Take for instance the following situation: A person has been on the waiting list for an apartment for several years and suddenly has to change jobs. Does this mean giving up hope of obtaining an apartment?

[Gladkiy] Nothing of the kind. If a person has a good record, a collective may decide to keep him on the waiting list. This point has been introduced in the resolution at the working people's suggestion. People will be able to use kindergartens and creches at their previous place of employment if that is more convenient.

[Journalists] We are talking about millions of people who will be forced to look for a new job. But who, specifically, will be laid off? How many workers, how many office employees? What should young people study today, for what jobs should they train?

[Gladkiy] Here we must look truth right in the face. So far we are not managing labor resources very skillfully and efficiently, and sometimes we work by rule of thumb, not very accurately. There is another thing we do not know: Who will need help? Who are these people in terms of education, age, and sex? Why are there so many blanks? Let me cite an example. Fewer than half the Moscow enterprises which have shed workers have submitted statistical data about those dismissed. This is the situation everywhere.

It is essential that we seriously change our view of these matters. We can no longer act blindly. At present the USSR State Committee for Statistics and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems are elaborating effective forms of keeping tabs on the unemployed. Detailed statistics in every city and region are also needed for a substantiated development of housing, social, medical and cultural services.

[Journalists] Essentially, would you say that we are on the threshold of radical transformations in the job-placement service?

[Gladkiy] Without any doubt. It is impossible to produce high-grade metal or goods without ensuring that the technological process is observed. Yet what do the

present employment bureaus know? Let us be self-critical and admit that their technical equipment is extremely poor and their staff not numerous and sometimes incompetent.

Do you think these bureaus are capable of forecasting layoffs and defining areas of resettlement of workers, taking account of sector and rayon development and the introduction of achievements of scientific and technical progress? I very much doubt it. Without that we will not be able to cope with the situation. How many reports and statistics are compiled merely for the sake of formalities? People are very reluctant to approach the bureaus for advice or assistance; often they do not come at all. Is that really surprising? Not until last year did we establish our country's first electronically equipped employment bureau in Vilnius, whereas in Japan and the developed countries of America and Europe this stage belongs to the past. To be employed as a specialist in a job center (which is what employment bureaus are called in Canada) you have to have 2 years' specialist training. One in four of our employment bureau staff has no vocational training.

What we need is a fundamentally different job-placement service. Special attention is focused on this aspect in the resolution. It is envisaged to set up economically accountable [khozraschetnyy] job-placement centers, not only at city but also republic and oblast level.

[Journalists] Do you mean this will be a paid service?

[Gladkiy] For the population the bureaus' services will be free, as in the past. If people consult the bureau, that alone is to the state's advantage. As a rule an independent job search saves time. Even if we save only one day, that is already a considerable advantage. Why ask for money? It is the enterprises that will have to pay for the services.

[Journalists] Even with a guaranteed, real right to work thousands, hundreds of thousands, or even more people will nonetheless find themselves without work, albeit temporarily, for a month or two. What consequences will this entail? What do you make of this situation, which is new in our society?

[Gladkiy] You have touched on a very important question. Naturally, the problem of job-placement is by no means the only problem; there are also longer-term issues. You have mentioned one of them. We are giving this serious thought. At present a program for the comprehensive development of the country through the year 2005 is being elaborated. It takes into account demographic factors and the structure of cadre training and forecasts the redistribution of labor resources and the creation of new jobs. This will enable us to be ready for the changes, to know the situation, and hence to control it.

"Economic Review" of Reform's 'Growing Pains'

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INDUSTRIYA in Russian 30,31 Jan 88 p 1

["Economic Review" by Ye. Leontyeva, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA Economics and Propaganda Desk editor: "Debtors"; published in two parts—boldface also published in italics]

[Text][Part One] First, let us define our terms: In this instance we will apply the term debtors not to those who obtain credits or operate on loan funds, but to those who fail to pay on time. For industrial enterprises, the former is a norm of life while the latter is a question of liquidity. We will be talking about the financial health of the machine building complex. Let us note, nevertheless, that many of its ills and problems apply fully to any sector, and even to industry as a whole.

"In the new year we obtained our first credit facility for wages and paid the collective as we should—on the day they were due," N. Volkova, chief of the Finance Department of the Kolomna heavy machine tool building plant, reported with satisfaction. "This was of great help to us."

"But this facility will be available for only 6 months, and then you will have to do without it. Will you be able to cope?"

"It is hard to say. After all, we have only just switched to self-financing. But I think the government will pass a new resolution, and the term will be extended...."

We will come back to this conversation, but for now let us examine the results with which the eight machine building ministries started the new year of economic accountability [khozraschet]. True enough, I am using only data from a preliminary analysis, but I think that they will not be all that different from what will emerge later.

So, 38 percent of enterprises failed to fulfill the profit plan and are, consequently, in financial difficulties.

The "leading position" is held by the Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building, one-half of whose enterprises have financial troubles. The "runner-up" is the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, with the machine tool builders and the electrical equipment industry only slightly behind. Heavy machine building is following closely in this unsavory competition. Profit indicators for all of them are worse than the average for the complex.

Another rather unpleasant fact should be stated: The situation with loss-making enterprises is not improving. Economic accountability has not pulled away from the brink even those which are operating in its conditions. Moreover, their number in the Ministry of the Automotive Industry has increased from 23 percent in 1986 to 33 percent last year. The construction, road, and municipal

machine builders have also recorded "multiplication"—they had one loss-making enterprise, now they have seven. The ranks of loss-makers have also swollen in the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry, the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, and the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building.

One automatically asks: Who is next in line? This is no rhetorical question. In 1986 machine builders paid R410 million in fines and sanctions, and last year this mark was reached even earlier—in just 9 months. How can they avoid going bankrupt?

There are numerous arguments at present: Who is to blame if enterprises have financial problems? Two polarized positions are clearly discernible among the multiplicity of opinions: Departmental spokesmen point the finger "downward," while enterprises point "upward" or at their partners. This routine was also followed by the USSR Gosbank. Our conversation with S. Kotelnikov, chief of the Machine Building Credits Administration, was held at a crucial moment—the administration was "moving" to the newly established USSR Industrial Construction Bank.

"Who should be kicked if a debtor is insolvent? Nobody but the debtor himself. Yes, of course. Those who find themselves in dire straits should blame nobody but themselves. We have given them more than enough assistance. But tell me, please, how much more can we help them?"

Indeed, a system for improving the national economy's financial health and consolidating money circulation was adopted last year. Its paramount goal was to create normal starting conditions for the transfer of enterprises to self-financing. Decisions on help from "above" were adopted, while the USSR Gosbank gave all machine building ministries more time to repay overdue loans. This involves, bluntly speaking, a considerable sum—R1.2 billion. This benefit was extended to those who submitted proof (planned measures) that they would correct the situation and repay the debt within 6 months.

Another measure taken by the top echelon of management was the interministry settlement or, as it was jokingly styled, the day of reckoning. The point was that debts owed by enterprises to each other represented a solid amount—about R2.5 billion. This settlement took place on 25 December. In most cases, plants and enterprises repaid their debts but once again, by way of an incentive, credit facilities were granted since many of them were left penniless. Moreover, these facilities were made available on more than preferential terms: not at 6 percent, but at 2 percent annually.

These and other forms of assistance certainly helped to improve the starting conditions, otherwise the financial position of machine builders would have been much worse than at present. But the new year came, and the

new system of calendar payments came into operation—we described it in our article "Time to Live Within One's Means," published on 10 January this year. The bank now automatically debits enterprises' accounts with sums which fall due for payment. This was done in January, and when pay day came some were left with no funds. The state again gave preferential treatment to the machine builders in the form of a 10-day loan to pay wages, and many of them took advantage of it. Including the Kolomna heavy machine tool building plant.

So Gosbank branch officials are justified in their categorical claims (S. Kotelnikov is not the only one holding this view) that enterprises have nobody but themselves to blame for their financial misfortunes. But let's ask the machine builders: Why are they in debt?

For example, here is the opinion of I. Danilov, chief of the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry Main Planning-Economic Administration:

"Over the year, our plans were largely unfulfilled and there was a shortfall in deliveries of many machine tools and presses. Why? The Gosplan takes no account of our potential. The same old voluntarism when it comes to deductions from profits for budget payments. We are, to put it bluntly, being skinned alive. The Gosnab arranges resources. The State Committee on Prices ignores the conditions in which output is produced. Consequently, almost one in two of our enterprises is halfway to bankruptcy. We find it very hard to work now: We have come across situations when plants refused to accept the 1988 plans and appealed to party obkoms, which in turn drowned us in correspondence...."

As a matter of fact, I heard almost the same reasons given at the Kolomna machine tool building plant: "Mythical" targets, meager supplies, worn-out equipment—and the year ended with miserable results.

True enough, P. Pastukhov, Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building Financial Administration chief, tried to be as objective as possible. He admitted that the nonfulfillment of the profit plan is mainly their fault. He continued to make the same complaints.

"The Ministry of Finance commandeered from enterprises around R200 million in temporarily uncommitted money from economic incentives funds and has no intention of paying it back. Consumers are not buying a series of machines. Overproduction! But wasn't it the Gosagroprom itself that ordered them? Consequently, it ought to take delivery and pay for them. This is why we are constantly in difficulties when it comes to paying wages—going 'cap in hand' to the bank every month. The Volgograd tractor plant, the 'Rostselmash,' and others among our plants, big and small, are suffering...."

According to the year's results, the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building appears better off than all others in the machine building complex. It has quite

a few plants that are firmly standing on their own feet—Kiev's "Bolshevik" Plant, the "Dneprotyazhbummash" and "Volgogradneftemash" Associations, Moscow's "Borets" Plant. But they were well off even in the past. I was interested to find out: Which one of those that spent the year working in conditions of economic accountability actually managed to improve its financial situation by itself?

"You won't find any in our ministry," was the brief answer by B. Popkov, chief of the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building Financial Administration.

So it is difficult to dispute the "bankers'" arguments but, on the other hand, much of what ministry and plant financial executives are saying is also fair. An even fairer argument is that the first year of economic accountability made virtually no improvement in machine builders' liquidity, even though those who operated on self-financing principles seem to have achieved higher labor productivity and faster output renewal.

The paramount task is therefore to further improve the economic mechanism and make its introduction more purposeful and more consistent. Its provisions must be protected from the arbitrary interpretations and distortions with which the first unprofitable year of economic accountability was fraught.

But the growing pains of the new economic mechanism and its instability and immaturity are no excuse for those who failed to seek out reserves in their own "backyard." This will be discussed in the next review. [Part Two]

Probably every ministry has its own Achilles' heel. The question why the Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building is left with such small profit could be answered thus: It gives no thought to reducing prime costs and scandalously exceeds them. Why is the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building making losses? It is not giving enough attention to its clients' growing demands. But one and the same disease underlies the failures by both sectors—the inability to run things properly.

Nowadays every enterprise, whether weak or strong, must rely primarily on its own resources. Even an enterprise on the brink of bankruptcy can help itself by realizing the fact of its insolvency and abandoning its disheartening belief that, being weak, it will be allowed to hang around the state's neck for a long time to come. They have got used to hanging around the state's neck—many have been literally spoiled by constant injections of funds. The bank virtually never refused credit facilities to economic leaders. A come-and-get-it approach, literally. They did not even bother to find out whether the enterprise receiving the credit was capable of repaying. Credit facilities on inordinately preferential terms frequently aggravated the already shaky financial position of enterprises. The interest they still had to pay

depleted the economic incentive funds, but this was simply overlooked. Voices could be heard: "So write off our debts. They're being written off for kolkhozes!...."

Credit facilities became harder to obtain for the first time recently—an attempt was made to bring this reserve into play. It is obvious, however, that many have failed to realize that this is an immutable fact, and this is confirmed by the reaction of ministry and plant financial executives with whom I had opportunity to converse after 1 January, as soon as the bank adopted the calendar payments system. Let us recall just the opinion expressed by N. Volkova, financial executive at the Kolomna machine tool building plant: "The government will extend the term...." P. Pastukhov from the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, whom we have already met, thinks exactly the same:

"On 1 July, when the preferential term runs out, about one-half of our enterprises will probably have no money to pay wages. The benefits will have to be extended. I can't imagine that workers will be left without wages."

V. Medvedev, "Rostselmash" director for economic matters, is more categorical:

"Either put unpromising enterprises under the hammer, or carry on pumping funds into them."

To judge by everything, hardly anybody believes that benefits will come to an end and that they have to rely more substantially on economic work if they don't want to go under. The example of Leningrad's "Skorokhod" Plant, which was described to me at the USSR Gosbank, is interesting in this context. The factory's leaders asked the "bankers" to help. Send along your specialists, they said, and let us investigate our problems together. They did. The specialists identified the channels along which the money disappeared, explained why prime costs were not declining, discovered reserves. You'd think they would be eternally grateful for this, wouldn't you? No. "It would have been better if you had not come" was what the "bankers" were told when they were leaving.

Let me recall the classic advice given by Polonius to Laertes: "Neither a borrower, nor a lender be; For loan oft loses both itself and friend, and borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry." It is not proper to rely endlessly on credits alone. They offer temporary relief, but not a cure.

There is a strong and multifaceted tendency to make for the nearest loophole rather than for the distant gate. It also takes the form of machine builders "taking liberties" with their own circulating capital, spending it like water. What happened last year, for example? If a plant failed to fulfill the accumulations plan, it dipped into the "forbidden source" of funds. In this way, the machine building complex had already lost more than R700 million of circulating capital by October. Comes the time to pay fines—we'll pay from that same "forbidden source." Take almost R500 million again.

So what becomes of circulating capital in such cases? A money-box from which sums are be extracted with impunity to bridge various gaps? Not at all: We are hacking away at the branch on which we are sitting. The heaviest ax blow takes the form of the accumulation of above-normative stocks of material assets not funded by credit—and here we are also talking in billions. The machine building complex is greatly in excess of the upper limit of expenditure on commodity-material assets. This is not all: It actually accounts for the bulk of the excess of such expenditure in industry. The leader with 80 percent is the pioneer of self-financing, the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building. Its spendthrift attitude is fully backed by the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building and the Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building with approximately 70 percent each.

Passion for stockpiling and squandering are two faces of one and the same coin. Both originate from expense-oriented economic management, which was not firmly eradicated in the past. Now it is being punished by fines. But as we see, enterprises are in no great hurry to abandon their expensive habits: They pay the fines and continue to accumulate. But if only this were all. There is something even worse: The more stocks that are lying idle, the less money there is in circulation. How can we then talk about financial prosperity?

Surely, all these layers of reserves are just beneath our feet?

But we are unwilling to stoop and pick them up. Because, if you only look, you'll see yet another loophole just ahead—would it not be simpler to squeeze through it? Recently I was told about difficulties with profits at Zaporozhye's "Abrazivnyy Kombinat" Association: Formerly they were earning R16 million, now they earn much less. There is no denying that normatives were being used to put the squeeze on them. What was to be done?

They urgently set up a rigid and uncompromising system of fines, having decided to correct the situation by making more rigorous demands of their partners. Similar systems were set up also by many machine builders. Make more rigorous demands by all means, but even this is no solution. It is much more reliable to improve quality and production standards. Then nobody will impose sanctions on you, and there will be no overstocking, either, as with the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building.

How about the abandonment of ossified forms of labor organization and wage leveling—is that not a way to improve the state of affairs? I recall S. Donskoy, director of the Yermak ferroalloy plant, ardently addressing his colleagues:

"You've been given the rights—hurry and take advantage of them! Don't waste any time. We have differences of up to R150 in wages paid to workers from one and the same team. Such an apportionment will quickly bring to their senses those who do not work but just lean against the pillars. Try it, it's a good way—the plant's profit has increased severalfold."

Are many trying? Not yet. In any event, the abandonment of wage leveling can in no way be described as a mass phenomenon. Nor can any particular haste be noticed in the transfer of enterprises to two- and three-shift working. During the first 9 months, the efforts made by machine builders along this avenue released approximately 25,000 units of metal-cutting equipment and about 250,000 square meters of production area. The results are not particularly impressive. While the equipment shift index is low, you can hardly get rid of financial defects.

Any day now contract relations, even though afflicted by laxity, will become the norm of economic life, and yet we are still shutting our eyes to production processes, thus aggravating our own position and the position of our willing or unwilling partners. Losses from unsteady work are truly irreparable—at the end of every month machine building ministries are left with an average of R1 billion's worth of unsold output just because of unsteady work.

Generally speaking, the inability to apply genuine economic accountability to organize work time and people, equipment and finished products, raw materials and finances (and this list can be continued) does not, alas, fill the collective purse. Yes, the transition period is difficult and highly contradictory, but "channels along which money disappears" can be found at every enterprise. Production is the ultimate foundation; only production creates material assets. It is there that the new methods of economic management must be forged. Therefore, the first to miscalculate is the one who waits for the "golden age" when absolutely all the conditions necessary for a qualitatively new stage of development will have been created.

Military

Solovyev, Yefimov Attend Leningrad Party Aktiv
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31 Jan 88 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "In the March of Restructuring"]

[Text] Leningrad, 30 Jan—The progress of restructuring the work of commanders, political organs, and party organizations in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress has been examined today at a meeting of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District party aktiv.

Its participants pointed out that the district's Communists are celebrating the year of the 70th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces and the 19th All-Union Party Conference by stepping up the restructuring of the style and methods of the leadership of combat training and with a creative approach to the organization of political education work with personnel. Most Communist servicemen are participating actively in restructuring. Work is being built on the principles of democratization and glasnost in all spheres of collectives' life.

At the same time restructuring is still not going smoothly everywhere. Poor organizational work is preventing certain primary party organizations attaining a vanguard role for Communists in resolving the tasks facing them. Under the new conditions more attention must be devoted to improving political education work, strengthening troop discipline, and ensuring troops' high combat readiness.

Taking part in the work of the party aktiv meeting were Yu.F. Solovyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and Leningrad party obkom first secretary; Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, CPSU Central Committee member, Air Force commander in chief, and USSR deputy defense minister; Colonel General V.F. Yermakov, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District commander.

'Truth' Seen As Necessity in Historical Memory
PM041733 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 88 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Article by Major General Retired, I. Sidelnikov: "...And Only the Truth is Fitting; Thoughts on a Topical Theme"]

[Text] The revolution that was a new dawn for mankind is continuing. In the storms and whirlwinds of restructuring. In the irrepressible rotation of the renewal of life. The immortality and greatness of the truly heroic pages of our post-October history "shine like an invisible glow" in this continuation. A history which has absorbed everything: great victories and bitter failures, great feats and defeats, times of fervor and times of tragedy. Everything with which the path of pioneers of a new society is paved.

Soviet people, especially the rising generation, wish to know and comprehend the sources of that path and to learn the truth about the origins of all that is best in what we have today. They wish to know the truth that makes it possible to adjust and to enrich our historical memory. It is for this reason that Soviet people look so closely, at times critically, at the history of the Soviet motherland and its Army and take in with sincere emotion and a sense of high civic interest every word about the events of the creative and fiery years of our people's life.

I. I have observed on more than one occasion that at meetings between veterans and young people—soldiers and draftees—the main topic of discussion one way or other is the events of the Great Patriotic War. The questions follow on one after another: What happened on the front in that place and why did it happen in that way; why did the enemy succeed in doing that particular thing; and why did our army have no luck at that particular time...? Recently it has been possible to hear with increasing frequency opinions about the cost of our victory in the war and about the huge sacrifices borne by the Soviet people in the war. The past disturbs people, gives them no rest, does not forgive if it is hushed up. This is natural.

But it is hardly necessary to say that the past, our combat history requires an exclusively responsible and circumspect attitude. In most cases this is in fact so. Yet from time to time, something surfaces at the intersections of judgments, opinions, and views expressed at "round table" discussions or at this or that forum, or else on the pages of newspapers and magazines—something which, as a veteran wrote to me, "makes the heart bleed again and again." He is thinking of a very specific "opinion" concerning the Great Patriotic War and published in one of the newspapers: "Our victory was achieved at such a great cost in blood that, considering the significantly smaller losses of the enemy, it is even possible not to regard it as a victory...."

It might have been possible, of course, to ignore this rather strange opinion expressed during polemics in literary circles and worthily rebuffed—incidentally—from the platform of the USSR Writers Union plenum by Iavan Stadnyuk. Nonetheless, having found its way onto the pages of a popular newspaper, it drew readers' attention. Already the philistine smirks, nodding in the direction of the front line soldiers: "So was it a victory you had?"

The authors of this kind of allegation believe that virtually the only and main reason for our great losses in the Great Patriotic War lay in errors and miscalculations permitted in preparing the country to repulse fascist aggression. Soviet historians still have to investigate this thoroughly and in detail. But even today nobody is going to start denying that some miscalculations and errors took place. They cost our people and their Armed Forces dearly. It would be a flouting of historical truth to hush this up and to close our eyes to the tragic events which befell our country and Army even before the war. But it would also be disregarding historical truth to close our eyes to other, no lesser and even perhaps more substantial reasons for our defeats and great losses, especially in the initial period of the war. To the fact, for example, that the economy of fascist Germany was completely switched onto war lines and that almost 6,500 enterprises in 11 countries occupied by it were working for its Army. As a result a military-industrial potential twice as

great as we had at our disposal was brought down on our country. The Hitlerite command sent the forces of its allies into war against the USSR.

The following factor is also quite important. The then ruler of the Western countries, as is known, refused to act in a united front with the USSR to halt the Hitlerite adventure. This made it possible for the Wehrmacht to advance almost the entire combat might of its Army against the USSR, and that of course also aggravated our position at the beginning of the war.

This is something that should be remembered by those who are inclined to cast doubt on the very legitimacy of our victory in the war purely on the basis that it was "achieved with a great amount of blood," at too high a price. We were forced into this by world imperialism, which nurtured fascist Germany and militarist Japan.

The Soviet people stopped at nothing in defending a great and just cause. They did not bend, they did not falter—neither at the first failures and defeats, nor under the weight of millions of deaths. They withstood and were victorious, and the foundation of that victory was laid by the building of socialism and the feats of the heroes of the prewar 5-year plans.

II. Hardly anyone who reminisces or writes about the last war omits to pay attention to its tragic situations, including the situations in 1941 when at times it was indeed difficult to understand: "Where is our territory and where is the enemy's territory? Where is the front and where is Russia? Where is the border of our land?" The especially costly title page in the war against fascism was 1941.

It is difficult to understand, however, the attempts that are sometimes encountered to take that year, which poured out its life-blood and was ruthlessly disfigured by the plow of barbarous aggression, as if "on hire," for example to back up individual ideas about, for instance, this or that problem of today's restructuring.

The magazine NOVYY MIR carried an article by the writer Anatoliy Zlobin entitled "At Any Price." It touches on what is in my view a very topical question about the activity of economic cadres. But the article implies that the so-called principle of fulfilling the plan at any price, completing a construction project by such-and-such a time at any price, or looking decent in the eyes of the higher authorities at any price came into this world not as a result of the dominance of administrative-edict and bureaucratic methods of leadership of the economy, but...was engendered by the events and atmosphere of 1941.

It turns out that 1941 has for him its own psychology, its own so to speak "seal of quality." Zlobin writes the following: "When I hear wild cries of 'Press on, put the

pressure on!" on the construction site or in the shop. I know exactly that that leader has the mentality of 1941. He produces the plan at any price."

You read this, reflect, and your mind is burned by perplexed and sad questions. Is it not blasphemous to depict the truly patriotic, sacred, perfectly explicable, and justified desire of our Soldier—at any price, not sparing his own blood or life itself—to halt, break down, thrust back, and smash the fascist hordes which burst into our native land as some kind of harmful mentality, as the primary source and, as it were, detonator of the good-for-nothing "method" which took root back in the prewar years of producing the plan at any price? Is 1941 really "responsible" for the fact that this "method," this "mentality" "sits without an outlet" (an expression used by the article's author) in those who have not seen even in their dreams what war is like? Anatoliy Zlobin believes, and correctly believes, that 1941 "will remain for ever in the memory as a national symbol of our bitterness and pain." But why does he recall so impassively, without a shadow of pain, and with a smirk hidden with difficulty, for example, a crossing and the death of half the strength of the artillery regiment in which Sergeant Zlobin served as gunner? Is it really only because even at that time he was interested in today's problems—problems, as he writes, of "managerial decisions"?

No, it was not like this that our sorrowful and courageous, our suffering and unruly 1941 went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The author of its "psychology" for some reason did not note that not only the scars of our painful defeats, but also the reflections of our first victories during the war are imprinted on the face of 1941 for centuries to come. Already during the 2-month Smolensk engagement, mounted on a 650 km front, the Soviet Army conducted not only defensive but also offensive battles. For the first time in World War II, the Soviet Soldier forced the fascist occupiers onto the defensive and applied the brake to the flywheel of Hitlerite aggression. None other than he, the great worker of the war, dissipated into dust the myth of the fascist Army's invincibility.

Of course, Anatoliy Zlobin is also "clearly aware" of all this. Whereas he sees 1941 only as "evidence" of our "inability to do things," only as retribution for retreat, and sees nothing else, this in no way accords with a solicitous attitude to historical truth or with an objective approach to the appraisal of the events of the war in all their totality, interconnection, and contradiction.

We risk falling captive to half-truths and delusions, if we turn the tragic and negative features of our history into absolutes, including the history of the last war. Thus it is possible willy-nilly to cast a shadow over the great feat of the Soviet people and their Army. It seems to me that it would not be out of place for each of us who reminisces and writes about the mortal upheavals of 1941-1945 to follow strictly the motto of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy:

"Just one untruth is to our detriment. Only the truth is fitting!" Following this, most of all to show concern for a representation of events which rules out narrow, one-sided, and superficial notions of the greatest battle of the 20th century, not only arouses in each Soviet person pain over the millions who fell in the war but also elevates him, kindles in him pride in the exploits of those who defended October's gains, the motherland's present and future, and awakens the desire to be worthy of their legacy.

Perhaps I am mistaken, but I cannot say that such an aim is met by, for example, the reminiscences of V.N. Shubkin entitled "One Day in the War," published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. No doubt everything which Private Vladimir Shubkin experienced on that far-off day of 28 August 1942 near Stalingrad is worth describing to people. But, reading the reminiscences, you sense more and more that they are somehow studied and deliberate.

It is particularly difficult to get rid of this sensation in trying to grasp what the author writes about the officers in the artillery battalion (and not only the battalion). All of them, with the exception of Lieutenant Bulochnikov—V. Shubkin's friend—were terribly poor people. "Some colonel was prepared to shoot everybody" to save "his own skin." Following enemy bombardment, it was not known to where the battalion commander and two other officers had disappeared. V. Shubkin only recalls the battery commissar in connection with conducting an exercise on the theme "what functions Comrade Stalin exercises." Two officers, according to rumors, "shot each other in the arm and went off to the rear: Let those who organized this chaos pay for it with their lives, they said...." But the general (he, like all the officers mentioned by the author, apart from his friend, was not named), when sought out by the supposedly injured officers, "did not even begin to listen to them, but without pausing bawled at them: 'Have you read Stalin's order? You will be court-martialed!'"

You read all this and you think: Of course in the war untalented commanders, good-for-nothing political workers, cowards, and self-seekers were all encountered. Being loyal to the truth, it is necessary to write about this too. But the question arises: So who commanded the companies and batteries, the battalions and squadrons, the regiments and divisions which bore the enemy onslaught and smashed him at the battle of Stalingrad? Why did the author of "One Day in the War" have to paint all the battalion and other subdivision officers in one color—gray—and I misrepresent them with such staggering indifference? After all, we know well that in the war officers who panicked at the beginning and were cowardly in the heat of battle overcame weak will, fear, and indecisiveness in themselves and became courageous and fearless commanders and political workers. Obviously former Pvt V. Shubkin needed this "bunch" of front line officers for Professor V. Shubkin to

decades later prove with "concrete facts" the authenticity of the reference, cited by him in his reminiscences of one day in the war, to the place in "history of the Great Patriotic War" which says what losses were inflicted on military cadres by the repressions of 1937-1938. But this method has a strong smell of the opportunist approach to the history of the war and of half-truth of the worst kind.

The truth of history, including the history of war, cannot be either monochrome or "accepted in all respects." It is a multicolored and a bleak book, recording the fervor and the dramas, the heroics and the calamities of our existence, our struggle, and our labor. We must treat this book with care and respect, and read it just as it is in all respects.

III. "I went to command posts of divisions and regiments. I reached a battalion command post, but even there I did not succeed in meeting with the commander. They said he was with one of the companies... pretty lively exchange of artillery and mortar fire was in progress... I decided to go there... In some places walking upright along the communication trench, in others hunched up along half-filled trenches, I reached the most forward one." "I thought and still think the commander should be wherever his troops are fighting: It is easier to control, and the men will fight more confidently..." This recollection is also of one day in the war. The place of disposition that day was also near Stalingrad. The recollection belongs to Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy, then commander of the Don Front. I cited these lines, pondering again and again the opinion of the writer who said: Since our victory in the war was achieved "with much blood," those who "were the supreme leaders of the Soviet people's armed struggle...should be expunged from our history or branded with shame for ever."

So I think again: What is this? A "shot" by a fighter who is handling his weapon without skill? A "sentence" by a pretender to the throne of supreme judge? Or is it a "burst of anger" from a man thirsting to settle a score with somebody? But all this is alien to our approach to history and to the truth of history, however bitter may be that truth. It is especially alien to a historical truth which is an object of the people's pride. This truth consists in the fact that the armed struggle of the Soviet people and their fighting Army was led at the top by Soviet Surovovs and Kutuzovs, Bagratians and Nakhimovs.... It was led by soldiers of the highest courage. It was led by outstanding military leaders, who came from the people and who gave their talent, their hearts, and their lives to the service of the socialist fatherland. They commanded fronts and armies and directed their actions. When the situation so demanded, they went into the very thick of the battles and were wherever it "was easiest to control and men would fight most confidently." It happened on more than one occasion that they fell on the field of battle, struck down by an enemy bullet or shell fragment.

That is how they died: Front Commanders Army Generals N.F. Batutin and I.D. Chernyakhovskiy and Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, and Army General I.R. Apanasenko, deputy front commander.

The supreme leadership of the armed struggle of the people and Army in the last war lay not only and indeed not so much with I.V. Stalin, as many people believe. It also lay with the Supreme Command headquarters, which included G.K. Zhukov, A.I. Antonov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, N.G. Kuznetsov, V.M. Shaposhnikov, S.K. Timoshenko, and other prominent commanders. It lay also with the General Staff. It also included—apart from those named above—the cohort of military leaders and commanders who grew in the heat of the war to head fronts, staffs, and fleets. Men such as marshals of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy, I.S. Konev, V.D. Sokolovskiy, R.YA. Malinovskiy, L.A. Govorov, A.N. Yermenko, N.Kh. Bagramyan, and F.I. Tolbukhin, Army General I.Ye. Petrov, Admirals F.S. Oktyabrskiy, A.G. Golovno, and V.E. Tributs, and others. The whole country knows the military leaders of the Great Patriotic War. Our army is proud of them.

At the head of the people, who rose in a holy war to defend the socialist fatherland, stood the Communist Party. Its leading role was displayed with full vigor in the very severe tests of war. It was indeed a fighting party, a collective military leader. The report entitled "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues" noted that "the war showed that the Soviet people, the party, socialism, and October were indivisible and that no force in the world could crush this unity."

Such is the historical truth about the "supreme leadership" of the Soviet people's armed struggle in the Great Patriotic War. This truth is indelible. It is for ever.

A wise man said you have to "take fire and not ashes from history." It is the fire we take from the history of the Great Patriotic War. The fire of unparalleled courage and steadfastness. Of military valor and bravery. The fire of the Soviet soldier's boundless loyalty to his military duty and devotion to the fatherland, the people, and the cause of Lenin's party. This is the fire that illuminated the Soviet Army's path from Moscow and Stalingrad to Berlin. This is the fire that illuminated our Great Victory. The victory won by the children of Krasniy Vyborg and Krasnaya Presna, of Krasniy Putilovets and Krasniy Sormov.... The Children of Great October and Socialism. The sons and daughters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For all of them there was no greater duty than to fulfill the will of the motherland and the people, to forge, build, and gain through suffering the historic victory. One victory in everything. One victory for everybody. It is rather unworthy of us, who enjoy the fruits of that

victory, to complain or even more to cast a shadow over those who paid generously for it. It was obviously an awareness of this that inspired the poet Mikhail Lvov to write the following lines:

We salute those great years,

Those glorious commanders and fighters,

Marshals of the country, and privates,

We salute the dead and the living—All those who must not be forgotten,

We salute, we salute them, friends—With the whole world, the whole people, the whole earth

We salute them for that great battle,

We salute them for each mortal battle!

IV. The lessons of the last war have taught us much. High and constant vigilance and combat readiness are the main lessons, which make it possible to curb any aggressor and halt any intrigues by imperialism against the USSR and its allies.

The officer corps has special responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and strengthening and improving combat readiness. During his visit to Murmansk, M.S. Gorbachev noted in conversation with sailors that in our age Army and Navy officers shoulder an incomparably greater burden even compared with 10 years ago. Not everybody is capable of bearing that burden. For this reason it is necessary to foster strong individuals capable of assuming the whole plenitude of responsibility.

Our Army has never been short of strong individuals. Neither in war, nor in peace. They are to be found today too in all categories of troops and in all branches of the Armed Forces.

The Army and the people know well that Heroes of the Soviet Union Colonel General V. Pikalov, Major General of Aviation N. Antoshkin, and officers R. Aushev, I. Zaporozhan, F. Pugachev, G. Kuchkin, and N. Malyshev are the heroes of Afghanistan and Chernobyl, the heroes of our present-day Army. And Officers S. Razygrayev and V. Kulyapin, V. Veropotvelyan, R. Chebotarevskiy, and M. Klyuyev, who have also been honored with the motherland's high awards, and many, many others are tireless workers on all the bridgeheads of combat readiness and the education of skillful defenders of the fatherland.

Saying nice words about the Soviet officer corps does not mean idealizing it. Although champions of such idealization are encountered not so very infrequently.

Not so long ago chance brought me together with a quite well-known honored combat general, who—as he put it—spent all of the last war “frying in its hellish cauldron.” So that he, for example, believes that “criticism of military cadres, despite their rank and office, and openness in such criticism will lead to no good.” Today, he said, “you criticize an officer in a newspaper for shortcomings in service or in conduct. Tomorrow his subordinates will laugh at him. By your criticism it is as if you removed from him the moral right to command men in the performance of his duty.”

That is one opinion. On the one hand, it contains as it were some “rational grain.” On the other hand.... Whether idealization of the reality of our Army and Navy, or a ban on the broad criticism of shortcomings have promoted a situation in which phenomena alien to the socialist nature of our Army, our ideology, and our morals have emerged both in the Armed Forces and in society as a whole. In some officers the sense of personal responsibility for the fulfillment of their duty and for their own conduct has been blunted. Shortcomings and defects in the organization of service and training and in discipline are sometimes concealed by inventive ostentation and deception. These phenomena have struck at the heart of more than one officer.

The Army today lives according to restructuring, a renewal of the forms, methods, and ways of struggle to strengthen combat readiness, military discipline and organization, and improvement of the whole system of the political, military, and moral education of personnel. The creative initiative and activeness of servicemen is growing. This is assisted by the expansion of openness and criticism of shortcomings and omissions in training, in the performance of combat duty, and in servicemen's conduct.

Our press and radio constantly familiarize Soviet people with the life of today's Army and the work of the officer corps. The television program “I Serve the Soviet Union!” enjoys great popularity among the people. But you still come across erroneous and distorted notions about Army and Navy service today, and opinions which do not help to eliminate such notions. Take, for example, cases of nonregulation relations between servicemen in draft service. The problem exists and it is written and spoken about openly. In the process of restructuring and the activation of educational work in the Army and Navy, much is being done to resolve it. But I would like to mention that the authors who write on this theme often quite simply lose their sense of moderation. In one newspaper a publicist vividly described with outright inspiration and sympathy the conduct of an “older officer” who humiliated the dignity of a young soldier. Then he mocks the “foolish lieutenant” who at that very time is telling his subordinates “about innovations in the restructuring of education.” You would think the author would reflect on the sources of the amoral conduct of individual young people in mutual relations with comrades, and on what should be done to ensure that young

draftees in the Army are delivered from this "virus" in the process of training for military service. But no. The writer is not bothered about this. You see, he is just pleased that he can write openly about nonregulation relations.

It is scarcely necessary to say what tremendous mental, moral, and professional efforts are required from commanders, political workers, and Army and Navy party and Komsomol organisations to fashion and build up a thinking, convinced, and highly moral individual from each man beginning his military service. So that each succeeding generation of soldiers, sailors, and sergeants

becomes a collective, a community, a comradeship of just such individuals—defenders of the motherland. If they become such people, if they perform their duty honestly and complete their service as stronger people, who have grown up politically and morally and acquired good professional knowledge, that is the best testimonial for the officer corps and the highest award for their labors and concerns, their patience and restraint, their exactingness and sincere generosity. It is convincing proof that the USSR Armed Forces officer corps is deeply aware of its responsibility and that the people can also rely on it in the future.